Reformulating the Second Law

The current formulation of the second law is flawed since it does not specify the causal relations between the outcomes of theory assessment and the actual acceptance/unacceptance of a theory; it merely tells us that a theory was assessed by the method employed at the time. We propose a new formulation of the second law: “If a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.” This new formulation makes the causal connection between theory assessment outcomes and cases of theory acceptance/unacceptance explicit. Also, this new formulation is not a tautology because it forbids certain logically possible scenarios, such as a theory satisfying the method of the time yet remaining unaccepted. Finally, we outline what inferences an observational scientonomist can make regarding theory assessment outcomes from the record of accepted theories.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2017-0004]:Accept the following reformulation of the second law:The second law: if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if assessment is inconclusive, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.Accept the following definitions of theory assessment outcomes:Outcome: satisfied ≡ the theory is deemed to conclusively meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.Outcome: not satisfied ≡ the theory is deemed to conclusively not meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.Outcome: inconclusive ≡ it is unclear whether or not the requirements of the method employed at the time are met.Accept the following ontology of theory assessment outcomes:The three possible outcomes of theory assessment are “satisfied”, “not satisfied”, and “inconclusive”.Accept the following redefinition of employed method:Employed method ≡ a method is said to be employed if its requirements constitute the actual expectations of the community.Reject:The previous formulation of the second law.The previous definitions of theory assessment outcomes.The previous ontology of theory assessment outcomes.The previous definition of employed method. [Sciento-2017-0005]:Contingent upon the acceptance of the preceding modification [Sciento-2017-0004], accept that the new second law is not a tautology. [Sciento-2017-0006]:Contingent upon the acceptance of modification [Sciento-2017-0004], accept the following set of inferences of theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of a single contender (see text).Also accept the following set of inferences of theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of two contender theories (see text).

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A Compatibility Law and the Classification of Theory Change

Scientonomy Journal for the Science of Science ◽

10.33137/js.v2i0.31278 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2 ◽

pp. 67-82

Author(s):

Patrick Thomas Fraser ◽

Ameer Sarwar

Keyword(s):

Scientific Theory ◽

Theory Change ◽

Epistemic Stance ◽

Current Formulation ◽

Previous Definition ◽

The Law ◽

Definition Of ◽

Theory Acceptance ◽

Demarcation Criteria

The current formulation of the zeroth law (the law of compatibility) is marred with a number of theoretical problems, which necessitate its reformulation. In this paper, we propose that compatibility is an independent stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. We then provide a new definition of compatibility criteria to reflect this change. We show that the content of the zeroth law is deducible from our definition of compatibility. Instead of a static law of compatibility, we propose a new dynamic law of compatibility that explains how the stance of compatibility obtains. Unlike the zeroth law, this new law has empirical content, as it forbids certain conceivable scenarios. Having established these notions, we propose a classification space that exhaustively covers all the possible states a theory may occupy and all the transitions it may undergo during its lifecycle. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0015]: Accept the following definition of compatibility: Compatibility ≡ the ability of two elements to coexist in the same mosaic. Also accept the following corollary: Compatibility Corollary: at any moment of time, the elements of the scientific mosaic are compatible with each other. Accept that all theorems that take the current zeroth law as their premise are recoverable when the compatibility corollary is used as a premise instead. Reject the zeroth law. [Sciento-2018-0016]: Accept compatibility as a distinct epistemic stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. Also accept that compatibility is binary, reflexive, and symmetric. Transitivity of compatibility holds only within mosaics, not sui generis. [Sciento-2018-0017]: Accept the following definition of compatibility criteria: Compatibility Criteria ≡ criteria for determining whether two elements are compatible or incompatible. Reject the previous definition of compatibility criteria. [Sciento-2018-0018]: Accept the following law of compatibility as a scientonomic axiom: The Law of Compatibility: if a pair of elements satisfies the compatibility criteria employed at the time, it becomes compatible within the mosaic; if it does not, it is deemed incompatible; and if assessment is inconclusive, the pair can become compatible, incompatible, or its status may be unknown. [Sciento-2018-0019]: Accept the new definition of theory acceptance: Theory Acceptance ≡ an accepted theory is a scientific theory that is taken as the best available description or prescription of its object. Reject the previous definition of theory acceptance. [Sciento-2018-0020]: Accept the following theorem: Demarcation-Acceptance Synchronism theorem: every theory that becomes accepted satisfies the demarcation criteria employed at the time of acceptance.

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Diffusive Bejan number and second law of thermodynamics toward a new dimensionless formulation of fluid dynamics laws

Thermal Science ◽

10.2298/tsci190726340t ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 23 (6 Part B) ◽

pp. 4005-4022 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Michele Trancossi ◽

Jose Pascoa

Keyword(s):

Fluid Dynamics ◽

Entropy Generation ◽

Fluid Dynamic ◽

Second Law Of Thermodynamics ◽

Integral Form ◽

Second Law ◽

Bejan Number ◽

Definition Of ◽

New Formulation ◽

Dimensionless Formulation

In a recent paper, Liversage and Trancossi have defined a new formulation of drag as a function of the dimensionless Bejan and Reynolds numbers. Further analysis of this hypothesis has permitted to obtain a new dimensionless formulation of the fundamental equations of fluid dynamics in their integral form. The resulting equations have been deeply discussed for the thermodynamic definition of Bejan number evidencing that the proposed formulation allows solving fluid dynamic problems in terms of entropy generation, allowing an effective optimization of design in terms of the Second law of thermodynamics. Some samples are discussed evidencing how the new formulation can support the generation of an optimized configuration of fluidic devices and that the optimized configurations allow minimizing the entropy generation.

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Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change

Scientonomy Journal for the Science of Science ◽

10.33137/js.v2i0.31032 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2 ◽

pp. 13-38

Author(s):

Hakob Barseghyan

Keyword(s):

Normative Theory ◽

Scientific Change ◽

Epistemic Agent ◽

Theory Evaluation ◽

Recent Developments ◽

Previous Definition ◽

Definition Of ◽

Descriptive Theories ◽

Theory Acceptance

Recent developments in theoretical scientonomy coupled with a reflection on the practice of the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy all suggest that the ontology of scientific change currently accepted in scientonomy has serious flaws. The new ontology, suggested in this paper, solves some of the issues permeating the current ontology. Building on Rawleigh’s suggestion, it considers a theory as an attempt to answer a certain question. It also introduces the category of definition as a subtype of theory. It also reveals that methods and methodologies of the currently accepted ontology do not differ from the perspective of their propositional content and, thus, belong to the same class of epistemic elements. This is captured in the new definition of method as a set of criteria for theory evaluation. It is also argued that methods are a subtype of normative theories. It is shown that normative theories of all types, including methods, ethical norms, and aesthetic norms, can be both accepted and employed. Finally, a new definition of scientific mosaic is suggested to fit the new ontology. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0005]: Accept the following definitions of method and methodology: Method ≡ a set of criteria for theory evaluation. Methodology ≡ a normative discipline that formulates the rules which ought to be employed in theory assessment. Reject the previous definitions of method and methodology. [Sciento-2018-0006]: Accept the following ontology of epistemic elements, where: Each theory is an attempt to answer a certain question. Theories can be of three types – descriptive, normative, or definitions. Method is a subtype of normative theory. Questions as well as theories of all types – including methods – can be accepted. Normative theories of all types can be employed; the name of the stance is norm employment. Accept the following definition of theory acceptance: Theory acceptance ≡ a theory is said to be accepted by the epistemic agent if it is taken as the best available answer to its respective question. Also accept the following questions as legitimate topics of inquiry: Role of Definitions in Scientific Change: Do definitions play any distinct role in the process of scientific change, or do they only exhibit the exact same patterns as descriptive and normative theories? Reducibility of Definitions: Are definitions a distinct subtype of theory, or are they somehow reducible to descriptive theories and/or normative theories? Reject the previous ontology of epistemic elements and the previous definition of theory acceptance. [Sciento-2018-0007]: Accept the following definition of definition: Definition ≡ A statement of the meaning of a term. [Sciento-2018-0008]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0006] is accepted, accept the following definition of norm employment: Norm Employment ≡ a norm is said to be employed if its requirements constitute the actual expectations of the epistemic agent. [Sciento-2018-0009]: Accept the new definition of scientific mosaic: Scientific Mosaic ≡ a set of all epistemic elements accepted and/or employed by the epistemic agent. Reject the previous definition of scientific mosaic. [Sciento-2018-0010]: Accept that: Epistemic stances of all types can be taken explicitly and/or implicitly. Epistemic elements of all types can be explicit and/or implicit. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of inquiry: Tracing Implicit/Explicit: Should observational scientonomy trace when a certain stance towards an epistemic element was taken explicitly or implicitly? What are the practical considerations for and against collecting and storing this data?

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Reasons in the Scientonomic Ontology

Scientonomy Journal for the Science of Science ◽

10.33137/js.v3i0.33557 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 3 ◽

pp. 15-31

Author(s):

Kye Palider

Keyword(s):

Central Area ◽

Sufficient Reason ◽

Second Law ◽

Epistemic Reasons ◽

Basing Relation ◽

Definition Of ◽

Theory Acceptance

The question of how we come to accept new theories is a central area of inquiry in scientonomic discourse. However, there has yet to be a formal discussion of the subjective reasons an agent may have for accepting theories. This paper explores these epistemic reasons and constructs a historically sensitive definition of reason. This formulation takes an abstractionist stance towards the ontology of reasons and makes use of a composite basing relation. The descriptive and normative components of reasons are fully formulated in scientonomic terms through the application of the newly introduced notion of implication, and its separation from the notion of inference. In addition, the paper provides scientonomic definitions for sufficient reason, support, and normative inference. The fruitfulness of this formulation of reasons is illustrated by a few examples. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0009]: Accept the following definition of implication: Implication ≡ a logical transition from one theory to another. [Sciento-2019-0010]: Accept the following definitions of sufficient reason, reason, support, and normative inference: Sufficient Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a sufficient reason for (accepting) theory B iff the following four conditions are met: (1) The agent accepts A. (2) The agent accepts that A→B. (3) The agent employs ε. (4) The agent accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Support ≡ an agent takes theory A to be supporting theory B iff the agent accepts A and accepts that A→B. Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a reason for theory B iff the agent accepts that A→B, employs ε, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Normative Inference ≡ An agent takes theory A to normatively infer theory B iff the agent accepts A, accepts that A→B, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). [Sciento-2019-0011]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2019-0010] is accepted, accept the sufficient reason theorem and its deduction from the definition of sufficient reason and the second law: Sufficient Reason theorem: a theory becomes accepted by an agent, when an agent has a sufficient reason for accepting it. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Theory Acceptance without Sufficient Reason: how do theories become accepted without a sufficient reason, i.e. in the cases of circularity or theories without a reason?

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Reactions in solution

10.1093/oso/9780198782957.003.0016 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Dennis Sherwood ◽

Paul Dalby

Keyword(s):

Phase Equilibria ◽

Gas Phase ◽

First Principles ◽

Unique Feature ◽

Life Sciences ◽

Equilibrium Mixture ◽

Second Law ◽

Ideal Solution ◽

Coupled Reactions ◽

Definition Of

Another key chapter, examining reactions in solution. Starting with the definition of an ideal solution, and then introducing Raoult’s law and Henry’s law, this chapter then draws on the results of Chapter 14 (gas phase equilibria) to derive the corresponding results for equilibria in an ideal solution. A unique feature of this chapter is the analysis of coupled reactions, once again using first principles to show how the coupling of an endergonic reaction to a suitable exergonic reaction results in an equilibrium mixture in which the products of the endergonic reaction are present in much higher quantity. This demonstrates how coupled reactions can cause entropy-reducing events to take place without breaking the Second Law, so setting the scene for the future chapters on applications of thermodynamics to the life sciences, especially chapter 24 on bioenergetics.

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Large-Eddy Simulation Analyses of Heated Urban Canyon Facades

Energies ◽

10.3390/en14113078 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 14 (11) ◽

pp. 3078

Author(s):

Carlo Cintolesi ◽

Francesco Barbano ◽

Silvana Di Sabatino

Keyword(s):

Urban Canopy ◽

Pollutant Removal ◽

Present Contribution ◽

Convective Flows ◽

Eddy Simulation ◽

Large Eddy ◽

Isothermal Case ◽

Definition Of ◽

New Formulation ◽

Heating Up

Thermal convective flows are common phenomena in real urban canyons and strongly affect the mechanisms of pollutant removal from the canyon. The present contribution aims at investigating the complex interaction between inertial and thermal forces within the canyon, including the impacts on turbulent features and pollutant removal mechanisms. Large-eddy simulations reproduce infinitely long square canyons having isothermal and differently heated facades. A scalar source on the street mimics the pollutant released by traffic. The presence of heated facades triggers convective flows which generate an interaction region around the canyon-ambient interface, characterised by highly energetic turbulent fluxes and an increase of momentum and mass exchange. The presence of this region of high mixing facilitates the pollutant removal across the interface and decreases the urban canopy drag. The heating-up of upwind facade determines favourable convection that strengthens the primary internal vortex and decreases the pollutant concentration of the whole canyon by 49% compare to the isothermal case. The heating-up of the downwind facade produces adverse convection counteracting the wind-induced motion. Consequently, the primary vortex is less energetic and confined in the upper-canyon area, while a region of almost zero velocity and high pollution concentration (40% more than the isothermal case) appears at the pedestrian level. Finally, numerical analyses allow a definition of a local Richardson number based on in-canyon quantities only and a new formulation is proposed to characterise the thermo-dynamics regimes.

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Neomisticius platypi n. sp. and N. variabilis n. sp. (Tylenchomorpha: Anguinidae) from dead oak trees in Japan

Nematology ◽

10.1163/15685411-bja10135 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-21

Author(s):

Natsumi Kanzaki ◽

Hayato Masuya ◽

Keiko Hamaguchi

Keyword(s):

New Species ◽

Vas Deferens ◽

Morphological Characteristics ◽

Platypus Quercivorus ◽

Oak Trees ◽

Two New Species ◽

Previous Definition ◽

Rectal Glands ◽

Stylet Length ◽

Definition Of

Summary Two new Neomisticius species, typologically and phylogenetically close to each other, are described and illustrated from dead Quercus trees and an ambrosia beetle, Platypus quercivorus. The two species share some stylet morphological characteristics, namely, they both possess a long conus occupying more than half of the total stylet length, a long crustaformeria composed of more than 160 cells (eight rows of more than 20 cells each), and a short and broad female tail with a digitate tip. They are distinguished from each other by N. variabilis n. sp. having a wide, spindle-shaped male bursa with a blunt terminus and N. platypi n. sp. having an oval bursa with a rounded terminus. In addition, the males and females of both species have three large rectal glands and the posterior end of the male testis (distal end of the vas deferens) bears three cells that seemingly function as a valve between the vas deferens and the cloacal tube. These characteristics have not been reported in other tylenchids. Currently, the genus contains only three species: the two new species and N. rhizomorphoides, which has a normal stylet with a short conus, a short crustaformeria, and lacks rectal glands and valve cells in the vas deferens. Therefore, the two new species are readily distinguished from N. rhizomorphoides and, based on the previous definition, may even represent a new genus. However, considering their phylogenetic closeness and biological similarities (e.g., association with ambrosia beetles), the generic definition of Neomisticius was emended to include these new species.

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The Status of Questions in the Ontology of Scientific Change

Scientonomy Journal for the Science of Science ◽

10.33137/js.v2i0.29651 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2 ◽

pp. 1-12

Author(s):

William Rawleigh

Keyword(s):

Basic Element ◽

Scientific Change ◽

Semantic Structure ◽

Epistemic Agent ◽

Distinct Class ◽

Epistemic Stance ◽

The Status ◽

Definition Of ◽

Theory Acceptance ◽

Scientific Questions

The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – theories and methods. However, the ontology underlying the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy includes questions/topics as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia. I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infintum. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0001]: Accept the following definition of question: Question ≡ a topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0002]: Accept the ontology of epistemic elements with theories, methods, and questions as distinct epistemic elements. Reject the previously accepted ontology of epistemic elements. [Sciento-2018-0003]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0002] is accepted, accept that the epistemic stance that can be taken by an epistemic agent towards a question is question acceptance (the opposite is unacceptance), defined as follows: Question Acceptance ≡ a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0004]: Provided that modifications [Sciento-2018-0002] and [Sciento-2018-0003] are accepted, accept the following question as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry: Mechanism of Question Acceptance: How do questions become accepted as legitimate? What is the mechanism of question acceptance? Indicators of Question Acceptance: What are the historical indicators of theory acceptance? How can observational scientonomists establish that such-and-such a question was accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry by a certain epistemic agent at a certain time?

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