THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSON IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Nur Halane

There has been a civil war in Somalia ever since the central government collapsed in 1991 which means there has been more then twenty years of domestic violence. To stop the fight, the United Nations Missions and other forces authorised by the UN Security Council have been deployed to Somalia such as the United Nations Operations (UNOSOM) and United Task Force (UNITAF), but none of those missions and forces have bore fruit and the civil war in the country has not come to an end. Furthermore, United Nations thought it has failed militarily whatever caused in Somalia but politically it has been present because immediately after its withdrawal from the country United Nation Office in Somalia (UNPOS) was established in 1995 in neighboring country in Kenya. However, in 2006 the situation deteriorated further when there was a bloody conflict between Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) heavily supported by Ethiopia which later resulted in military defeat of the former and two years presence of Ethiopian contingent in Somalia. Consequently, the situation came under the spotlight of African Union which later established African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which is currently operating in Somalia with the approval of the UN Security Council under its Resolution 1744. The idea of creating AMISOM is to assist (TFG) as well as to promote peace and stability in Somalia. 

Author(s):  
Charles Riziki Majinge

SummaryThis article examines the role of regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) in the maintenance of international peace and security. The African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), the organ within the AU charged with addressing threats to international peace and security on the African continent, is used as a case study. The author contends that the major challenges facing regional arrangements in exercising mandates under Article 53 of the UN Charter of the United Nations have more to do with inadequate financial and logistical resources than the nature of those mandates. Taking the AU’s role in Somalia, Sudan, and other African countries as examples, the article demonstrates that the AU PSC has failed to achieve its objective of maintaining peace and security precisely because the United Nations (UN) Security Council — a more powerful and better resourced organ — has failed to live up to its responsibility of extending the assistance necessary to enable the AU PSC to perform its functions. Consequently, the author concludes that the UN Security Council, when delegating powers to regional arrangements to maintain international peace and security, should provide adequate resources to such regional arrangements, especially those that will otherwise have minimal or no capacity to fulfil their mandate effectively.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 590-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Falk

President George W. Bush historically challenged the United Nations Security Council when he uttered some memorable words in the course of his September 12, 2002, speech to the General Assembly: “Will the UN serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?” In the aftermath of the Iraq war there are at least two answers to this question. The answer of the U.S. government would be to suggest that the United Nations turned out to be irrelevant due to its failure to endorse recourse to war against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. The answer of those who opposed the war is that the UN Security Council served the purpose of its founding by its refusal to endorse recourse to a war that could not be persuasively reconciled with the UN Charter and international law. This difference of assessment is not just factual, whether Iraq was a threat and whether the inspection process was succeeding at a reasonable pace; it was also conceptual, even jurisprudential. The resolution of this latter debate is likely to shape the future role of the United Nations, as well as influence the attitude of the most powerful sovereign state as to the relationship between international law generally and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.


Subject Peacekeeping in Darfur Significance The UN Security Council in July authorised a major drawdown and reconfiguration of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The downsizing was expected. Nevertheless, the mission’s exit does not mark an end to Darfur’s 15-year-old conflict; rather, it increases the potential for a serious deterioration. Impacts The government will persist with efforts to dismantle camps that still play host to 1.8 million displaced people, despite fierce resistance. The weapons collection campaign will deepen tensions between government militias and non-Arab communities, potentially sparking fighting. The army will focus on combatting Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdel Wahid rebels and loyalists of recently arrested militia chief Musa Hilal.


Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karim Makdisi

After Israel's first invasion of Lebanon in 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 (UNSCR 425) establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The early struggle over the contested meanings and interpretations of UNSCR 425, and the differences of position regarding UNIFIL itself were never fully resolved due to the shifting nature of US policies and objectives in the region and the context of the force's deployment within two distinct, albeit related conflicts: the Lebanese civil war and Arab-Israeli conflict. UNIFIL found itself trapped between the competing demands of sovereignty and resistance, not knowing which war it was there to prevent and which peace it was meant to build. This confusion resurfaced with the passage of UNSCR 1701 following the 2006 war, when UNIFIL's mandate and scope was expanded, but the force continued to be a site of contested narratives and potential future conflicts.


The United Nations Secretary-General and the United Nations Security Council spend significant amounts of time on their relationship with each other. They rely on each other for such important activities as peacekeeping, international mediation, and the formulation and application of normative standards in defense of international peace and security—in other words, the executive aspects of the UN’s work. The edited book The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council: A Dynamic Relationship aims to fill an important lacuna in the scholarship on the UN system. Although there exists an impressive body of literature on the development and significance of the Secretariat and the Security Council as separate organs, an important gap remains in our understanding of the interactions between them. Bringing together some of the most prominent authorities on the subject, this volume is the first book-length treatment of this topic. It studies the UN from an innovative angle, creating new insights on the (autonomous) policy-making of international organizations and adding to our understanding of the dynamics of intra-organizational relationships. Within the book, the contributors examine how each Secretary-General interacted with the Security Council, touching upon such issues as the role of personality, the formal and informal infrastructure of the relationship, the selection and appointment processes, as well as the Secretary-General’s threefold role as a crisis manager, administrative manager, and manager of ideas.


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