scholarly journals X-Phi and Impartiality Thought Experiments: Investigating the Veil of Ignorance

Diametros ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (64) ◽  
pp. 72-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Paulo ◽  
Thomas Pölzler

This paper discusses “impartiality thought experiments”, i.e., thought experiments that attempt to generate intuitions which are unaffected by personal characteristics such as age, gender or race. We focus on the most prominent impartiality thought experiment, the Veil of Ignorance (VOI), and show that both in its original Rawlsian version and in a more generic version, empirical investigations can be normatively relevant in two ways: First, on the assumption that the VOI is effective and robust, if subjects dominantly favor a certain normative judgment behind the VOI this provides evidence in favor of that judgment; if, on the other hand, they do not dominantly favor a judgment this reduces our justification for it. Second, empirical investigations can also contribute to assessing the effectiveness and robustness of the VOI in the first place, thereby supporting or undermining its applications across the board.

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
James Robert Brown

Religious notions have long played a role in epistemology. Theological thought experiments, in particular, have been effective in a wide range of situations in the sciences. Some of these are merely picturesque, others have been heuristically important, and still others, as I will argue, have played a role that could be called essential. I will illustrate the difference between heuristic and essential with two examples. One of these stems from the Newton–Leibniz debate over the nature of space and time; the other is a thought experiment of my own constructed with the aim of making a case for a more liberal view of evidence in mathematics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 130-135
Author(s):  
Igor Berestov

We analyze contemporary thought experiments with some Zeno objects and infinity machines. On the one hand, we continue to analyze the examples from Hawthorne, 2000, pointing out the incompleteness of our comprehension of the examples from this paper. On the other hand, using a mode of reasoning associated with that of Hawthorne, 2000, we show how Zeno of Elea’s Dichotomy can be made immune to its traditional refutation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-52
Author(s):  
Nashuddin Nashuddin

True education makes people more respectful of differences and understanding diversity. Schools offer openness, moderation, and peace, not closure, extremism, and violence. But in reality on the ground, schools are actually not sterile from the outbreak of intolerance and the virus of radicalism. A number of studies show at one conclusion - which is almost agreed on - that intolerance in the world of education is increasing. Starting from rejecting leaders of different religions, do not want to respect the flag, the veil obligation, to those who openly support the khilafah. The entry of intolerance is assessed entering from three doors. First, teacher. Teacher understanding often determines how students behave and act. Second, the curriculum which is still dogmatic-doctrinaire does not provide space for dialogue and imagination. Third, extra activities are loaded with certain ideologies. In this context, it is necessary to return to voice moderation in schools. Attitudes that are not extreme right, always negate everything; nor extreme left, accommodating anything from outside; but rather be selective-accommodating. Teaching selective-accommodative attitude to students, has its own challenges. Not to mention the tendency of religious ways that are practical, instant, and do not want to be complicated, on the one hand; plus the penetration of social media - borrowing the language of Tom Nicholas (Death of Expertise, 2017) - there is a democratization of information, everyone is equal in it, on the other hand. Making moderation mainstreaming projects in schools has its challenges. Pendidikan sejatinya membuat manusia lebih menghargai perbedaaan dan memahami keragaman.Sekolah mengarjakan keterbukaan, moderasi, dan kedamaian, bukan ketertutupan, ekstrim, dan kekerasan.Akan tetapi fakta di lapangan, sekolah justru tidak streril dari wabah intoleransi dan virus radikalisme. Sejumlah penelitian menunjukkan pada satu kesimpulan –yang hampir disepakati—bahwa intoleransi dalam dunia pendidikan semakian meningkat. Mulai dari menolak pemimpin beda agama, tidak mau menghormat bendera, pewajiban jilbab, sampai yang terang-terangan mendukung khilafah. Masuknya intoleransi dinilai masuk dari tiga pintu. Pertama, guru. Pemahaman guru sering menentukan cara bersikap dan bertindak siswa. Kedua, kurikulum yang masih dogmatis-doktriner, tidak memberikan ruang untuk berdialetika dan berimajinasi. Ketiga, kegiatan ekstra yang sarat dengan ideologi tertentu. Dalam konteks inilah, perlu kembali menyuarakan moderasi di sekolah. Sikap yang tidak ekstrim kanan, selalu menegasikan semuanya; juga tidak ekstrim kiri, menampung apapun dari luar; melainkan bersikap selektif-akomodatif. Mengajarkan sikap selektif-akomodatif kepada peserta didik, mendapat tantangan tersendiri. Belum lagi adanya  kecenderungan cara beragama yang praktis, instan, dan tidak mau ribet, di satu sisi; di tambah penetrasi media sosial –meminjam bahasa Tom Nicholas (Matinya Kepakaran, 2017) – terjadi demokratisasi infomasi, semua orang setara di dalamnya, di sisi lain. Membuat proyek pengarusutamaan moderasi di sekolah mendapat tantangannya tersendiri.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Samuele Tonello

<p>This thesis in divided in two main parts. First, I develop the claim that current democracies are unable to properly defend what I deem the pivotal feature to evaluate the quality of a political system - namely the people’s liberty - due to what I call a twofold democratic dilemma. On the one hand, common citizens are affected by biases that compromise their ability to successfully maintain forms of self-government. On the other hand, even representative forms of democracy that limit to a certain degree the people’s power are threatened by an oligarchic power. That is, oligarchs are using their wealth power to sway governments towards pursuing oligarchic interests rather than common ones, thus hindering the people’s liberty. For this reason, I argue that we ought to rely on Pettit’s view of liberty as non-domination to resolve the democratic dilemma. The thesis conceives these two threats as two forms of domination that must be avoided and focuses on adding a supplementary editorial and contestatory dimension of democracy to the classical participatory one. Republicanism could offer a solution to both sides of the dilemma. On the one hand, citizens’ political task would be more compatible with the people’s biases, since citizens would limit their participation to control that government’s policies do not entail oligarchic domination. On the other hand, framing liberty as a battle between dominating masters and dominated slaves, republicanism could offer the many the institutional means to counteract elites’ political domination. In this way, I conclude the first part of the thesis, but this opens the gates to the main question of the thesis, namely to how we should structure this contestatory democracy. The problem is that whereas republican scholars agree on the importance of setting freedom as non-domination at the basis of our political systems, there is no such agreement on the best way to institutionally enhance the republican ideal. I analyse this debate, maintaining that while Pettitt’s ideal is the view to pursue, we should reject his editorial solution because small committees of experts are likely to increase oligarchic domination rather than to protect the people’s liberty. Rejecting Pettit’s model does not yet imply refusing any editorial model, since I argue that critical scholars mistakenly identify the editorial component of democracy with Pettit’s answer only. In this way, they neglect alternative solutions to Pettit’s, such as Bellamy’s and McCormick’s. Having explained that Bellamy’s solution does not resolve the democratic dilemma, since this scholar rejects editorial bodies, I argue that McCormick’s “Machiavellian Democracy” framed on a divided conception of the populace offers instead the solution I am looking for. Institutionally recognizing the social differences among the populace, we could create modern bodies similar to the Roman “Tribune of the Plebs” to offer the weaker part of the population a class-specific institution to use as defence from oligarchic domination. The problem is how to implement a modern “Tribune of the plebs” making sure that these bodies are effective but popular in character at the same time. I thus explain how modern editorial tribunates could work in practice, drawing from McCormick’s “thought experiment”. I agree with most of McCormick’s ideas – lottery selection, wealth threshold exclusion, large size tribunates, etc. - but I suggest that we must review some of his suggestions with features more concerned with improving the people’s knowledge – specialization, education selection, etc. Hence, I conclude the thesis describing my thought experiment of a system of Specialized Ministerial Tribunates. In this way, I argue that we could better resolve the democratic dilemma. On the one hand, tribunates’ editorship would be more specific and would not require members of the tribunate to analyse the operation of governments on a too broad spectrum, thus reducing the problems of the people’s biases. On the other hand, tribunates’ operation could be primarily connected to detecting oligarchic features in the policies enacted by single ministries, thus challenging more precisely any oligarchic influence over governments. In sum, I argue that an editorial dimension could produce significant improvements to the people’s liberty. Thanks to a modern “Tribune of the plebs”, citizens could participate more meaningfully in politics, while taming more efficiently the influence oligarchs have on how modern societies are politically directed.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Samuele Tonello

<p>This thesis in divided in two main parts. First, I develop the claim that current democracies are unable to properly defend what I deem the pivotal feature to evaluate the quality of a political system - namely the people’s liberty - due to what I call a twofold democratic dilemma. On the one hand, common citizens are affected by biases that compromise their ability to successfully maintain forms of self-government. On the other hand, even representative forms of democracy that limit to a certain degree the people’s power are threatened by an oligarchic power. That is, oligarchs are using their wealth power to sway governments towards pursuing oligarchic interests rather than common ones, thus hindering the people’s liberty. For this reason, I argue that we ought to rely on Pettit’s view of liberty as non-domination to resolve the democratic dilemma. The thesis conceives these two threats as two forms of domination that must be avoided and focuses on adding a supplementary editorial and contestatory dimension of democracy to the classical participatory one. Republicanism could offer a solution to both sides of the dilemma. On the one hand, citizens’ political task would be more compatible with the people’s biases, since citizens would limit their participation to control that government’s policies do not entail oligarchic domination. On the other hand, framing liberty as a battle between dominating masters and dominated slaves, republicanism could offer the many the institutional means to counteract elites’ political domination. In this way, I conclude the first part of the thesis, but this opens the gates to the main question of the thesis, namely to how we should structure this contestatory democracy. The problem is that whereas republican scholars agree on the importance of setting freedom as non-domination at the basis of our political systems, there is no such agreement on the best way to institutionally enhance the republican ideal. I analyse this debate, maintaining that while Pettitt’s ideal is the view to pursue, we should reject his editorial solution because small committees of experts are likely to increase oligarchic domination rather than to protect the people’s liberty. Rejecting Pettit’s model does not yet imply refusing any editorial model, since I argue that critical scholars mistakenly identify the editorial component of democracy with Pettit’s answer only. In this way, they neglect alternative solutions to Pettit’s, such as Bellamy’s and McCormick’s. Having explained that Bellamy’s solution does not resolve the democratic dilemma, since this scholar rejects editorial bodies, I argue that McCormick’s “Machiavellian Democracy” framed on a divided conception of the populace offers instead the solution I am looking for. Institutionally recognizing the social differences among the populace, we could create modern bodies similar to the Roman “Tribune of the Plebs” to offer the weaker part of the population a class-specific institution to use as defence from oligarchic domination. The problem is how to implement a modern “Tribune of the plebs” making sure that these bodies are effective but popular in character at the same time. I thus explain how modern editorial tribunates could work in practice, drawing from McCormick’s “thought experiment”. I agree with most of McCormick’s ideas – lottery selection, wealth threshold exclusion, large size tribunates, etc. - but I suggest that we must review some of his suggestions with features more concerned with improving the people’s knowledge – specialization, education selection, etc. Hence, I conclude the thesis describing my thought experiment of a system of Specialized Ministerial Tribunates. In this way, I argue that we could better resolve the democratic dilemma. On the one hand, tribunates’ editorship would be more specific and would not require members of the tribunate to analyse the operation of governments on a too broad spectrum, thus reducing the problems of the people’s biases. On the other hand, tribunates’ operation could be primarily connected to detecting oligarchic features in the policies enacted by single ministries, thus challenging more precisely any oligarchic influence over governments. In sum, I argue that an editorial dimension could produce significant improvements to the people’s liberty. Thanks to a modern “Tribune of the plebs”, citizens could participate more meaningfully in politics, while taming more efficiently the influence oligarchs have on how modern societies are politically directed.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-221
Author(s):  
Wardah Nuroniyah

Hijab (veil) for female Muslims has been subject to a debate regarding its meanings. On the one hand, it represents the virtue of religious obedience and piety. Still, on the other hand, it is associated with the form of women oppressions in the public domain. At this point, the hijab has been an arena of contesting interpretations. Meanwhile, contemporary Indonesia is witnessing the increase in the use of veil among urban female Muslims that leads to the birth of various hijab wearer communities. One of them is Tuneeca Lover Community (TLC). This community has become a new sphere where female Muslims articulate their ideas about Islam through various activities such as religious gathering, hijab tutorial class, fashion show, and charity activities. This study seeks to answer several questions: Why do these women decide to wear a hijab? Why do they join the TLC? How do they perceive the veil? Is it related to religious doctrines or other factors such as lifestyle? This research employs a qualitative method using documentation and interview to gather the data among 150 members of the TLC.  This research shows that their understanding of the hijab results from the common perception that places the veil as a religious obligation. Nevertheless, each of the members has one's orientation over the hijab. This paper also suggests that they try to transform this understanding into modern settings. As a consequence, they are not only committed to the traditionally spiritual meaning of the hijab but are also nuanced with modern ideas such as lifestyle and particular social class. Their participation in the TLC enables them to reach both goals simultaneously.


1987 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene E. Mumy

In the first half of the 1970s, two books appeared which have subsequently been regarded as major works in political philosophy: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Economists have devoted a considerable amount of ink to commentary, pro and con, on A Theory of Justice; and it is getting to be a rare public finance textbook that does not, in its discussion of governmental redistribution, describe the Kantian contract made behind the veil of ignorance. On the other hand, while Nozick has not exactly been ignored, economists have not joined the debate over Anarchy, State, and Utopia with the same gusto. When economists have joined the debate, their concern has been, more often than not, with Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice, as is the case with Varian (1975) and Sen (1977). What is largely missing, then, is any economic analysis of the processes that give rise to Nozick's morally legitimate state, which he calls the minimal state, and the characteristics and likely activities of the minimal state within the moral boundaries set by Nozick, his assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.


2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2021-107615
Author(s):  
Joona Räsänen

In a recent JME paper, Matthew John Minehan applies John Rawls’ veil of ignorance against Judith Thomson’s famous violinist argument for the permissibility of abortion. Minehan asks readers to ‘imagine that one morning you are back to back in bed with another person. One of you is conscious and the other unconscious. You do not know which one you are’. Since from this position of ignorance, you have an equal chance of being the unconscious violinist and the conscious person attached to him, it would be rational to oppose a right for detachment. Likewise, behind the veil of ignorance, it is rational to oppose abortions since you could be the fetus, Minehan claims. This paper provides a plausible reply to this argument.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Lord ◽  
Dionysia Tamvaki

In this paper, we apply a revised version of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al. to European Parliament (EP) debates. This updated measurement instrument, after the inclusion of new indicators, helps us identify not just the principles of European Union (EU) deliberation but most importantly the favourable contextual conditions of supranational deliberation. We illustrate the new DQI coding for selected debates over the last EU parliamentary term and discuss how the data can be employed to assess the overall quality of deliberation in the EP. At the same time we demonstrate that institutional issues matter for the quality of EP discourse, as do Members of the European Parliaments’ personal characteristics. Issue attributes on the other hand, influence supranational deliberation but not in the expected direction.


1975 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Otto Nigsch

AbstractThe restriction of the number of enrolling students seems to be more and more becoming one of the conditions of efficiency in our universities. However, administrative restrictions turn into social discrimination towards the students concerned. Is there now a possibility to avoid this dilemma, by offering shortened curricula at universities?Empirical investigations seem to show that the projected shortened curricula would mainly be of interest for students coming from the lower social classes. On the other hand, students from the privileged classes would maintain their aspirations for full traditional university training. Therefore the implementation of shortened curricula would in the long run lead to a self-elimination of the less privileged and consequently to a stabilisation of the unequal distribution of the chances for higher education.


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