scholarly journals The Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment Insurance Receipt: New Evidence from a Regression Kink Design in Missouri, 2003-2013

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Card ◽  
Andrew Johnston ◽  
Pauline Leung ◽  
Alexandre Mas ◽  
Zhuan Pei
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Duration Of Unemployment ◽  
Regression Kink Design ◽  
New Evidence

scholarly journals The Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment Insurance Receipt: New Evidence from a Regression Kink Design in Missouri, 2003–2013

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 126-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Card ◽  
Andrew Johnston ◽  
Pauline Leung ◽  
Alexandre Mas ◽  
Zhuan Pei
Keyword(s):  
Administrative Data ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
The State ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Experimental Variation ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Duration Of Unemployment ◽  
Regression Kink Design ◽  
New Evidence

We provide new evidence on the effect of the unemployment insurance (UI) weekly benefit amount on unemployment insurance spells based on administrative data from the state of Missouri covering the period 2003-2013. Identification comes from a regression kink design that exploits the quasi-experimental variation around the kink in the UI benefit schedule. We find that UI durations are more responsive to benefit levels during the recession and its aftermath, with an elasticity between 0.65 and 0.9 as compared to about 0.35 pre-recession.

scholarly journals Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 243-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Landais
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Time Profile ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Search Effort ◽  
Benefit Level ◽  
The Us ◽  
Regression Kink Design

I show how, in the tradition of the dynamic labor supply literature, one can identify the moral hazard effects and liquidity effects of unemployment insurance (UI) using variations along the time profile of unemployment benefits. I use this strategy to investigate the anatomy of labor supply responses to UI. I identify the effect of benefit level and potential duration in the regression kink design using kinks in the schedule of benefits in the US. My results suggest that the response of search effort to UI benefits is driven as much by liquidity effects as by moral hazard effects. (JEL D82, J22, J65)

scholarly journals Front-Loading the Unemployment Benefit: An Empirical Assessment

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 140-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Lindner ◽  
Balázs Reizer
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Behavioral Responses ◽  
Sharp Change ◽  
Unemployment Benefit ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Cost Increase ◽  
Empirical Assessment ◽  
Pareto Improving

We estimate the effect of front-loading unemployment benefit payments on nonemployment duration and reemployment wages. Exploiting a sharp change in the path of benefits for those who claimed unemployment benefits after November 1, 2005 in Hungary, we show that nonemployment duration fell by two weeks, while reemployment wages rose by 1.4 percent as a result of front-loading. We show that these behavioral responses were large enough to offset the mechanical cost increase of the unemployment insurance. We argue that our results indicate that benefit front-loading was a Pareto improving policy reform as both unemployed and employed workers were made better off. (JEL D91, J31, J64, J65)

scholarly journals Equilibrium unemployment and the duration of unemployment benefits

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 1385-1409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Lalive ◽  
Jan C. van Ours ◽  
Josef Zweimüller
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Equilibrium Unemployment ◽  
Duration Of Unemployment

scholarly journals Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yann Algan ◽  
Pierre Cahuc
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Civic Virtue ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
Labor Market Institutions ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Public Insurance ◽  
Civic Attitudes ◽  
Civic Virtues ◽  
Cross Country

We argue civic virtue plays a key role in explaining the design of public insurance against unemployment risks by solving moral hazard issues which hinder the efficiency of unemployment insurance. We show, in a simple model, that economies with stronger civic virtues are more prone to provide insurance through unemployment benefits rather than through job protection. We provide cross-country empirical evidence of a strong correlation between civic attitudes and the design of unemployment benefits and employment protection in OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2003. We then use an epidemiological approach to estimate the existence of a potential causal relationship from inherited civic virtue to labor market insurance institutions. (JEL: J41, J65, J68, Z13)

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