scholarly journals Concurrent elections lead to coattails and electoral spill-overs: Quasi-experimental evidence from German municipalities

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukas Rudolph ◽  
Arndt Leininger

Concurrency of elections is a widely used tool to increase turnout. However, this turnout increase is likely not outcome-neutral if some voters attribute more importance to one of the elections compared to the other. We theorize coattail effects and electoral system effects that should occur in this setting. Drawing on a unique case of quasi-random variation in the timing of local executive and legislative elections in Germany, we show that concurrent elections lead to an increase in turnout. Thereby, in line with our theoretical argument, concurrency of local executive elections increases council votes for the incumbent mayor's party and for centrist parties more generally. Additionally, concurrent elections consolidate party system and political power through more single-party majorities in councils, less fragmentation and greater alignment of executive leadership and legislative majority. Our theoretical argument and empirical results thus serve to explain divergent findings in the literature on turnout effects.

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mahmoud Mahgoub

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system within the period from 1997 to 2017, in which Algeria has experienced five legislative elections regularly every five years by testing a hypothesis about adopting the proportional representation system on the basis of the closed list during the foregoing legislative elections has obviously influenced the exacerbation of the Algerian party system’s fragmentation, compared to other factors. Design/methodology/approach The essence of the theoretical framework of this study is to address the effect of the electoral system as an independent variable on the party system as a dependent variable. The starting point for that framework is to reassess the “Duverger’s law,” which appeared since the early 1950s and has influenced the foregoing relationship, and then to review the literature on a new phase that tried to provide a more accurate mechanism for determining the number of parties and their relative weight, whether in terms of electoral votes or parliamentary seats. This means that researchers began to use a measure called the effective number of parties (ENP) for Laakso and Taagepera since 1979. The study elaborates the general concepts of the electoral system and the party system. It used Laakso, Taagepera index of the “ENP” to measure the phenomenon of fragmentation party during the five legislative elections from 1997 to 2017 in Algeria. Findings The results of the study reveal that the proportional representation electoral system – beside other factors – had clear impacts on the fragmentation of the Algerian party system by all standards, whether on the level of the apparent rise in the number of the parties represented in the Algerian parliament from 10 parties in 1997 election to 36 parties in 2017 election or according to the index of Laakso and Taagepera (ENP). The average number of effective number of electoral parties in the five elections was around 7.66, and the average number of effective number of parliamentary parties in the five elections was around 4.39, which puts Algeria in an advanced degree of the fragmentation of the party system. Originality/value This study about the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the party system, which is one of the new subjects in the field of comparative politics – globally and in the Arab world. Hence, the value of this study aims to shed light on this mysterious area of science, the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system during the period from 1997 to 2017.


Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yen-Pin Su

While many studies of party system nationalization examine the effects of various institutional factors, few take into account the impact of party formation cost. This paper aims to fill the empirical gap by focusing on the interactive effect of electoral systems and party registration rules. I argue that the effect of electoral systems on party system nationalization is conditional on spatial registration rules, a requirement that requires a party to collect signatures or organize local branches in a specified geographical manner to maintain the party’s legal status. Based on data for 97 legislative elections in 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011, the empirical analysis demonstrates that a country with an electoral system that encourages a personal vote tends to have a much lower level of party system nationalization when that country does not have spatial registration requirements. The result is robust across different model specifications and estimation techniques.


Author(s):  
Nathan Allen

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.


Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld

Throughout its history, India has employed first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral rules for nearly all of its legislative elections. Though India uses a relatively common set of electoral rules, three features of India’s FPTP electoral system stand out. First, India’s election constituencies exhibit persistent malapportionment, even after a recent redrawing of constituency boundaries. Second, India mandates representation for historically disadvantaged ethnic groups—and, more recently, women at the local level—by setting aside, or “reserving,” seats in which only members of certain groups may compete for office. Third, political parties often form pre-election alliances in which multiple parties agree not to field candidates against one another. As a result of frequent pre-election alliances, India’s party system exhibits a number of characteristics rarely found in countries using FPTP rules.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Woller

Legislative elections sustain authoritarian regimes. However, properties of any electoral system may simultaneously benefit and hurt regimes’ political prospects. We propose a trade-off between electoral systems facilitating parliamentary bargaining and electoral systems maintaining legislative control. While an electoral system can achieve either, it cannot solve both. We investigate this theory by studying Russian federal deputies, half of which are elected in a first-past-the-post single-member district, the other half on a nationwide closed-party list. Candidates can register on both lists, and district results determine final list affiliation. We exploit that electoral incentives change abruptly for deputies barely winning/losing the district, to identify effects of list affiliation on pro and anti-regime parliamentary behavior. Results support a trade-off: while district deputies bargain more for local amendments in parliamentary speeches, they also more often seek to obstruct legislation. How autocrats weigh this trade-off determines the electoral system, and illuminates electoral system reform in autocracies.


Author(s):  
Mark F Stehr

Abstract A large body of evidence indicates that increased alcohol availability leads to increased consumption of alcohol. From 1995 to 2008, fourteen states relaxed or repealed their bans on the Sunday sale of packaged alcohol. This paper leverages these repeals to provide quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of Sunday sales bans on alcohol related crash fatalities. Previous published studies in this area have found conflicting results regarding the effect of Sunday sales on traffic accidents and fatalities, but these studies have focused on repeals in single states, cities, or provinces; are outdated; or have failed to control for underlying changes in traffic fatalities that may be correlated with repeals but are due to other factors affecting traffic safety. Drawing upon data from the lower 48 states from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), this paper finds that only the repeal in New Mexico led to an increase in fatalities. The effect is evident only in New Mexico because this repeal led to larger increases in drinking in New Mexico than in other states, residents of New Mexico drive more than residents of the other repeal states, and there is a greater fraction of traffic fatalities involving alcohol in New Mexico than in the other repeal states.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document