scholarly journals Evolutionary Processes in Quantum Decision Theory

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav I. Yukalov

The review presents the basics of quantum decision theory, with an emphasis on temporary processes in decision making. The aim is to explain the principal points of the theory. How an operationally-testable, rational choice between alternatives differs from a choice decorated by irrational feelings is elucidated. Quantum-classical correspondence is emphasized. A model of quantum intelligence network is described. Dynamic inconsistencies are shown to be resolved in the frame of the quantum decision theory.

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (05) ◽  
pp. 659-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
VYACHESLAV I. YUKALOV ◽  
DIDIER SORNETTE

One of the most complex systems is the human brain whose formalized functioning is characterized by decision theory. We present a "Quantum Decision Theory" of decision-making, based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to explain a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision-making of real human beings. The theory describes entangled decision-making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference of composite prospects. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage's sure-thing principle (disjunction effect) can be explained as a result of the interference of intentions, when making decisions under uncertainty. The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. We demonstrate that all known anomalies and paradoxes, documented in the context of classical decision theory, are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes, all of which allow the finding of straightforward explanations in the frame of the developed quantum approach.


Author(s):  
V. I. Yukalov ◽  
D. Sornette

A rigorous general definition of quantum probability is given, which is valid not only for elementary events but also for composite events, for operationally testable measurements as well as for inconclusive measurements, and also for non-commuting observables in addition to commutative observables. Our proposed definition of quantum probability makes it possible to describe quantum measurements and quantum decision-making on the same common mathematical footing. Conditions are formulated for the case when quantum decision theory reduces to its classical counterpart and for the situation where the use of quantum decision theory is necessary.


2006 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 157-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edna Ullmann-Margalit

I want to focus on some of the limits of decision theory that are of interest to the philosophical concern with practical reasoning and rational choice. These limits should also be of interest to the social-scientists' concern with Rational Choice.Let me start with an analogy. Classical Newtonian physics holds good and valid for middle-sized objects, but not for the phenomena of the very little, micro, sub-atomic level or the very large, macro, outer-space level: different theories, concepts and laws apply there. Similarly, I suggest that we might think of the theory of decisionmaking as relating to middle-sized, ordinary decisions, and to them only. There remain the two extremes, the very ‘small’ decisions on the one hand and the very ‘big’ decisions on the other. These may pose a challenge to the ordinary decision theory and may consequently require a separate treatment.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. G. Williams

AbstractInformation can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mona Riabacke ◽  
Mats Danielson ◽  
Love Ekenberg

Comparatively few of the vast amounts of decision analytical methods suggested have been widely spread in actual practice. Some approaches have nevertheless been more successful in this respect than others. Quantitative decision making has moved from the study of decision theory founded on a single criterion towards decision support for more realistic decision-making situations with multiple, often conflicting, criteria. Furthermore, the identified gap between normative and descriptive theories seems to suggest a shift to more prescriptive approaches. However, when decision analysis applications are used to aid prescriptive decision-making processes, additional demands are put on these applications to adapt to the users and the context. In particular, the issue of weight elicitation is crucial. There are several techniques for deriving criteria weights from preference statements. This is a cognitively demanding task, subject to different biases, and the elicited values can be heavily dependent on the method of assessment. There have been a number of methods suggested for assessing criteria weights, but these methods have properties which impact their applicability in practice. This paper provides a survey of state-of-the-art weight elicitation methods in a prescriptive setting.


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