scholarly journals The influence of Xenophon’s didactic writings on the military leadership practice of Alexander the Great

Hypothekai ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 113-140
Author(s):  
Alexander Kleymeonov ◽  

The article examines the influence of Xenophon’s didactic works on the military activities of Alexander the Great. It is re-vealed that messages from ancient sources containing direct in-dications of the fact that Alexander was familiar with Xeno-phon’s works are either fundamentally unreliable or subject to different interpretations. Nevertheless, a comparison of the rec-ommendations proposed in “Kyropedia” and other Athenian au-thor’s writings the with Alexander’s practical activities reveals obvious similarities in their views on training military personnel, organizing competitions in military skill, providing soldiers with richly decorated weapons, and caring for the sick and wounded. A set of coincidences is associated with the political and admin-istrative activities of Alexander, who, like Cyrus the Elder in Xenophon’s writings, demonstratively showed mercy towards the vanquished, attracted representatives of the local elite to the ser-vice, wore clothes traditional for a conquered country. A large number of similarities, good education of Alexander and the popularity of Xenophon’s writings in the second half of the 4th century BCE allow us to conclude that the Macedonian king was familiar with the works of the Athenian author. However, the components of Xenophon's didactic legacy associated with the methods of warfare do not correlate well with Alexander's mili-tary leadership practice. The fundamental differences are re-vealed in the armament of the cavalry and their tactics, the depth of the infantry formation, the role of army branches on the battle-field. They were caused by a significant breakthrough in the art of war that took place in Macedonia during the time of Philip II. This breakthrough also led to the emergence of new tactics that provided for crushing the enemy not with a frontal attack of heavy infantry, but through the combined use of various types of troops. Alexander as a military leader was raised under the con-ditions of a new, more developed military art. Thus, the over-whelming majority of Xenophon's recommendations, which de-scribed the cavalry as a purely auxiliary branch of the army and considered the classical hoplite phalanx a decisive force in battle, were clearly irrelevant for him and therefore ignored.

2020 ◽  
pp. 74-86
Author(s):  
Alexandra Arkhangelskaya

The history of the formation of South Africa as a single state is closely intertwined with events of international scale, which have accordingly influenced the definition and development of the main characteristics of the foreign policy of the emerging state. The Anglo-Boer wars and a number of other political and economic events led to the creation of the Union of South Africa under the protectorate of the British Empire in 1910. The political and economic evolution of the Union of South Africa has some specific features arising from specific historical conditions. The colonization of South Africa took place primarily due to the relocation of Dutch and English people who were mainly engaged in business activities (trade, mining, agriculture, etc.). Connected by many economic and financial threads with the elite of the countries from which the settlers left, the local elite began to develop production in the region at an accelerated pace. South Africa’s favorable climate and natural resources have made it a hub for foreign and local capital throughout the African continent. The geostrategic position is of particular importance for foreign policy in South Africa, which in many ways predetermined a great interest and was one of the fundamental factors of international involvement in the development of the region. The role of Jan Smuts, who served as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa from 1919 to 1924 and from 1939 to 1948, was particularly prominent in the implementation of the foreign and domestic policy of the Union of South Africa in the focus period of this study. The main purpose of this article is to study the process of forming the mechanisms of the foreign policy of the Union of South Africa and the development of its diplomatic network in the period from 1910 to 1948.


Author(s):  
Timur Gimadeev

The article deals with the history of celebrating the Liberation Day in Czechoslovakia organised by the state. Various aspects of the history of the holiday have been considered with the extensive use of audiovisual documents (materials from Czechoslovak newsreels and TV archives), which allowed for a detailed analysis of the propaganda representation of the holiday. As a result, it has been possible to identify the main stages of the historical evolution of the celebrations of Liberation Day, to discover the close interdependence between these stages and the country’s political development. The establishment of the holiday itself — its concept and the military parade as the main ritual — took place in the first post-war years, simultaneously with the consolidation of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Later, until the end of the 1960s, the celebrations gradually evolved along the political regime, acquiring new ritual forms (ceremonial meetings, and “guards of memory”). In 1968, at the same time as there was an attempt to rethink the entire socialist regime and the historical experience connected with it, an attempt was made to reconstruct Liberation Day. However, political “normalisation” led to the normalisation of the celebration itself, which played an important role in legitimising the Soviet presence in the country. At this stage, the role of ceremonial meetings and “guards of memory” increased, while inventions released in time for 9 May appeared and “May TV” was specially produced. The fall of the Communist regime in 1989 led to the fall of the concept of Liberation Day on 9 May, resulting in changes of the title, date and paradigm of the holiday, which became Victory Day and has been since celebrated on 8 May.


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 754-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond F. Hopkins

The study of politics in “developing” countries has tended to focus on the less formal organs of government, such as political parties, the military, the bureaucracy, and even the educational system. National legislatures have often been ignored or rated of little significance in the political processes of these states. This practice contrasts markedly with the attention paid to legislatures in Western states. The most obvious explanation for it is that legislatures in new states tend to have little influence. Important decisions and shifts in power are usually made or recorded elsewhere in the political system.The Bunge, or National Assembly, of Tanzania is no exception to this general phenomenon. Nevertheless, an examination of the role of M.P.'s in Tanzania can be illuminating. The Bunge contains most of the major political leaders and has, at least constitutionally, broad authority. As a consequence, if the Assembly is to be only a weak political body, then informal norms limiting the powers of the M.P.'s role must exist. Moreover, these norms should prescribe authority relationships between the legislature and other policy shaping bodies in the political system, particularly the Party. Thus, an analysis of the roles of these men can provide important insights not only into the functions of the Bunge, but also into the elite political culture of Tanzania and the pattern of politics which this culture supports.


2008 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID CORNELL

In 1314 the English-held castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling were seized and destroyed by Robert Bruce. This was the pinnacle of a policy by which Bruce systematically slighted the castles he seized in Scotland. The reign of Edward II has been seen as a period in which the military value of the castle was in decline and by analysing the role the castle played in the campaigns of Bruce it is possible to assess the importance a successful contemporary commander attached to the castle during this period. Bruce had first-hand experience of the castle at war and knew of its limitations. In 1306, however, he seized and garrisoned a number of castles preparing to use them for a specific purpose, but defeat in the field rendered them redundant. On his return in 1307 Bruce initiated a policy of destruction. Castles in the north of Scotland were slighted as they were the regional focus of the political power of his Scottish enemies, and militarily they were of little value to Bruce. In the Lowlands the first-rate castles of Scotland were destroyed precisely because they were so militarily powerful. Bruce recognised that these castles, used aggressively, were indispensable to the English war effort, and consequently he undertook a prolonged and expensive campaign to reduce them, a campaign which involved the tactic of both surprise assault and, more importantly, the set-piece siege. In 1314 the imminent English campaign led Bruce to launch an unprecedented offensive against the English-held castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling. These castles were subsequently slighted despite their inextricable association with the Scottish Crown. Bruce recognised that, unlike the English, he did not need to occupy castles in Scotland to fight the war. Although in Ireland a small number of castles were occupied, and Berwick was also garrisoned by Scottish troops, in northern England Bruce did not attempt to occupy English castles. Those which were seized were destroyed, an indication that Bruce never intended a conquest of Northumberland. Indeed Bruce never undertook a serious campaign aimed at the seizure of the first-rate castles of Northumberland despite their frequently perilous state. Instead he sought to gain political capital by threatening their loss and so placing enormous pressure on the English Crown. That the castle featured prominently in the campaigns of Bruce demonstrates it was not in decline. Bruce understood the continued military and political value of the castle, but he was able to exploit its inherent vulnerabilities in order to gain victory in war.


Author(s):  
Oren Barak

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.


Author(s):  
Sofia K. Ledberg

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a key political actor in the Chinese state. Together with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese state institutions, it makes up the political foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the early years after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the military played an important role in state consolidation and the management of domestic state affairs, as is expected in a state founded on Leninist principles of organization. Since the reform process, which was initiated in the late 1970s, the political role of the PLA has changed considerably. It has become less involved in domestic politics and increased attention has been directed toward military modernization. Consequently, in the early 21st century, the Chinese military shares many characteristics with the armed forces in noncommunist states. At the same time, the organizational structures, such as the party committee system, the system of political leaders, and political organs, have remained in place. In other words, the politicized structures that were put in place to facilitate the role of the military as a domestic political tool of the CCP, across many sectors of society, are expected to also accommodate modernization, professionalization, and cooperation with foreign militaries on the international arena in postreform China. This points to an interesting discrepancy between form and purpose of the PLA. The role of the military in Chinese politics has thus shifted over the years, and its relationship with the CCP has generally been interpreted as having developed from one marked by symbiosis to one of greater institutional autonomy and independence. Yet these developments should not necessarily be seen as linear or irreversible. Indeed, China of the Xi Jinping era has shown an increased focus on ideology, centralization, and personalized leadership, which already has had consequences for the political control of the Chinese armed forces. Chances are that these trends will affect the role of the PLA in politics even further in the early decades of the 21st century.


1972 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 375-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Kossok

At the beginning of this study of military dictatorship and the political role of the intellectuals in Latin America, Florestan Fernandes (1970: 1) makes the following statement: “The idea that Latin America is a region in which the coups d'état are a political routine has become a commonplace.” Without doubt, such an opinion is justified and also explains—at least to a certain extent—the wealth of “routine” verdicts on the function of the military in Latin America. A contradiction, however, seems evident at this point: while the number of publications on the political and social position of the armed forces is rapidly increasing (McAlister, 1966; Rouquié, 1969), there is an evident lack of comprehensive analyses that go beyond detailed description, and which explain in a reliable and sound manner the phenomenon of the cyclically increasing militarization of politics. It cannot be overlooked that research on the role of the military in Latin America is in a really critical situation which calls for a reexamination of the facts according to new criteria.


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