scholarly journals Increasing Police Accountability and Improving Use of Force Policies in the United States

Author(s):  
Leica Kwong
Criminology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip M. Stinson

Deadly force refers to any use of force by a police officer that could result in the imposition of serious bodily injury or death. It includes homicides by police. Most homicides by police in the United States are found to be legally justified. A sworn law enforcement officer with general powers of arrest is legally justified in using deadly force if the officer has a reasonable apprehension of an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death being imposed against the officer or someone else. The fleeing felon rule has been abrogated and police officers are no longer legally justified in using deadly force to stop a fleeing felon absent other exigencies that would constitute an imminent threat. Deadly force research has long been hampered by the lack of meaningful data on the incidence and prevalence of police use of deadly force. Government counts of fatal officer-involved shootings have grossly underestimated annual counts of deadly force incidents. Recent open-source databases, largely created and curated by media organizations, have found that between 900 and 1,000 persons are shot and killed by on-duty police officers each year in the United States. This bibliography mostly focuses on deadly force in the United States. There has been a renewed interest in deadly force research in the aftermath of numerous officer-involved shooting in recent years, with calls for police accountability, transparency, and legitimacy, particularly as various stakeholders have called attention to racial disparities in terms of who is victimized by police deadly force and claims of police bias manifested through police violence against minority citizens.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Rebecca Tapscott

The notion that states pursue a monopoly over the use of force rings increasingly hollow. From vigilantes that patrol the United States’ southern border, to thugs for hire in China, states are characterized by non-state violent actors. These trends are more pronounced in comparatively lower-capacity states. Employing the concept of “security assemblages,” I propose that it is crucial to consider historically embedded relations among violent actors and institutions in order to understand their socio-political role and implications for state authority. This approach offers three insights: first, in low-capacity states, violence is not zero-sum. Rather, it is assembled among diverse actors, which each have historically embedded comparative advantages. Second, therefore, state efforts to monopolize violence should be taken as an empirical question rather than an assumption grounding analysis. Third, relationships between violent actors occur in thick institutional environments, meaning that violent actors, including state actors and institutions, often must act under significant constraints. To illustrate these points, I conduct a mixed-methods nested study of vigilantes in Uganda, finding that vigilantes are more common where other authorities are present, and are more helpful when other authorities are also more helpful. Focusing on dynamics between vigilantes and police, I pinpoint their historically distinct roles: the police were established as a colonial-era institution to suppress political dissent, while vigilantes have long been socially embedded actors tasked with everyday security provision. Thus, in this case, police and vigilantes are not substitutes; instead they play distinct and complementary roles.


Author(s):  
Anna Igorevna Filimonova

After the collapse of the USSR, fundamentally new phenomena appeared on the world arena, which became a watershed separating the bipolar order from the monopolar order associated with the establishment of the US global hegemony. Such phenomena were the events that are most often called «revolutions» in connection with the scale of the changes being made — «velvet revolutions» in the former Eastern Bloc, as well as revolutions of a different type, which ended in a change in the current regimes with such serious consequences that we are also talking about revolutionary transformations. These are technologies of «color revolutions» that allow organizing artificial and seemingly spontaneous mass protests leading to the removal of the legitimate government operating in the country and, in fact, to the seizure of power by a pro-American forces that ensure the Westernization of the country and the implementation of "neoliberal modernization", which essentially means the opening of national markets and the provision of natural resources for the undivided use of the Western factor (TNC and TNB). «Color revolutions» are inseparable from the strategic documents of the United States, in which, from the end of the 20th century, even before the collapse of the USSR, two main tendencies were clearly traced: the expansion of the right to unilateral use of force up to a preemptive strike, which is inextricably linked with the ideological justification of «missionary» American foreign policy, and the right to «assess» the internal state of affairs in countries and change it to a «democratic format», that is, «democratization». «Color revolutions», although they are not directly mentioned in strategic documents, but, being a «technical package of actions», straightforwardly follow from the right, assigned to itself by Washington, to unilateral use of force, which is gradually expanding from exclusively military actions to a comprehensive impact on an opponent country, i.e. essentially a hybrid war. Thus, the «color revolutions» clearly fit into the strategic concept of Washington on the use of force across the entire spectrum (conventional and unconventional war) under the pretext of «democratization». The article examines the period of registration and expansion of the US right to use force (which, according to the current international law, is a crime without a statute of limitations) in the time interval from the end of the twentieth century until 2014, filling semantic content about the need for «democratic transformations» of other states, with which the United States approached the key point of the events of the «Arab spring» and «color revolutions» in the post-Soviet space, the last and most ambitious of which was the «Euromaidan» in Ukraine in 2014. The article presents the material for the preparation of lectures and seminars in the framework of the training fields «International Relations» and «Political Science».


2021 ◽  
pp. 088740342110383
Author(s):  
Scott M. Mourtgos ◽  
Ian T. Adams ◽  
Samuel R. Baty

Most use-of-force policies utilized by U.S. police agencies make fundamental ordinal assumptions about officers’ force responses to subject resistance. These policies consist of varying levels of force and resistance along an ordinally ranked continuum of severity. We empirically tested the ordinal assumptions that are ubiquitous to police use-of-force continua within the United States using 1 year’s use-of-force data from a municipal police department. Applying a quantitative technique known as categorical regression with optimal scaling, we found the assumptions of ordinality within the studied department’s use-of-force continuum (which is similar to many police use-of-force continua within the United States) are not met. Specifying physical force as a “lower” force option than less-lethal tools is associated with increased officer injury and decreased subject injury. Our findings call into question use-of-force continua featuring ordinal rankings for varying categories of less-lethal force.


2019 ◽  
pp. 290-316
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Most discussions of cross-domain deterrence focus on variation in the means of coercion, but variation in political ends can be just as consequential. Cross-domain deterrence in the context of linkage politics, in which disparate political interests are tied together to create incentives for favorable outcomes, gives potential adversaries the opportunity to avoid confrontational meeting engagements by playing for time to clarify interests and choosing the means most suited to achieving new goals. A broader diplomatic conception of cross-domain deterrence can also highlight the potential of using financial, institutional, or other nonmilitary actions that render the threat or use of force less attractive. This chapter draws on newly available archival evidence to examine issue linkage politics in the context of changing strategic interests in the case of U.S. efforts to deter Soviet repression in Poland and East Germany at the end of the Cold War. In both cases, U.S. policymakers used diplomatic reassurance and threats of isolation to shape Soviet policy as the United States pressed its new-found political interests in Eastern Europe rather than its traditional preoccupation with military affairs.


Author(s):  
Rubins Noah ◽  
Papanastasiou Thomas-Nektarios ◽  
Kinsella N Stephan

This chapter discusses the actions that States may take to obtain redress against other States at whose hands their citizens are mistreated. Where no investment treaty binds home and host States, and where no other instrument offers the jurisdictional foundation for investor–State arbitration, a foreign investor may have no other remedy but to appeal to his government for assistance. A State’s intervention on behalf of its citizens may take several forms, ranging from informal diplomatic discussions to formal adversarial proceedings before ad hoc or standing international tribunals. The remainder of the chapter covers the “espousal” of claims, claims before international tribunals, economic sanctions, invalidation of title, prohibitions against the use of force, and the Foreign Claims Settlement Act of the United States.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 305-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ermus St. Louis ◽  
Alana Saulnier ◽  
Kevin Walby

Recent controversies over police use of force in the United States of America have placed a spotlight on police in Western nations. Concerns that police conduct is racist and procedurally unjust have generated public sentiments that accountability must be externally imposed on police. One such accountability mechanism is body-worn cameras (BWCs). Optimistic accounts of BWCs suggest that the technology will contribute to the improvement of community–police relations. However, BWCs address consequences, not causes, of poor community–police relations. We argue that the evolving visibility of police associated with BWCs is double-edged, and suggest that the adoption of surveillance technologies such as BWCs in the quest to improve community–police relations will fail without a simultaneous commitment to inclusionary policing practices (such as community policing strategies, community and social development, and local democracy). We outline two initiatives that optimize BWCs by promoting these simultaneous commitments.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 141-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Ellen O’Connell

Tom Ruys’s article in the latest issue of the American Journal of International Law is an erudite study of the prohibition on the use of force in UN Charter Article 2(4). Ruys makes many points with which I wholeheartedly agree. In note 241, he says that the case for cross-border drone attacks by the United States “verges on stretching criteria for necessity, proportionality, and armed attack to the point of absurdity . . . .” He is also right to reject emerging claims that the defense of necessity provides a basis for the lawful resort to force. Indeed, there is much that is truly excellent about the article—just not, unfortunately, its central thesis.


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