scholarly journals Trust and Fertility Dynamics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnstein Aassve ◽  
Francesco C Billari ◽  
Léa Pessin

We argue that the divergence in fertility trends in advanced societies is influenced by the interaction of long-standing differences in generalized trust with the increase in women's educational attainment. Our argument builds on the idea that trust enhances individuals’ and couples’ willingness to outsource childcare to outside their extended family. This becomes critically important as women's increased education leads to greater demand for combining work and family life. We test our hypothesis using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study on 36 industrialized countries between the years 1981 and 2009. Multilevel statistical analyses reveal that the interaction between national-level generalized trust and cohort-level women's education is positively associated with completed fertility. As education among women expands, high levels of generalized trust moderate fertility decline.

Author(s):  
Sjoerd Beugelsdijk ◽  
Mariko J. Klasing

Diversity research has shown that ethno-linguistic, religious, and genetic diversity are related to a variety of socio-economic outcomes. We complement this literature by focusing on a dimension of diversity so far ignored in diversity research for lack of data: Diversity in key human values. Using data from all available waves of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study we develop a multi-item indicator of value diversity. This measure reflects the extent to which key human values are shared among the inhabitants of a country. Our newly developed measure is available for up to 111 countries and three decades (1981-2014). We conclude by comparing our newly developed measure of value diversity with existing measures of social diversity and relating it to various indicator of socio-economic performance.


Author(s):  
Ho Fai Chan ◽  
Mohammad Wangsit Supriyadi ◽  
Benno Torgler

This empirical chapter examines the relation between trust and tax morale at both country and individual levels using a combined World Values Survey and European Values Study dataset covering 400,000 observations across 108 countries. The results overall indicate that although vertical trust matters, horizontal trust in the form of generalized trust is not linked to tax morale. We do, however, identify intercountry differences that warrant further exploration. We also demonstrate that generalized trust uncertainty, in contrast to vertical trust uncertainty, is negatively correlated with tax morale. Lastly, we provide some evidence that generalized trust varies under different vertical and governance conditions, but we are unable to identify any indirect path from generalized trust to tax morale using governance quality as a mediator.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rena C Zito

This study draws on insights from institutional anomie theory to examine justification of morally dubious behavior and violence cross-nationally. Further, it builds on a burgeoning body of multilevel institutional anomie theory and research on crime-relevant attitudes by considering whether and how individual financial hardship intersects with anomic structural and cultural systems at the national level, acknowledging that individual responses to anomie may be contingent upon experiences with such hardships. Results from multilevel modeling using data from 74,930 World Values Survey respondents in 52 nations, the World Bank, and other organizations provide partial support for the hypotheses. Specifically, conditions of “want amid plenty,” (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008a, p. 183) weakened family and education institutions, and monetary fetishism predict justifications cross-nationally. Moreover, economic inequality and individualism moderate the effect of financial hardship on justifications of morally dubious actions and violence, consistent with expectations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1150-1168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daiga Kamerāde ◽  
Jo Crotty ◽  
Sergej Ljubownikow

To contribute to the debate as to whether volunteering is an outcome of democratization rather than a driver of it, we analyze how divergent democratization pathways in six countries of the former Soviet Union have led to varied levels of volunteering. Using data from the European Values Study, we find that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—which followed a Europeanization path—have high and increasing levels of civil liberties and volunteering. In Russia and Belarus, following a pre-emption path, civil liberties have remained low and volunteering has declined. Surprisingly, despite the Orange Revolution and increased civil liberties, volunteering rates in Ukraine have also declined. The case of Ukraine indicates that the freedom to participate is not always taken up by citizens. Our findings suggest it is not volunteering that brings civil liberties, but rather that increased civil liberties lead to higher levels of volunteering.


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (9) ◽  
pp. 740-762
Author(s):  
Plamen Akaliyski ◽  
Christian Welzel

Soon after the collapse of Soviet-type communism in Central and Eastern Europe, a new geopolitical division began to reshape the continent. Our study demonstrates that this newly emerging geopolitical divide has been underpinned by a corresponding cultural divergence, of which “emancipative values” are the most powerful marker. Using the European Values Study/World Values Survey 1990 to 2014, we find that the former Iron Curtain no longer constitutes a cultural boundary because the ex-communist states that joined the European Union have been converging with the West’s strong emphasis on emancipative values. Instead, a new and steeply growing cultural gap has emerged between the European Union and its Eastern neighbors. The two competing geopolitical formations in the West and East—the European and Eurasian Unions, respectively—have diverged culturally in recent decades. The divergence goes back to contrasting supranational identities that originate in different religious traditions, which rulers have increasingly accentuated to strengthen their nations’ endorsement or dismissal of emancipative values. Through this sorting-out process, emancipative values became an increasingly significant marker of a Western-vs-Eastern cultural identity. Our study is the first to link this groundbreaking cultural transformation to civilizational identities and geopolitical rivalry.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingrid Storm

AbstractThe exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study 1981–2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myunghee Kim

AbstractUsing data from the 1999–2001 World Values and European Values Surveys, this article examines the impact of spiritual values and religious practices on democratic attitudes in twenty countries throughout Western Europe, North America, South America, Asia, and Africa. I assume that a reciprocal interaction between national conditions and individual orientations shapes support for democracy. Religious commitment as theological orthodoxy and attendance at religious services does not strengthen democratic views. Instead, explicitly political and cultural variables explain approval for democratic principles, particularly among industrialized countries. Individuals who express a low fear of threatening groups also back democratic institutions, regardless of a nation's industrialization. Among religious affiliations, Protestants in developing countries advocate democratic values. So do Muslims in industrialized countries. Nonmembers of religious institutions, however, are less likely to uphold democratic attitudes.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alisa Remizova ◽  
Maksim Rudnev

Several large international surveys, including the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, have been using the moral attitudes scale (MAS) to measure individual and country differences for decades. However, the validity of the instrument has been barely assessed. The current study addressed the concurrent and content validity of four popular MAS items (justifiability of homosexuality, suicide, prostitution, and euthanasia). A sample of 493 Russians completed both MAS and the four validated multi-item scales. Results demonstrated that, except for the homosexuality item, the MAS items had low concurrent validity, explaining less than 50% of the variance of the corresponding multi-item scales. The MAS items underestimated the justifiability of homosexuality, prostitution, and suicide, and overestimated the justifiability of euthanasia. The MAS homosexuality item appeared to be a precise measure of attitude towards male (but not female) homosexuality, responses to the prostitution and suicide items overlooked the positive arguments and the euthanasia item tapped more into attitudes towards active euthanasia of a dying person. The four items showed strong dependence on the overall justifiability. We conclude that separate MAS items should be used with caution, given the detected content bias and the items’ strong link to non-specific overall justifiability.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Lettinga ◽  
P.O. Jacquet ◽  
J-B. André ◽  
N. Baumard ◽  
C. Chevallier

AbstractAlthough humans cooperate universally, there is variability across individuals, times and cultures in the amount of resources people invest in cooperative activities. The origins of such variability are not known but recent work highlights that variations in environmental harshness may play a key role. A growing body of experimental work in evolutionary psychology suggests that humans adapt to their specific environment by calibrating their life-history strategy. In this paper, we apply structural equation models to test the association between current and childhood environmental harshness, life-history strategy and adult cooperation in two large-scale datasets (the World Values Survey and the European Values Study). The present study replicates existing research linking a harsher environment (both in adulthood and in childhood) with a modulated reproduction-maintenance trade-off and extends these findings to the domain of collective actions. Specifically, we find that a harsher environment (both in adulthood and in childhood) is associated with decreased involvement in collective action and that this association is mediated by individuals’ life-history strategy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 32-52
Author(s):  
Lidia Okolskaya

The aim of the paper is to analyze parental values in Russia and 33 other countries, and explore how they’ve changed between 1990 and 2017–2020. Russian dynamics are shown on 7 waves, international — on 2 waves. We used a combination of data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study. We found that in 1990 the Russian value agenda in regards to children was essentially directed towards survival. By 2017–2020 certain changes had occurred: Russians no longer considered survival values to be as important (such as hard work, thrift, obedience); self-expression values (e.g., independence and imagination) became more popular; humanistic values lost much of their importance for Russians. In 33 countries humanistic values remained as popular as in 1990, while survival values seem to be less important. Russian parental values change in the same direction as do Russian personal values.


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