scholarly journals Miejsce zwykłego pobytu dziecka — uwagi na tle wyroków Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej z dnia 28 czerwca 2018 r. (C-512/17) oraz z dnia 17 października 2018 r. (C-393/18 PPU)

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 319-338
Author(s):  
Olga Bobrzyńska

In cases C-512/17 and C-393/18 PPU, the national courts raised doubts as to the significance of the circumstances that should be taken into account in determining the habitual residence of a child. In particular the issue was whether the child’s physical presence is a prerequisite in order to recognize that a child has his habitual residencein the country concerned. In its judgment of 17 October 2018, the Court of Justice found that a child must be physically present in a Member State in order to be regarded as habitually resident in that Member State. The parent’s intention cannot be assigned a decisive role. The arguments in this respect are consistent with the interpretation of the concept of habitual residence laid out in the earlier judgment of 28 June 2018, in which the Court of Justice connected the habitual residence of the child with the place where the centre of that child’s life is actually situated, and not with the place where the child would have lived in accordance with the plans of one of the parents. The Court’s interpretation can be attributed to the so-called combined model of determining a habitual residence by looking for child’s centre of interest, taking into account a number of circumstances, including the intention of parents with parental responsibility. Physical presence has rightly been recognized as a necessary condition for establishing jurisdiction under Regulation No 2201/2003 based on habitual residence.

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-474
Author(s):  
Katarina Trimmings

ARTICLE 8 of the Brussels IIa Regulation sets out the general rule regarding jurisdiction in intra-EU parental responsibility cases, namely that jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Member State of the habitual residence of the child. However, exceptionally, the court that has been seised of a case pursuant to Article 8 may not be the best placed to hear the case. To cater for such situations, the Regulation contains an innovative rule according to which a court that is seised of a case, and has jurisdiction on the substance, can transfer the case to a court of another Member State, if the latter is “better placed” to hear the case, and if the transfer is in the best interests of the child. Additionally, the transfer is subject to the condition that there is a “particular connection” between the child and the other Member State (e.g. the child is a national of that Member State). The “transfer of jurisdiction” rule, which is embodied in Article 15 of the Regulation, is at the heart of the Supreme Court decision in Re N (Children) (Adoption: Jurisdiction) (AIRE Centre and others intervening) [2016] UKSC 15; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 1103.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-14
Author(s):  
Jasmina Alihodžić ◽  

The rules of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility contained in the Brussels II bis Regulation are based on the concept of habitual residence, while the legislation in B&H in this area gave priority to the principle of nationality. Analyzing these concepts, the author of the paper points to the importance of interpreting the concept of habitual residence by the European Court of Justice, and gives possible directions for reform of the relevant provisions of the PIL Act in terms of their compliance with EU law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 751
Author(s):  
Diana Gluhaia

Resumen: En este Auto se cuestiona la competencia judicial internacional de los órganos juris­diccionales españoles en materia de responsabilidad parental de una menor que cambió la residencia habitual a otro Estado miembro: Alemania. El artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) nº 2201/2003 es una excepción al criterio general de determinación de la competencia judicial internacional y sólo se activa cuando se cumplen todos los requisitos exigidos por esta norma. La Sala entendió que no se cumplían todas las condiciones, ya que no existía un pronunciamiento judicial previo respecto al derecho de visita que requiriese una modificación debido al traslado de la menor a otro Estado miembro, y que carece de sentido en este caso alterar una decisión judicial no existente.Palabras clave: responsabilidad parental, competencia judicial internacional, residencia habitual del menor. Competencia para modificar una resolución judicial sobre derecho de visita.Abstract: His Order questions the international judicial competence of the Spanish courts in mat­ters of parental responsibility of a minor who changed habitual residence to another Member State: Germany. Article 9 of Regulation (EC) nº 2201/2003 is an exception to the general criterion of deter­mination of international jurisdiction and is only activated when all the requirements demanded by this rule are met. The Chamber understood that all the conditions were not met, since there was no previous judicial ruling regarding the visiting right that required an amendment due to the transfer of the minor to another Member State, and that it makes no sense in this case to alter a decision non-existent judicial.Keywords: parental responsibility, international jurisdiction, habitual residence of the minor, competence to modify a court ruling on visiting rights.


Author(s):  
Morten Broberg ◽  
Niels Fenger

A reference for a preliminary ruling is a request from the national court of a Member State to the Court of Justice of the European Union to give an authoritative interpretation of an EU act or a decision on the validity of such an act. In this situation, the Court of Justice does not function as a court of appeal that rules on the outcome of the main proceedings before the referring court: it makes judgment neither on the facts in the main proceedings nor on the interpretation and application of national law. Moreover, in principle it does not itself pronounce on the concrete application of EU law in the main proceedings before the referring court. Finally, while a preliminary ruling is normally given in the form of a judgment, the ruling is addressed to the referring court and not to the parties to the main proceedings. Only the referring court’s subsequent decision can be enforced against those parties. The preliminary reference procedure is therefore an expression of the interplay and allocation of tasks between national courts and the Court of Justice.


Author(s):  
Morten Broberg

This chapter examines to what extent and how the preliminary reference procedure provided in Article 267 TFEU can be used as a means for private parties to enforce EU law against the Member States. The procedure enables national courts to apply to the Court of Justice to obtain a ruling on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal act. It has in fact become a highly important means for private parties’ enforcement of EU law. Today, the preliminary reference procedure has attained such importance as an enforcement measure that the prospect of a reference to the Court of Justice can of itself induce a Member State party to proceedings before a national court to settle the dispute. Indeed, the preliminary reference procedure is sometimes referred to as ‘indirect enforcement’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Raúl Lafuente Sánchez

Resumen: El Reglamento sobre bloqueo geográfico injustificado tiene como finalidad eliminar la discriminación directa e indirecta basada en la nacionalidad, el lugar de residencia o el lugar de esta­blecimiento de los clientes. Para alcanzar este objetivo, prohíbe a los comerciantes el uso de medidas tecnológicas o de otro tipo con el fin de bloquear o limitar el acceso de los clientes a sus interfaces en línea. Por otra parte, dispone que del cumplimiento del Reglamento no se derivará que el comerciante dirige sus actividades al domicilio o residencia habitual del consumidor en el sentido de lo dispuesto en los Reglamentos Bruselas I bis y Roma I. De esta declaración puede derivarse una posible interferencia con los criterios ya definidos en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia a la hora de delimitar cuando un comerciante ha dirigido sus actividades al Estado miembro del domicilio o residencia habitual del consumidor. En el presente trabajo estudio y analizo esta cuestión, así como sus posibles consecuencias en los contratos de consumo celebrados por vía electrónica.Palabras clave: mercado único digital, bloqueo geográfico injustificado, reglamento (UE) 2018/302, derecho internacional privado, contratos de consumo electrónicos, concepto de “actividades dirigidas”. Abstract: The unjustified geo-blocking Regulation aims to eliminate direct and indirect discrimi­nation based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment. In order to achie­ve this goal, prohibits to traders the use of technological measures or otherwise, to block or limit a customer’s access to their online interfaces for reasons related to the customer’s nationality, place of residence or place of establishment. Moreover, the Regulation provides that compliance with its rules shall not be construed as implying that a trader directs activities to the Member State of the consumer’s habitual residence or domicile within the meaning of Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation. This statement raises a possible interference with the criteria identified in the European Court of Justice case law, in order to delimit when a trader has directed his activities to the Member State of the consumer’s habitual residence or domicile. In this paper I analyze the aforementioned issue and its consequences for the electronic consumer contracts.Keywords: EU digital single market, unjustified geo-blocking, regulation (EU) 2018/302, conflict of laws, electronic consumer contracts, concept of “directing activities”.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 86-109
Author(s):  
Kehinde Ibrahim

The judgments of the ECOWAS Court, which are final and immediately binding, are vital for the realisation of ECOWAS aims and objectives. The enforcement of its judgments is particularly important in the case of individuals whose enjoyment of fundamental human rights, as guaranteed under the ECOWAS Community laws, is dependent on effective enforcement. Yet, an existential puzzling paradox emanates through a poor record in the implementation of the ECOWAS Court's judgments. This problem, which is not limited to the West African region deserves scrutiny and concrete proposals. Legal and political considerations surface in assessing the existence of this paradox, and despite the lack of a consistent political will, to implement the decisions of ECOWAS Court relevant judicial actors have roles to play. National courts could take a bolder approach in complementing the work of the ECOWAS Court. The ECOWAS Court itself could put in place concrete mechanisms and adopt certain practices to address this poor record of non-implementation. It is yet to be seen how substantive mechanisms would work in practice.


Author(s):  
Elena Sorokina

The preliminary ruling procedure is an essential feature of the EU legal system, which is a unique cooperation tool as part of the dialogue between the Court of Justice of the EU and national courts of the Member States. Its main purpose is to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of EU law with all Member States and to preserve the uniformity of the European legal system. The continuous use by national courts of the Member States of the mechanism of preliminary ruling and constructive inter-judicial cooperation, the Court of Justice has developed an extremely extensive case law on the prohibition of discrimination and with the result to introduce substantial changes in European anti-discrimination law.The preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice have shown its inclination to expand notions of what constitutes discrimination and in most cases the Court prompt by the desire to interpret the provisions of European law so as to ensure the full effectiveness of the law, as well as a willingness to promote and strengthen protection against discrimination in Europe. While the protection against discrimination on some grounds is stronger than others, however, the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice are important contribution to the transformation of anti-discrimination law, promote change in the national legislation of the Member States and provide the more effective protection of human rights in general.


Author(s):  
Nico van Eijk

The point of departure for this chapter is the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case, which annulled the European Data Retention Directive, in part because the use of retained data was not made subject to independent oversight. Next, it examines judgments from the national courts of the Netherlands and the UK, also focusing on the independent oversight issue, declaring invalid the data retention laws of those two countries. From the Digital Rights Ireland case and others, seven standards for oversight of intelligence services can be drawn: the oversight should be complete; it should encompass all stages of the intelligence cycle; it should be independent; it should take place prior to the imposition of a measure; it should be able to declare a measure unlawful and to provide redress; it should incorporate the adversary principle; and it should have sufficient resources.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


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