Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth

Apeiron ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-344
Author(s):  
Whitney Schwab

Abstract This paper deals with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It argues that the central argument presented by Jonathan Barnes in favor of the view that skepticism precludes the possession of any belief fails. In brief, Barnes maintains that, because skepticism requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, no skeptic can, consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of truth; this entails, he argues, that no skeptic can make any judgments about anything and, hence, cannot come to possess any beliefs. I evaluate this argument in two ways: first, if we understand criteria of truth along the lines proposed by Sextus’ Hellenistic opponents, the argument fails because such criteria were introduced to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could count as knowledge, and not to guarantee the very possibility of making judgments in the first place. Second, if we broaden our conception of a criterion of truth, such that a criterion is any standard against which an impression can be evaluated, the argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of ‘possession’. On the one hand, in the sense in which someone must possess such a criterion in order to make judgments, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning their existence does not entail that she does not possess a criterion of truth. On the other hand, in the sense in which the skeptic does not possess such a criterion, possession of a criterion of truth is not a necessary condition for making judgments. Thus, I conclude that the skeptics’ epistemic attitude towards the existence of criteria of truth (i.e. suspension of judgment) does not entail that skeptics cannot possess any beliefs.

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-234
Author(s):  
Warren C. Campbell

This article examines both 4 and 5 Ezra as two textual reactions to Roman imperialism utilizing Homi Bhabha's notion of ‘hybridity’. The central argument offered here is that 4 and 5 Ezra both exemplify resistance to and affiliation with the discourse of dominance integral to imperial ideology. Such reactions are, however, inverted. On the one hand, 4 Ezra primarily offers a theodicean resistance to the destruction of the Second Temple during the First Jewish Revolt (66–70 CE), but relies upon essentialized binaries integral to a colonial discourse of domination. On the other hand, 5 Ezra advances a notion of religious replacement in the aftermath of the Bar Kokhba revolt (132–135 CE); an expression of dominance that is simultaneously a strategy of communal preservation arising from a position of proximity to a Jewish heritage.


Dialogue ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Miles

InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Li

The contributions in this paper are in two folds. On the one hand, we propose a general approach for approximating ideal filters based on fractional calculus from the point of view of systems of fractional order. On the other hand, we suggest that the Paley and Wiener criterion might not be a necessary condition for designing physically realizable ideal filters. As an application of the present approach, we show a case in designing ideal filters for suppressing 50-Hz interference in electrocardiogram (ECG) signals.


Problemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 58-68
Author(s):  
Jolanta Saldukaitytė

By distinguishing between space and place, the article situates and analyses the meaning of the closest place – home – in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. The effort to encounter transcendence, to escape, to leave, to not be attached a particular place, and not to be driven by a nostalgia to return, is dominant in Levinas’s philosophy. This article shows that dwelling in a place, as settling in a home, also has a positive meaning for Levinas. This positive meaning comes, however, not from an ontological but from an ethical relationship with a place. The home is shown as chosen place, warm and human, as opposed to a given or natural place. On the one hand, the home is a necessary condition for security, but also the very condition of interiority and activity, of having the place in the world in contrast to thrownness. On the other hand, it is not a place where I is embodied and rooted in like a vegetable, but a place where I welcome the other.


2021 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat

The concluding chapter addresses an apparent aporia: on the one hand, we have the Nietzschean argument that one must be causa sui for guilt to be justified, but on the other hand, we have the Heideggerian argument that not being causa sui is a necessary condition for guilt to be possible. The conclusion explains why this is only an apparent aporia. An alternative conception of guilt is sketched, one that rejects Nietzsche’s view of guilt as a form of self-punishment but retains Heidegger’s view that guilt expresses our normative commitments. This conception shows how guilt might nevertheless be justified.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirna Pit

The Dutch, German and French languages display a variety of regularly used connectives all of which introduce causes, arguments or reasons, such as Dutch omdat, want and aangezien, German weil, denn and da, and French parce que, car and puisque. Why should these languages have different connectives to express the notion of backward causality? The central argument developed in this article is that the use of these connectives is dependent on the degree of subjectivity associated with the causal relation. The pre-eminence of this account with respect to prior accounts of the uses of these connectives is established on the basis of a series of corpus analyses. The outcomes show that the degree of subjectivity of the main participant involved in the causal relation strongly predicts the occurrence of one or another connective. A distinction can be made between objective connectives like omdat and doordat, parce que and weil on the one hand and subjective connectives like want and aangezien, car and puisque and denn and da on the other hand. No differences between the subjective connectives aangezien/want, puisque/car and denn/da could be observed in terms of subjectivity, but additional frequency data and analyses of translation practices revealed promising directions for supplementary explanations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-292
Author(s):  
Jernej Kaluža

In this article, we argue that Deleuze's philosophy could be understood as anarchistic in a specifically defined meaning. The imperative of immanence of thought, which we explicate mainly through the reading of Deleuze's Spinoza, on the one hand establishes indivisibility between theory and practice and on the other hand paradoxically orders disobedience. We argue for a thought that is immanent, adequate with its inner practice, for thought that cannot be forced. That is the basis on which we combine the reading of Deleuze, Spinoza, Nietzsche and some basic ideas from the contemporary anarchistic movement (Graeber) and the anarchistic tradition (Stirner). We do not try to argue for a certain form of political action. Our goal is to establish a field of thought, that is by its innermost ontological principles anarchistic: practice must be accompanied by its own theory. Adequate thought cannot be forced. This is a necessary condition for each consistent practice-theory.


Elenchos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-326
Author(s):  
Jie Tian

Abstract Plato's Theaetetus develops an inquiry concerning the definition of knowledge. Famously, after Socrates and Theaetetus have discussed the three candidates for the definition of knowledge, the end of the dialogue seems to leave us in a situation of aporia. The present article focuses on the last hypothesis raised in the dialogue and tries to determine whether this hypothesis can be seen, under appropriate qualification, as acceptable within a Platonic framework. This hypothesis is connected with a dream theory that unfolds two crucial factors for understanding the definition of knowledge, i.e. elements and logos. So the aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to make clear what elements properly are; on the other hand, to find an account of logos suitable to make it a necessary condition for the definition of knowledge. As will emerge from this paper, the first two candidates for the definition of knowledge are indeed not sufficient for gaining an adequate definition, but they nonetheless foreshadow the third hypothesis and are necessary conditions for understanding the third one.


1999 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 1127-1156 ◽  
Author(s):  
PÉTER BÁLINT

Chaotic and ergodic properties are discussed for various subclasses of cylindric billiards. A common feature of the studied systems is that they satisfy a natural necessary condition for ergodicity and hyperbolicity, the so-called transitivity condition. The relation of our discussion to former results on hard ball systems is twofold. On the one hand, by slight adaptation of the proofs we may discuss hyperbolic and ergodic properties of 3 or 4 particles with (possibly restricted) hard ball interactions in any dimensions. On the other hand, a key tool in our investigations is a kind of connected path formula for cylindric billiards, which together with the conservation of momenta gives back, when applied to the special case of hard ball systems, the classical connected path formula.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 96-110
Author(s):  
Ivana Mokra

The lawful procedure in evidentiary process is a conditio sine qua non of the admissibility of evidence. In other words, it is a necessary condition for the admission of evidence in criminal proceedings. The violation of this condition leads to procedural errors leading to the unlawfulness of the evidence, as a result of which the accused may be acquitted. For this reason, it's the aim of this article, not only to define the procedural errors, whose incidence is particularly noticeable in providing evidence by law enforcement authorities involved in criminal proceedings, but also to analyse their impact on the outcome of the criminal proceedings, i.e. the decision about the guilt and punishment of the accused and on the basis of a specific example, to point out shortcomings which would be appropriate to prevent de lege ferenda. The presented article provides, on the one hand, a brief insight into the basic terminology related to the mentioned topic, explains the content and purpose of the legislation and on, the other hand, acquires more practical view, based on an analysis of selected example of procedural error in evidentiary process.


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