The Distinction between Real Rights and Personal Rights in the Deeds Registration System of South Africa – Part One: Statutory and Theoretical Distinction between Real Rights and Personal Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-462
Author(s):  
P. J. Badenhorst

Real rights in respect of land are registrable in the deeds registration system of South Africa, while personal rights may not be registered. The Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, which allows an open system of real rights, does not define real rights and personal rights properly, and does not draw a distinction between such rights. In this article in two parts the view is expressed that the nature of these rights is determined by distinguishing real rights from personal rights, especially in terms of the doctrine of subjective rights, and by distinguishing between ownership and limited real rights by application of the subtraction from the dominium test (as supplemented by the intention test). Both fundamental distinctions are founded in the South African common law and still form the basis for a modern theory of real rights.

Author(s):  
Max Loubser ◽  
Tamar Gidron

Both the Israeli and the South African legal systems are classified as mixed legal systems, or mixed jurisdictions. In Israel, tort law was originally pure English common law, adopted by legislation and later developed judicially. In South Africa, the law of delict (tort) was originally Roman-Dutch but was later strongly influenced by the English common law. Under both systems, tort law is characterized by open-ended norms allowing extensive judicial development. This paper traces and compares the structural basis, methodology, policy, and trends of the judicial development of state and public-authority liability in the Israeli and South African jurisdictions. Specific factors that have impacted the development of state- and public-authority liability are: (1) constitutional values, (2) the courts’ recognition of the need for expanded protection of fundamental human rights and activism towards achieving such protection, (3) the multicultural nature of the societies, (4) problems of crime and security, and (5) worldwide trends, linked to consumerism, toward the widening of liability of the state and public authorities.Within essentially similar conceptual structures the South African courts have been much more conservative in their approach to state liability for pure economic loss than their Israeli counterparts. This can perhaps be attributed to a sense of priorities. In a developing country with huge disparities in wealth, the courts would naturally be inclined to prioritize safety and security of persons above pure economic loss. The South African courts have been similarly more conservative in cases involving administrative negligence and evidential loss.The development of the law on state and public-authority liability in Israel and South Africa is also the product of factors such as the levels of education, the effectiveness of the public service, and the history and pervasiveness of constitutional ordering. Despite important differences, the law in the two jurisdictions has developed from a broadly similar mixed background; the courts have adopted broadly similar methods and reasoning; and the outcomes show broadly similar trends.


2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-170
Author(s):  
Sibo Banda

AbstractCompetent courts in Malawi must, as courts have done in South Africa, undertake a radical path in order to enhance the common law position of distinct categories of persons. This article discusses judicial appreciation of the common law-changing function of a bill of rights and its associated values, and judicial understanding as to when such a function may be brought into play. The article examines approaches taken by courts in South Africa in determining the circumstances in which the South African Bill of Rights applies to private relationships, when private parties owe each other duties arising out of the Bill of Rights and the scope of a court's authority to amend the common law in that regard. The article projects the debate, analysis and critique of these approaches onto the Malawian legal landscape through a discussion of the tenant worker contracted on the Malawi private estate.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Matsemela

Freedom of testation is considered to be one of the founding principles of the South African law of testate succession. Testators are given freedom to direct how their estate should devolve and free rein to dispose of their assets as they deem fit. As a result, effect must be given to the expressed wishes of the testator. Prior to 1994, such freedom could be limited only by common law or statutory law; more recently, such freedom has been tested against the Constitution of South Africa. This means that a provision in a will cannot be enforced by the courts if it is contra bonos mores, impossible or too vague, in conflict with the law, or is deemed to be unconstitutional.Having regard to the unfair discrimination provisions of section 9(3) of the Final Constitution, can a court enforce a will or a trust deed which discriminates against potential beneficiaries on account of their race, gender, religion or disability? Will such clause pass the test of constitutionality, be justified or considered to achieve a legitimate objective? Can potential beneficiaries or anyone who has locus standi challenge the freedom of testation by relying on the freedoms and rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights? It is against this background that the paper attempts to answer these questions and explore the extent to which the Constitution has an impact on freedom of testation. The central thesis of the article is to determine whether clauses in wills or trust instruments which differentiate between different classes of beneficiary can be deemed to be valid. This is done by looking at several more recent cases that have appeared before our courts.


Author(s):  
Fatima Osman

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marita Carnelley ◽  
Juanita Easthorpe

There are various models for determining and allocating child support obligations post-divorce and many different principles upon which such a policy can be based. In most legal systems the parents retain the duty to support their needy children after divorce as it is primarily their obligation to ensure the adequate financial welfare of their children. This principle is applicable in both the South African and Canadian legal systems. In South Africa, in terms of both the common law and legislation, both parents must maintain their children “according to their respective means”. The awarding of a specific amount of maintenance is, however, a complex process calculated by the courts on a case-by-case basis mainly by considering two issues: the needs of the children and the parents’ ability to maintain their children within the circumstances and means of each of the parents. Although both aspects are important in a maintenance enquiry, the focus of this note is on the interpretation of the calculation of the contribution of each of the parents, especially the non-custodial parent. The interpretation of the concept “means” obviously has important consequences for the parties: the broader the interpretation of the “means” of a parent, the higher the proportion of the contribution of that parent would be towards the support of the children. This is especially important in South Africa where a substantial proportion of those who are obligated to pay maintenance is impecunious. The Canadian law rested on similar principles until 1997 when the federal government promulgated the Federal Child Support Guidelines as an amendment to the Divorce Act. The impact of these Guidelines on the calculation of the parental share of post-divorce child support has been far-reaching. The aim of this note is firstly to examine the meaning of the term “means” within the South African legal system as set out in the common law, the various statutes and as these have been interpreted by the majority of courts over the past century. The second aim is to give a brief overview of the Canadian Guidelines and to compare their current system with the South African scenario. The rationale for choosing this jurisdiction is (i) the fact that in both jurisdictions the courts have the ultimate say over the amount of support paid; and (ii) as the Canadian position before their 1997 amendments was similar to the current South Africa system, it was envisaged that by exploring their reasons for change and evaluating their current system, some useful insights might be gained in solving some problems experienced in the South African maintenance system. The note will conclude with some suggestions for reform in South Africa in light of the Canadian experience. 


Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

The state law of South Africa consists of the common law and the customary law. However, in reality there exist various cultural and religious communities who lead their private lives outside of state law. For example, the Muslim community in South Africa is a close-knit community which lives according to their own customs and usages. Muslims are subject to informal religious tribunals whose decisions and orders are neither recognised nor reviewable by the South African courts.The non-recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law causes unnecessary hardships, especially for women. A Muslim woman is often in a "catch two" situation. For example, on the one hand her attempts to divorce her husband in terms of Muslim law may be foiled by the relevant religious tribunal and, on the other hand, the South African courts may not provide the necessary relief, because they might not recognise the validity of her Muslim marriage. Increasingly, South African courts are faced with complex issues regarding the Muslim community. The last few years there has been a definite change in the courts' attitude with regard to the recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law. Contrary to pre1994 court cases, the recent court cases attempt to develop the common law to give recognition to certain aspects of Muslim personal law. This article attempts to give an overview of the recent case law that dealt with issues regarding the recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law. Another issue, which eventuates from the current situation, is whether the South African legal order should continue to have a dualistic legal order or whether we should opt for a unified legal order or even a pluralistic legal order. In order to address this issue, some comments on the current status of Muslim personal law will be made and, finally, in order to contribute to the debate regarding the recognition of Muslim personal law, optional models for the recognition of Muslim personal law will briefly be evaluated.


De Jure ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thulisile Brenda Njoko

In Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd 2 1943 All ER 35 it was held that a finding of a criminal court did not have any probative value in a subsequent civil action and was inadmissible as evidence. Despite the case being one of English origin, the South African courts have largely adopted this ruling as one grounded in our common law. In this paper, the judgment in the Hollington case is critically analysed in order to determine its continued applicability in the face of South Africa's existing law of evidence and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ("the Constitution"). It is argued that in light of the existing law, this rule no longer finds application in South Africa.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oyebanke Yebisi ◽  
Victoria Balogun

Marital rape is a form of sexual violence, which is often downplayed due to the common law position that a man cannot rape his wife. While certain jurisdictions have enacted laws criminalising it, other jurisdictions have yet to criminalise it. This paper focuses on the criminal aspects of marital rape and examines the laws regarding marital rape in South Africa and the general rape provisions in Nigeria. While marital rape is punishable under South African criminal law, it is not in Nigeria. In this paper, the provisions of the South African Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Other Related Matters) Act of 2007, the Criminal Code Act, and the Penal Code Act – Nigeria in relation to rape and marital rape – are analysed. This paper also discusses the South African Sexual Offences Court, sentencing for rape in the selected countries, and relevant case law. It concludes that South Africa (SA) has a generally good framework with respect to rape and marital rape, but the country should work more on the strict application of the laws in place. It also suggests that Nigeria should establish a sexual offences court using the South African model and should amend the Criminal Law to expressly criminalise marital rape.


Author(s):  
Lefa Sebolaisi Ntsoane

Many people do not own immovable property to offer as security but do have movable property which can be offered as security for the repayment of a debt. In today’s world where the costs of a motor car can exceed that of a house, the increasing value of movable things makes it a popular and appropriate security object. Under the common law pledge, delivery of the movable property from the pledgor (debtor) to the pledgee (creditor) has to take place in order for the pledgee to acquire a real security right in the property. Delivery of the property is aimed at ensuring compliance with the publicity principle. The principle of publicity entails that the existence of a real security must be known to the public. With the aim to promote commerce, certain countries have taken the initiative in reforming their laws on pledge to allow the debtor to retain possession of the movable property that serves as security. Furthermore, technology has advanced to a level where national registration systems which can be accessed easily and at minimal costs can be established. The South African legislature enacted the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993 which makes provision for a pledge without possession. This Act deemed a duly registered notarial bond over specified movable property to have been delivered as if delivery has in fact taken place thereby substituted the common law delivery requirement with registration in the Deeds Office. On 30 May 2013, the Belgian House of Representatives adopted a Belgian Pledge Act which allows for a non-possessory pledge on movable property subject to registration in a newly created public register called the Electronic Pledge Register. This article therefore examines the efficacy of the registration system of special notarial bonds in South African law and whether this form of registration complies with the publicity principle looking at the developments of a computerised registration system taking place in Belgium.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon Hoctor

The origins of the housebreaking crime (for the sake of brevity this term will be used throughout this note, rather than the bulkier (but more accurate) “housebreaking with the intent to commit a crime”) are inexorably bound up with the need to protect the dweller in his or her abode. From the earliest times the interest of a person in the safe and private habitation of his home has been treated reverently and regarded as deserving of special protection by the law. This concern is reflected by the fact that common-law jurisdictions have typically classified housebreaking as a crime against the habitation, which implies the right to “feel secure in one’s own home”. With the broadening of the ambit of the crime (variously referred to as burglary or breaking and entering in other jurisdictions) beyond merely protecting habitation, differing approaches have been taken in defining the nature of the premises that can be broken into. Thus in English law, to be a “building” within the definition of the crime (in terms of s 9(1) of the Theft Act, 1968) the structure is required to have some degree of permanence and an inhabited vehicle or vessel is specifically included in theterm “building” (s 9(4) of the Theft Act, 1968). In Canada, breaking and entering (in terms of s 348 of the Canadian Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c.C-46) include, within the understanding of a “structure” which can be broken into and entered, spaces enclosed by a fence, but not unenclosed spaces. The position in South Africa has not been definitively resolved, although it can at least be accepted that it is incorrect to state that the breaking into and entering can only be in respect of an immovable structure, and cannot be committed by breaking into a movable structure. What then is the South African position regarding the nature of a “premises” which is protected by the housebreaking crime?


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