Would Scots Law Recognise a Dutch Same-Sex Marriage?

2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth McK Norrie

The opening, in the Netherlands, of the institution of marriage to same-sex couples will sooner or later give rise to the question of whether the Scottish international private law rules relating to marriage will permit or even demand the recognition here ofsuch unions validly entered into there. It is suggested in this article that the proper approach is not to ask whether the Scottish court will recognise the relationship as the institution ofmarriage as such, but whether the Scottish court will give effect to consequencesflowingfrom thefact that the relationship has been sanctioned by the Dutch state. For many purposes the answer to that question is unavoidably yes, and it is argued that since that is so then on grounds ofprinciple, policy, and practicality the Scottish court should give effect to such consequences as it would in relation to a Dutch opposite-sex union. There is no public policy objection to doing so.

Author(s):  
Stephen Macedo

This chapter examines the many “legal incidents” of marriage: the specific benefits, responsibilities, obligations, and protections that are associated with marriage by law. While critics focus on the special privileges or benefits that spouses acquire in marriage, those are balanced by special obligations. The chapter suggests that the whole package seems reasonably appropriate for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. It also considers the ways in which marriage seems to promote the good of spouses, children, and society, along with the class divide that now characterizes marriage and parenting. It argues that this class divide, not same-sex marriage, is the great challenge for the future.


Family Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 92-94
Author(s):  
Roiya Hodgson

This chapter discusses the scope of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004) which came into force on 5 December 2005 and the formation of civil partnerships. It outlines civil partnership and same-sex marriage under The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. It also explains the differences between civil partnership and marriage. Once a partnership has been formed, civil partners assume many legal rights and responsibilities for each other, third parties, and the State. It does explain that adultery, however, is not a fact to establish the ground for dissolution of a civil partnership as it is in marriage. The Civil Partnership (Opposite-sex Couples) Regulations 2019 are also outlined.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-377
Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill

AbstractThis article compares the difficulty in achieving a public stance of neutrality toward sexual orientation with the difficulty in achieving neutrality toward religious belief. Strict separation treats religion as a private commitment, with firm limits on government cooperation with religion and strong protection for free exercise. Formal neutrality discounts religion as a basis either for conferring special benefits or for withholding generally available benefits. Positive neutrality attends to the practical effects of public policy, sometimes requiring an abandonment of nonestablishment in favor of policies that allow for greater protection for free exercise of religion. I argue that none of these forms of neutrality establishes impartiality regarding either religious belief or same-sex marriage. First, Michael McConnell's “disestablishment” approach to sexual orientation and same-sex marriage instantiates are neither neutrality nor civic equality. Second, while formal neutrality may render an establishment more inclusive, it may exclude those whose beliefs and practices are not deemed in accordance with public purposes. Third, although positive neutrality may remove burdens from same-sex couples whose conscientious convictions may impel them to marry, it may still favor some kinds of practices over others.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Hayward

OPPOSITE-SEX couples are prohibited from forming a civil partnership. Following the introduction of same-sex marriage, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not extended to opposite-sex couples, resulting in the unusual position that English law permits same-sex couples access to two relationship forms (marriage and civil partnership) yet limits opposite-sex couples to one (marriage). This discrimination was recently challenged in the courts by an opposite-sex couple, Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan, who wish to enter a civil partnership owing to their deeply-rooted ideological opposition to marriage. Rejecting marriage as a patriarchal institution and believing that a civil partnership would offer a more egalitarian public expression of their relationship, the couple argued that the current ban constitutes a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-49
Author(s):  
Mauricio Albarracín ◽  
Mauricio Albarracín

In 2011 the Colombian Constitutional Court laid the groundwork for gay marriage, ruling it unconstitutional to exclude same-sex couples from the benefits of legal marriage. Instead of extending marriage to same-sex couples, however, the Court’s decision left it to Congress to pass a law regulating such unions. Sharply divided on the issue, Congress failed to act. The then-Inspector General, a conservative Catholic, launched a wide-ranging legal and moral attack on marriage rights for same-sex couples, an attack which lasted until the Constitutional Court in 2016 expressly authorized these weddings. The attack included not only briefs and legal actions but also disciplinary action against public officials that celebrated same-sex weddings. This article seeks to unpack both the subtle and overt ways in which religious homophobia reflects and is reflected in popular culture and argues for a complex understanding of the relationship between homophobia in popular culture, religious definition of homosexuality as sinful, and the recourse to Constitutional Law by advocates for and against same-sex marriage.


2006 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Dickey Young

Same-sex marriage is an important topic in Canadian courts, legislatures and churches today. This paper explores the sorts of official arguments put forth in public policy venues by Canadian churches and then proceeds to analyze these contributions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle L. Dion ◽  
Jordi Díez

AbstractLatin America has been at the forefront of the expansion of rights for same-sex couples. Proponents of same-sex marriage frame the issue as related to human rights and democratic deepening; opponents emphasize morality tied to religious values. Elite framing shapes public opinion when frames resonate with individuals’ values and the frame source is deemed credible. Using surveys in 18 Latin American countries in 2010 and 2012, this article demonstrates that democratic values are associated with support for same-sex marriage while religiosity reduces support, particularly among strong democrats. The tension between democratic and religious values is particularly salient for women, people who live outside the capital city, and people who came of age during or before democratization.


Author(s):  
Marie Evertsson ◽  
Eva Jaspers ◽  
Ylva Moberg

AbstractThis chapter introduces the concept of parentalization, defined as the ability to become parents and be recognized as such, both legally and via social policies. Applying the concept to same-sex couples, we examine how states may facilitate or hinder the transition to parenthood through laws and policies in five Northern European countries; Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Trends in the number of children zero years of age in married/cohabiting same-sex couples suggest a link between parentalization and realized parenthood. As partly indicated by these trends, parentalization is a gendered concept, and parenthood is more readily available to some couples than to others. Perhaps most importantly, very few same-sex couples have been able to jointly adopt a child. The fact that married female couples face fewer barriers to parentalization than other non-traditional couples partly reflects dominant norms on gender and motherhood.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 779-800
Author(s):  
Shawna M. Young

Currently, same-sex couples that are legally married in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage may not be able to divorce if they move to Texas. Of the few cases tried in Texas, most courts refused to grant the samesex divorce because the courts refused to recognize the underlying marriage. Because these couples cannot simply return to the granting state due to most states’ divorce residency requirements, they cannot divorce and face untold issues due to this inability. While Texas does offer the opportunity for the couple to declare the marriage void, declaring the marriage void is not an adequate legal remedy and may not prevent property and other legal issues. Instead, Texas should analyze divorce as implicating rights separate from those implicated by marriage. Based on such analysis, Texas should grant same-sex divorces. While several authors have addressed this issue from a national standpoint, this Comment addresses the issue as it stands in Texas, where a jurisdictional split between the courts of appeals makes it ripe for discussion.


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