USMCA: the reloading of the North American free trade zone

2018 ◽  
pp. 6-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petr Yakovlev
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Zone ◽  
The North

scholarly journals MOTIVASI MEKSIKO MELAKUKAN PENETAPAN TARIF TERHADAP DISTRIBUSI PRODUK AS KE MEKSIKO DALAM HUBUNGAN PERDAGANGAN ANTARA DUA NEGARA

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fachrie
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Zone ◽  
The North ◽  
The Us

This research discusses the analysis of Mexican motivation in determining tariffs on the distribution of US products to Mexico. In international law, Mexico and the US build a strong free trade cooperation in the North American Free Trade Zone (NAFTA) agreement. They agreed to implement the agreement that is built in that agreement, particularly for the exemption of tariff inthe distribution of products between two countries. In fact, the US could not complete the tariff exemption agreement in the distribution of Mexican products that has been agreed in NAFTA. It delays the implementation of this agreement by complicating the distribution of goods from Mexico to the US with unilateral regulations. Eventually, this research found that Mexico motivation is to respond US regulations on its products for several years. That US action, particularly the logisticsdistribution cooperation, has caused Mexico experiencing difficulties in gaining profits.

scholarly journals Motivasi Meksiko Melakukan Penetapan Tarif Terhadap Distribusi Produk As Ke Meksiko Dalam Hubungan Perdagangan Antara Dua Negara

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fachrie
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Zone ◽  
Logistics Distribution ◽  
The North ◽  
The Us

This research discusses the analysis of Mexican motivation in determining tariffs on the distribution of US products to Mexico. In international law, Mexico and the US build a strong free trade cooperation in the North American Free Trade Zone (NAFTA) agreement. They agreed to implement the agreement that is built in that agreement, particularly for the exemption of tariff inthe distribution of products between two countries. In fact, the US could not complete the tariff exemption agreement in the distribution of Mexican products that has been agreed in NAFTA. It delays the implementation of this agreement by complicating the distribution of goods from Mexico to the US with unilateral regulations. Eventually, this research found that Mexico motivation is to respond US regulations on its products for several years. That US action, particularly the logistics distribution cooperation, has caused Mexico experiencing difficulties in gaining profits.

Mexican integration into the North American free trade zone

1993 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. K. M. Matiur Rahman ◽  
M. M. Moosa Khan ◽  
M. Anisul Islam
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Zone ◽  
The North

Negotiating North American Free Trade

2000 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Weak States ◽  
Trade Negotiation ◽  
The North ◽  
The Future ◽  
Asymmetrical Power

AbstractNegotiators for powerful, self-reliant states tend to be less responsive to weak states relative to domestic constituents, while negotiators for states entangled in ties of asymmetric interdependence with more powerful states tend to be more responsive to the demands of powerful states than to the demands of domestic constituents. Asymmetrical power does not necessarily lead to asymmetrical results, however, because negotiators in weaker states may, nevertheless, have more attractive non-agreement alternatives and a longer shadow of the future. Negotiators with attractive non-agreement alternatives will be more willing to put agreement at risk by withholding concessions in the negotiation process. Centralized and vertical institutions are often a bargaining liability precisely because weak states tend to be less responsive to domestic constituents, whereas divided government can be a major asset. These propositions are demonstrated through an analysis and reconstruction of the North American Free Trade negotiation process.

The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ◽  
Laura W. Arnold ◽  
Christopher J. W. Zorn
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Critical Element ◽  
Vote Model ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The North ◽  
Timing Model

A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.

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