Anarchism in Deleuze

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-292
Author(s):  
Jernej Kaluža
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Practice Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Basic Ideas ◽  
The One

In this article, we argue that Deleuze's philosophy could be understood as anarchistic in a specifically defined meaning. The imperative of immanence of thought, which we explicate mainly through the reading of Deleuze's Spinoza, on the one hand establishes indivisibility between theory and practice and on the other hand paradoxically orders disobedience. We argue for a thought that is immanent, adequate with its inner practice, for thought that cannot be forced. That is the basis on which we combine the reading of Deleuze, Spinoza, Nietzsche and some basic ideas from the contemporary anarchistic movement (Graeber) and the anarchistic tradition (Stirner). We do not try to argue for a certain form of political action. Our goal is to establish a field of thought, that is by its innermost ontological principles anarchistic: practice must be accompanied by its own theory. Adequate thought cannot be forced. This is a necessary condition for each consistent practice-theory.

scholarly journals Liberalism, Governmentality and Counter-Conduct; An Introduction to Foucauldian Analytics of Liberal Civil Society Notions

2015 ◽  
pp. 8-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miikka Pyykkönen
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Potential Field ◽  
Political Action ◽  
The Other ◽  
Coercive Power ◽  
Historical Reality ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

This article gives an analysis of Foucault’s studies of civil society and the various liberalist critiques of government. It follows from Foucault’s genealogical approach that “civil society” does not in itself possess any form of transcendental existence; its historical reality must be seen as the result of the productive nature of the power-knowledge-matrices. Foucault emphasizes that modern governmentality—and more specifically the procedures he names “the conduct of conduct”—is not exercised through coercive power and domination, but is dependent on the freedom and activeness of individuals and groups of society. Civil society is thus analyzed as fundamentally ambivalent: on the one hand civil society is a field where different kinds of technologies of governance meet the lives and wills of groups and individuals, but on the other hand it is a potential field of what Foucault called ‘counter-conduct’ – for both collective action and individual political action.

Performativity and Caring in Education: Toward an Ethic of Reimagination

2020 ◽  
pp. 105268462097206
Author(s):  
Jeff Walls
Keyword(s):  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Student Needs ◽  
Collaborative Relationships ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Balance Of Care ◽  
The One

Schools are expected to be sites of caring, but there is evidence that both students and adults often experience them as uncaring places. One reason is that a sustained and heavy policy emphasis on accountability and demonstrations of effectiveness has placed pressure on educators to perform in certain ways, and to care about things other than caring. This case study explores how leaders and teachers at two schools balance their efforts to care for students, on the one hand, with the performative pressures they feel, on the other hand. Teachers who were able to prioritize a balance of care used collaborative relationships with colleagues to manage the pressure they felt, and took a longer term, more emotionally attuned, and more inquiry-based approach to meeting student needs. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Leibniz on Apperception and Animal Souls

Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Miles
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
The One

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).

Voices Inside Schools - A Charter to Educate or a Mandate to Train: Conflicts between Theory and Practice

2000 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 524-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johanna Elena Hadden
Keyword(s):  
Sixth Grade ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
School Environments ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Grade Teacher ◽  
Teaching Position ◽  
Normative Practices ◽  
The One ◽  
Sixth Grade Teacher

In this article, Johanna Elena Hadden distinguishes between two very different ideas of teaching — a charter to educate and a mandate to train — through a retelling of her experience as a fifth- and sixth-grade teacher in Utah. On the one hand, Hadden asserts, some critical theorists suggest that teachers should be given a charter to educate in which they are encouraged, and expected, to challenge normative practices and policy. On the other hand, teachers are routinely given a mandate to train that requires them to follow administrative dictates without question or challenge. Hadden contends that by establishing and supporting a mandate to train, many school environments constrain teachers — through overt and hidden forms of control — from thinking and acting independently and, in turn, from training students to think and act independently. She further argues that the pressures created by administrative expectations frustrate teachers who may ultimately be forced to choose between compliance with pedagogical and curricular standards and leaving their teaching position.

scholarly journals Approximating Ideal Filters by Systems of Fractional Order

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Li
Keyword(s):  
Fractional Calculus ◽  
Fractional Order ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Present Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Ecg Signals ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Electrocardiogram Ecg

The contributions in this paper are in two folds. On the one hand, we propose a general approach for approximating ideal filters based on fractional calculus from the point of view of systems of fractional order. On the other hand, we suggest that the Paley and Wiener criterion might not be a necessary condition for designing physically realizable ideal filters. As an application of the present approach, we show a case in designing ideal filters for suppressing 50-Hz interference in electrocardiogram (ECG) signals.

scholarly journals Space, Place, Haven: Levinas’s Phenomenology of Home

Problemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 58-68
Author(s):  
Jolanta Saldukaitytė
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Space And Place ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Natural Place ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Positive Meaning ◽  
The One

By distinguishing between space and place, the article situates and analyses the meaning of the closest place – home – in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. The effort to encounter transcendence, to escape, to leave, to not be attached a particular place, and not to be driven by a nostalgia to return, is dominant in Levinas’s philosophy. This article shows that dwelling in a place, as settling in a home, also has a positive meaning for Levinas. This positive meaning comes, however, not from an ontological but from an ethical relationship with a place. The home is shown as chosen place, warm and human, as opposed to a given or natural place. On the one hand, the home is a necessary condition for security, but also the very condition of interiority and activity, of having the place in the world in contrast to thrownness. On the other hand, it is not a place where I is embodied and rooted in like a vegetable, but a place where I welcome the other.

Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Conception ◽  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

The concluding chapter addresses an apparent aporia: on the one hand, we have the Nietzschean argument that one must be causa sui for guilt to be justified, but on the other hand, we have the Heideggerian argument that not being causa sui is a necessary condition for guilt to be possible. The conclusion explains why this is only an apparent aporia. An alternative conception of guilt is sketched, one that rejects Nietzsche’s view of guilt as a form of self-punishment but retains Heidegger’s view that guilt expresses our normative commitments. This conception shows how guilt might nevertheless be justified.

The Medieval Reformulations of Conversation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Randall
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Realm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Ars Dictaminis ◽  
The One

Rhetoric as a whole fragmented during the medieval era, as did the conversational constellation in particular, not fully to cohere again until the humanist reintegration of the Renaissance. Yet the humanist recuperation did not restore an unchanged rhetoric. On the one hand, the concepts of friendship, familiarity, and conversatio had reoriented themselves around the universalizing Christian conception of community during rhetoric’s long medieval rupture, while the sermo of dialogue had begun to concern itself with that eminently Christian subject matter, the interiority of the soul. On the other hand, the ars dictaminis had shifted the medieval letter toward the public realm, and thus toward the traditional realm of oratory. Petrarch’s rediscovery of classical conversation retained these medieval innovations. The Renaissance variant of conversation that sprang from him would partly slough the theory and practice of its medieval predecessor—but the influence of Christianity and the ars dictaminis would endure.

Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth

Apeiron ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-344
Author(s):  
Whitney Schwab
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Epistemic Attitude ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The One ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment

Abstract This paper deals with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It argues that the central argument presented by Jonathan Barnes in favor of the view that skepticism precludes the possession of any belief fails. In brief, Barnes maintains that, because skepticism requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, no skeptic can, consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of truth; this entails, he argues, that no skeptic can make any judgments about anything and, hence, cannot come to possess any beliefs. I evaluate this argument in two ways: first, if we understand criteria of truth along the lines proposed by Sextus’ Hellenistic opponents, the argument fails because such criteria were introduced to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could count as knowledge, and not to guarantee the very possibility of making judgments in the first place. Second, if we broaden our conception of a criterion of truth, such that a criterion is any standard against which an impression can be evaluated, the argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of ‘possession’. On the one hand, in the sense in which someone must possess such a criterion in order to make judgments, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning their existence does not entail that she does not possess a criterion of truth. On the other hand, in the sense in which the skeptic does not possess such a criterion, possession of a criterion of truth is not a necessary condition for making judgments. Thus, I conclude that the skeptics’ epistemic attitude towards the existence of criteria of truth (i.e. suspension of judgment) does not entail that skeptics cannot possess any beliefs.

scholarly journals Business model maturity in management theory and practice – defining from an expert perspective

Management ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-103
Author(s):  
Przemysław Niewiadomski
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Business Model ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Management Theory ◽  
Agricultural Machinery ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The One

SummarySince many researchers and managers think about the essence, creation mechanisms and limits of the manufacturing model maturity, at this point, the author raises the question related to this issue: what dimensions (descriptions and desiderata) should be considered when conceptualizing this idea? The formulated question became a starting point and a point of conducting a creative synthesis, based, on the one hand, on a detailed analysis of the problem theory, and on the other hand – on the author’s own research. The above question and belief related to the existence of economic demand for results of application nature were the main inspiration to undertake research whose main purpose is to recognize: how the maturity of the business model is understood by selected experts operating in the Polish agricultural machinery sector?

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document