scholarly journals Electoral Systems And The Autocrat's Trade-Off: Evidence From The Russian Duma

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Woller
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
The Other ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Legislative Control

Legislative elections sustain authoritarian regimes. However, properties of any electoral system may simultaneously benefit and hurt regimes’ political prospects. We propose a trade-off between electoral systems facilitating parliamentary bargaining and electoral systems maintaining legislative control. While an electoral system can achieve either, it cannot solve both. We investigate this theory by studying Russian federal deputies, half of which are elected in a first-past-the-post single-member district, the other half on a nationwide closed-party list. Candidates can register on both lists, and district results determine final list affiliation. We exploit that electoral incentives change abruptly for deputies barely winning/losing the district, to identify effects of list affiliation on pro and anti-regime parliamentary behavior. Results support a trade-off: while district deputies bargain more for local amendments in parliamentary speeches, they also more often seek to obstruct legislation. How autocrats weigh this trade-off determines the electoral system, and illuminates electoral system reform in autocracies.

scholarly journals Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Gelman ◽  
Gary King
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Methods ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Partisan Bias ◽  
The Relationship

We demonstrate the surprising benefits of legislative redistricting (including partisan gerrymandering) for American representative democracy. In so doing, our analysis resolves two long-standing controversies in American politics. First, whereas some scholars believe that redistricting reduces electoral responsiveness by protecting incumbents, others, that the relationship is spurious, we demonstrate that both sides are wrong: redistricting increases responsiveness. Second, while some researchers believe that gerrymandering dramatically increases partisan bias and others deny this effect, we show both sides are in a sense correct. Gerrymandering biases electoral systems in favor of the party that controls the redistricting as compared to what would have happened if the other party controlled it, but any type of redistricting reduces partisan bias as compared to an electoral system without redistricting. Incorrect conclusions in both literatures resulted from misjudging the enormous uncertainties present during redistricting periods, making simplified assumptions about the redistricters' goals, and using inferior statistical methods.

scholarly journals MIXED INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARISM

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
V. А. Usova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
The Past ◽  
Electoral Authoritarianism ◽  
National Legislatures ◽  
Mixed Systems ◽  
Cross National

Over the past decade, the mixed system became the fastest growing variety of electoral systems used in elections for national legislatures. Opinions about the reasons for the popularity of mixed systems in the research literature still vary. There are no cross-national studies in political science that would link the use of a mixed independent electoral system with the consolidation of an authoritarian order. Under authoritarianism, elections perform three functions: imitation, control and signaling. These functions set the structure of incentives for choosing an electoral formula. The purpose of my study is to determine the structure of incentives for the employment of mixed independent electoral systems under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. One of the main results of the study is that, in comparison with democracies, mixed independent electoral systems are more often used in authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that mixed independent electoral system provides an opportunity to effectively realize the imitation, control and signaling functions of elections under electoral authoritarianism.

The Spanish Electoral System

2020 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regional Parties ◽  
Lower House ◽  
System P ◽  
The Future ◽  
The One

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.

Personal vote, spatial registration rules, and party system nationalization in Latin America

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yen-Pin Su
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Party System ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Interactive Effect ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Spatial Registration ◽  
Party Registration ◽  
The Impact

While many studies of party system nationalization examine the effects of various institutional factors, few take into account the impact of party formation cost. This paper aims to fill the empirical gap by focusing on the interactive effect of electoral systems and party registration rules. I argue that the effect of electoral systems on party system nationalization is conditional on spatial registration rules, a requirement that requires a party to collect signatures or organize local branches in a specified geographical manner to maintain the party’s legal status. Based on data for 97 legislative elections in 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011, the empirical analysis demonstrates that a country with an electoral system that encourages a personal vote tends to have a much lower level of party system nationalization when that country does not have spatial registration requirements. The result is robust across different model specifications and estimation techniques.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 920-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Allen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.

The Jenkins Commission and the Implications of Electoral Reform for the UK Constitution

1999 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Choice Sets ◽  
The Uk

THERE ARE TWO MAIN CONCEPTIONS OF ‘REPRESENTATION’ IN democratic theory, and they are not wholly compatible. All democratic electoral systems implicitly appeal to one or the other conception of representation. Therefore, the nature of an ideal electoral system is an essentially contested question. Furthermore, the mathematics of social choice sets severe limits on what an electoral system — any electoral system — can achieve. Though the implications of social choice are not so nihilistic as some would have us believe, they are relevant and serious.

scholarly journals Concurrent elections lead to coattails and electoral spill-overs: Quasi-experimental evidence from German municipalities

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukas Rudolph ◽  
Arndt Leininger
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Executive Leadership ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretical Argument ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Unique Case ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Concurrent Elections

Concurrency of elections is a widely used tool to increase turnout. However, this turnout increase is likely not outcome-neutral if some voters attribute more importance to one of the elections compared to the other. We theorize coattail effects and electoral system effects that should occur in this setting. Drawing on a unique case of quasi-random variation in the timing of local executive and legislative elections in Germany, we show that concurrent elections lead to an increase in turnout. Thereby, in line with our theoretical argument, concurrency of local executive elections increases council votes for the incumbent mayor's party and for centrist parties more generally. Additionally, concurrent elections consolidate party system and political power through more single-party majorities in councils, less fragmentation and greater alignment of executive leadership and legislative majority. Our theoretical argument and empirical results thus serve to explain divergent findings in the literature on turnout effects.

scholarly journals Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013

2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881988163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Sieberer ◽  
Tamaki Ohmura
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Behavioral Differences ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
German Bundestag

Research on mixed electoral systems provides inconclusive findings on the question whether members of parliament (MPs) elected in single-member districts are more likely to vote against the party line than MPs elected via closed party lists. This article rejects both the hypothesis of a general “mandate divide” and the competing claim that contamination effects completely wash out behavioral differences. Instead, we argue that electoral incentives to defect are stronger for a specific type of MP—those who run only in a district and are electorally insecure. Statistical analyses of roll call votes in the German Bundestag covering more than 60 years support this “conditional mandate divide” against alternative hypotheses. These findings suggest a more nuanced view on electoral system effects in mixed electoral systems and highlight the importance of electoral competition for incentivizing MPs to side with district demands if those conflict with the party line.

scholarly journals Electoral System Reform in Advanced Democracies

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Shugart ◽  
Justin Reeves
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Rare Event ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
System Reform ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Routine Procedures

The electoral system is the set of rules and procedures used to translate votes cast for specific candidates or political parties into seats in a legislative body; some scholars also include presidential or other executive elections under the rubric of electoral systems. Electoral system reform, often called simply electoral reform, is the adoption of some fundamental changes in these rules and procedures. Although no clear agreement exists on how much change is required in order to qualify as electoral system reform, the term is generally understood to mean more than incremental changes in specific features of an electoral system. Thus, electoral system reform typically means a shift in the main principle by which allocation of seats takes place, such as a move from majority allocation to proportional representation or from candidate-based to party-list allocation (or vice versa). By this standard, electoral system reform is a relatively rare event. Major reforms of electoral systems have taken place in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in several key countries, including France (twice), Italy (twice), Japan, and New Zealand. In addition, in the latter part of the 20th century, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have adopted for their own parliaments new electoral systems that are fundamentally different from those used for the UK House of Commons. Serious discussions of reform, in the sense of wholesale change in the principle of representation, have occurred in Canada (including some its provinces) and the United Kingdom. However, as of the early 21st century, reforms of the electoral system for the UK and Canadian House of Commons and Canadian provincial legislatures have not occurred. Some researchers increase the number of relevant cases by including more-incremental modifications to electoral systems rather than only wholesale changes. Within the family of proportional representation, incremental changes include alterations of the threshold (the minimum vote share needed to win a seat) or in the rules applying to the role of preference votes for individual candidates in the ordering of party lists. Such changes are much more common than wholesale changes between proportional and majority principles of representation. Most researchers do not consider changes in district boundaries (or the criteria to be used in such boundary drawing) in plurality/majority systems to be reform, since they are more-routine procedures periodically required by the laws of most countries using such systems.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 698-720
Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Historically Disadvantaged

Throughout its history, India has employed first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral rules for nearly all of its legislative elections. Though India uses a relatively common set of electoral rules, three features of India’s FPTP electoral system stand out. First, India’s election constituencies exhibit persistent malapportionment, even after a recent redrawing of constituency boundaries. Second, India mandates representation for historically disadvantaged ethnic groups—and, more recently, women at the local level—by setting aside, or “reserving,” seats in which only members of certain groups may compete for office. Third, political parties often form pre-election alliances in which multiple parties agree not to field candidates against one another. As a result of frequent pre-election alliances, India’s party system exhibits a number of characteristics rarely found in countries using FPTP rules.

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