SOLVING THE “PROBLEM” OF WILLS FORMALITIES IN THE MODERN POST-PANDEMIC SOCIETY: CAN THE ENDLESS DISCUSSION BE CONCLUDED?

2021 ◽  
pp. 526-552
Author(s):  
Mariusz Załucki

The last will as an instrument of succession law is one of the means of disposing property upon death. Around the world particular legal regulations of American, Australian, European or other countries generally provide for different specific formal requirements for the valid preparation of will. The inappropriateness of this kind of solutions was shown, among others, during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the need for making last wills has increased significantly and has rarely been executed in a manner consistent with the formalities. Reflecting the intent of a testator, often expressed informally, seems to be a more important value of the law of succession than respecting the formalities. This has already been noticed in some countries, especially in common law jurisdictions in Australia and America, where solutions based on substantial compliance doctrine or its variations, contrary to the pan-European strict compliance standard, were adopted. These solutions, however, do not take into consideration plenty of circumstances that may occur in the testation practice and are indifferent to new possible ways of making wills. Meanwhile, the range of mechanisms and proposals for statutory changes in the area of wills formalities is constantly growing. However, there are no proposals to cover all possible legislations in this area, as regards Anglo-American, European or other countries. Yet such a solution seems possible and desirable in order to reconcile the doctrines of substantial compliance and strict compliance. This proposal is the subject of this study.

1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Van Gerven

It has been believed for many years, indeed centuries, that the Channel between Great Britain and Continental Europe could be crossed only by boat. This belief has come to an end, albeit—at least for the time being—at a price which does not allow huge financial investments to be turned into a profit. The belief that in the legal field differences between English or Anglo-American common law and French and German—or, rather, Romanistic and Germanistic—legal systems are unbridgeable (or should I say “un-chunnelable”?) is even more widespread. That is the subject of this article: to show that differences between legal systems may, as a result of the European Union, be less unbridgeable than before, at least in certain areas of the law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-930
Author(s):  
Han-Ru Zhou

Abstract Principles form part and parcel of our law and legal discourse, so much so that we seldom think of what they are and what they entail. For centuries they have been invoked daily to interpret and argue about the law. But when it comes to matters of constitutional law, principles are further called upon to perform a perennially controversial function: to help police the boundaries of state action. In most common law jurisdictions with a written constitution, this function of principles runs against the generally accepted view that the exercise of judicial review must ultimately be governed and restricted by the terms of the national constitution. This Article argues that the exercise of judicial review based on principles is not confined to that view, once the relationship between principles and the constitution is unpacked and recontextualized. While the English-language literature on principles over the past half-century has been dominated by a select group of Anglo-American scholars, there is a wealth of untapped insights from other parts of the world. One of the major contributions by continental legal theorists even predates the earliest modern Anglo-American writings on the subject by more than a decade. Overall, the law literature in common law and civil law systems reveals a significant degree of commonalities in the basic characters of principles despite the absence of initial evidence of transsystemic borrowings. The wider conceptual inquiry also displays a shift in the focus of the debate, from the protracted search for a clear-cut distinction between rules and principles towards a redefinition of principles’ relationship with “written” law, be it in the form of a civil code or a constitutional instrument. From this inquiry reemerge “unwritten” principles not deriving from codified or legislated law although they have been used to develop the law. Translated into the constitutional domain, these unwritten principles bear no logical connection with the terms of the constitution. Their main functions cover the entire spectrum from serving as interpretive aids to making law by filling gaps. The theoretical framework fits with an ongoing four-century-old narrative of the evolution of constitutional principles and judicial review across most common law-based systems. Constitutional principles are another area where Anglo-American law and legal discourse is less exceptional and more universal than what many assume. Throughout modern Western history, legal battles have been fought and ensuing developments have been made on the grounds of principles. Our law and jurisprudence remain based on them.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Paweł Majka

<p>The subject of the study is to outline the boundaries within the legislator may sanction the obligations to provide information to tax authorities using tax sanctions. The author analyzes tax sanctions as instruments guaranteeing the effectiveness of legal norms related to information obligations in the light of the protection of the taxpayer’s rights. In the author’s opinion, there is a clear outline of the possible shape of the sanction, which limits the legislator in excessive interference with the rights of taxpayers. These limits, both in national and international law, are determined primarily by the principle of proportionality, which is decisive for the degree of discomfort associated with the application of sanctions. It should be indicated that the shape limits of these sanctions, characterized in this study, guarantee, in turn, the protection of the rights of these entities. At the same time, it should be emphasized that tax sanctions are, in principle, a complementary element of the system of the guarantees of the law effectiveness and the legislator deciding on their wider use should properly balance the degree of “saturation” of tax law with sanctions taking into account its nature.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (Vol 19, No 2 (2020)) ◽  
pp. 265-282
Author(s):  
Stanisław SZMITKA

Over the years, the franchise has become an attractive model for the sale of products and services, as well as a means of developing the franchisor’s business. Franchising systems around the world have become very popular among franchisees, who receive an already proven cost-effective business model in exchange for payments, purchases and other services from the franchisor. These systems also bring intangible benefits in the form of encouraging the promotion of entrepreneurship in society. Polish franchise legislation has systematic nature and is based on the Civil Code, the Law on Industrial Property, the Law on Combating Unfair Competition, the Law on Protection of Competition and Consumer Rights, the Law on Copyright and Related Rights, European Code of Ethics for Franchising. Taking into account the legal regulations, the mechanism of the Polish model of franchising is revealed and the newest forms of its use in business activity are distinguished.


2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 192-192
Author(s):  
Ian Winspur

I enjoyed Alice Brandfonbrener’s editorial “But I Didn’t Ask to Be a Lawyer” in the June 2002 issue of MPPA [MPPA 2002;17(2):57]. I understand and sympathize with her. Many physicians who, like her, are involved in these cases for altruistic reasons rather than pure commercial—-and I believe that this is more common in the world of performing arts medicine—-must find themselves in the same predicament. However, in the words of an eminent English lawyer, who qualified and practiced as a gynecologist before turning to the law, when considering medical and scientific evidence (or in many cases, including performers, non-scientific evidence!): “However scientific the subject matter of the claim and however recondite the evidence and the argument, the legal definitions must apply in a Court of Law; the problem for the lawyer is in making the scientist understand a totally different concept of proof required by the court.” Therefore physicians involved, whether altruistic or not, must understand the basis of these claims.


Author(s):  
Mike McConville ◽  
Luke Marsh

The point at which the liberty of the subject can be subject to interference by force of the law is a critical issue and one reliant on the integrity of judicial oversight. Focusing on the start of the twentieth century, this chapter addresses the discontinuities in the then existing rules relating to the interrogation of suspected persons (embodied by the Judges’ Rules of 1912, whose obscure origins are discussed) and the divergent responses of different police forces to the cautioning and questioning process. From this it explores how the need for closer formal regulation arose and the role of Home Office officials (the very same as those involved in the Adolph Beck case) in drafting the first revision of the Judges’ Rules in 1918 which were to remain in force for almost fifty years. These inapt and inexpertly drafted Rules thereafter laid the foundations for policing regulation in jurisdictions around the world.


Author(s):  
John Gardner

This chapter explores the idea that labour law rests on ‘a contractual foundation’, and the idea that work relations today are ever more ‘contractualised’. Section 1 lays out some essentials of British labour law and its connections with the common law of contract. Section 2 explains what contractualisation is, not yet focusing attention on the specific context of labour law. The main claims are that contract is not a specifically legal device, and that contractualisation is therefore not a specifically legal process, even when the law is complicit in it. Section 3 shifts attention to the world of work, especially the employment relationship. Here the main ideas are that the employment relationship is not (apart from the law) a contractual relationship, and that all the norms of the employment relationship cannot therefore be captured adequately in a contract, legally binding or otherwise. Section 4 illustrates the latter point by focusing on the rationale and the limits of the employer’s authority over the employee. A contractual rationale yields the wrong limits. It gives its blessing to authoritarian work regimes and lends credence to the miserable view that work is there to pay for the life of the worker without forming part of that life. Throughout the chapter there are intimations of the conclusion drawn in section 5: that contractualisation, in the labour market at least, is a process that lovers of freedom, as well as lovers of self-realisation, should resist—or rather, should have resisted while they still had the chance.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
JE Penner

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter traces the historical roots of the trust. The law of trusts is the offspring of a certain English legal creature known as ‘equity’. Equity arose out of the administrative power of the medieval Chancellor, who was at the time the King’s most powerful minister. The nature of equity’s jurisdiction and its ability to provide remedies unavailable at common law, the relationship between equity and the common law and the ‘fusion’ of law and equity, and equity’s creation of the use, and then the trust, are discussed.


1931 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh W. Brown

SynopsisUnder Common Law an employer has always been liable to his workmen for his own personal negligence, but it was not until 1897 that there was enacted the first of a series of Workmen's Compensation Acts which introduced a remarkable change in the law, inasmuch as the workman was given a statutory right to compensation for accident without requiring him to prove any negligence whatever.The evolution of the law relating to Workmen's Compensation is traced through the successive Acts of Parliament, and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925, which codifies the law on the subject, are summarised so far as they relate to the liability covered by an Insurance Policy. Under the Act the employer is liable for personal injury to his workmen by accident “arising out of and in the course of” the employment or by certain scheduled industrial diseases.An Insurance Policy covers the liability at Common Law and under the Employers' Liability Act 1880 as well as under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, and in addition makes the Insurance Company responsible for the cost of defending claims. The injured workman may have to consider whether he is likely to recover a larger sum by way of damages than he would receive in compensation by arbitration proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, and he can then elect which course to take.A description is given of the Returns of Compensations made by Insurance Companies to the Home Office on behalf of the employers in certain selected industries as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925.The requirements of the Assurance Companies Act 1909 relating to Employers' Liability Insurance business are stated. In the Annual Returns to the Board of Trade under this Act, an Actuarial Valuation of the Outstanding Claims that have been in existence for five years or more is called for on an annuity basis, but no regulations are laid down for estimating the Liability in respect of Outstanding Claims of shorter duration. The present method is to take each of such claims and after considering the facts—nature of injury, rate of compensation, etc.—to make the best possible estimate of the ultimate cost to the Insurance Company. Later developments of the injury, however, may cause such estimate to be wide of the amount which the Company is called upon to pay. A plea is advanced for an investigation into the liability in respect of Outstanding Claims, in the hope that it may be found possible to arrive at average factors which could be used, with a suitable grouping of the Claims, to determine the Liability under the non-fatal Outstanding Claims from the first occasion of their becoming outstanding. When there is no recognised method based on past experience of making such an estimate, judgment may be influenced by factors not solely relevant to the ascertainment of the liability.All the leading Offices transacting Employers' Liability Insurance business are members of the Accident Offices Association. This Association was formed after the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, by which the scope of workmen's compensation was widely extended. The Association controls the rates and policy conditions of the Tariff Offices, but as the regulations are in great measure confidential, detailed information can only be given regarding what is already common knowledge.A further step was taken in Government supervision of Insurance Companies by the Agreement made in 1923 between the Home Office and the Accident Offices Association, the effect of which is to limit to 37½% the expenses and profits in respect of the combined figures of the members of the Association.The trend of probable future legislation as recommended by the Departmental Committee in the Insurance Undertakings Bill is described, and the questions of Compulsory Insurance and State Insurance are touched upon.An account is given of an Undertaking made recently by the Accident Offices Association to furnish the Government with workmen's compensation statistics in connection with a Home Office Scheme of enquiry into the Incidence and Causation of Accidents.The subject is so extensive that it has only been possible to deal with it in broad outline, but in conclusion reference is made to various aspects that could with advantage be expanded.


1961 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glanville Williams

Hart and Honoré's book is a thorough and scholarly study of the concept of causation in Anglo-American law. Closely reasoned, with full reference to the literature and a considerable treatment of Continental theories, it represents a serious attempt to restate the law in tort, contract and crime in an intelligible way. In future, any serious student of the subject will have to take note of it. Unfortunately for the authors they have backed a loser in supporting Re Polemis and criticising the foreseeability test; and since much of their argument depends upon their opinion on this question, their book must now be accounted largely out of date, if the decision of the Judicial Committee in The Wagon Mound receives the acceptance that seems probable. In respect of the general theory of causation, however, the discussion retains its intellectual interest; and the chapters on contract and crime, though relatively short, are largely unaffected by The Wagon Mound.


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