scholarly journals Evolutionary Game for Content Cache in a mm-Wave-Based Vehicular Fog

Electronics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1794
Author(s):  
Wooseong Kim
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Network Performance ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Fog Computing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Spatial Diversity ◽  
Social Utility ◽  
Beam Forming ◽  
Large Bandwidth ◽  
Content Cache

Vehicular fog computing is attractive for sharing computing resources and data for safety and infortainment of self-driving cars. Recently, the V2X communication technology using mm-Wave frequency spectrum accelerates such future mobile computing with large bandwidth and beam-forming using a directional antenna. Although the beam-forming technique requires a complicate procedure for beam alignment, it can reduce mutual interference by spatial diversity. From the beam-forming scheduling, the vehicular fog can improve network performance, which is limited by data locations. Beams toward a vehicle for the same content should be scheduled in the time domain. Instead, we propose to replicate the content to multiple vehicles nearby to diversify beam directions. However, it is a challenge for vehicles to cache the content because the content caching costs not only limited local storage, but data transmission for other vehicles. For this, we adopt evolutionary game theory in which vehicles learn an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) from repeated games and maximize social utility. In this paper, we contribute to modeling a road segmentation for the mm-Wave V2X communication in order to derive connectivity probability with distributed content caches for the vehicular fog, and centralized and distributed algorithms for the evolutionary content cache game. From experiments, we confirm that content cache can improve V2X connectivity and the proposed evolution algorithm leads vehicles to choose the ESS for the content cache in the vehicular fog.

scholarly journals Evolution of populations with strategy-dependent time delays

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacek Miȩkisz ◽  
Marek Bodnar
Keyword(s):  
Stationary State ◽  
Time Delays ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Small Time ◽  
Stochastic Perturbations ◽  
New Type ◽  
Novel Behavior

AbstractWe address the issue of stability of coexistence of two strategies with respect to time delays in evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that a microscopic model of evolutionary games with a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (a globally asymptotically stable interior stationary state in the standard replicator dynamics) and with strategy-dependent time delays leads to a new type of replicator dynamics. It describes the time evolution of fractions of the population playing given strategies and the size of the population. Unlike in all previous models, an interior stationary state of such dynamics depends continuously on time delays and at some point it might disappear, no cycles are present. In particular, this means that an arbitrarily small time delay changes an interior stationary state. Moreover, at certain time delays, there may appear another interior stationary state.Author summarySocial and biological processes are usually described by ordinary or partial differential equations, or by Markov processes if we take into account stochastic perturbations. However, interactions between individuals, players or molecules, naturally take time. Results of biological interactions between individuals may appear in the future, and in social models, individuals or players may act, that is choose appropriate strategies, on the basis of the information concerning events in the past. It is natural therefore to introduce time delays into evolutionary game models. It was usually observed, and expected, that small time delays do not change the behavior of the system and large time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of evolutionary games with strategy-dependent time delays, in which payoffs appear some time after interactions of individuals, lead to a new type of replicator dynamics. Unlike in all previous models, interior stationary states of such dynamics depend continuously on time delays. This shows that effects of time delays are much more complex than it was previously thought.

Quality Evaluation of Cloud and Fog Computing Services in 5G Networks

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stojan Kitanov ◽  
Borislav Popovski ◽  
Toni Janevski
Keyword(s):  
Network Performance ◽  
Fog Computing ◽  
High Mobility ◽  
Network Control ◽  
5G Networks ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Network Function ◽  
Computing Services ◽  
5G Network ◽  
Intelligent Networking

Because of the increased computing and intelligent networking demands in 5G network, cloud computing alone encounters too many limitations, such as requirements for reduced latency, high mobility, high scalability, and real-time execution. A new paradigm called fog computing has emerged to resolve these issues. Fog computing distributes computing, data processing, and networking services to the edge of the network, closer to end users. Fog applied in 5G significantly improves network performance in terms of spectral and energy efficiency, enable direct device-to-device wireless communications, and support the growing trend of network function virtualization and separation of network control intelligence from radio network hardware. This chapter evaluates the quality of cloud and fog computing services in 5G network, and proposes five algorithms for an optimal selection of 5G RAN according to the service requirements. The results demonstrate that fog computing is a suitable technology solution for 5G networks.

scholarly journals The Applications and Complexity Analysis Based on Network Embedding Behaviors under Evolutionary Game Framework

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Xin Su ◽  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Shubing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Biological Evolution ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Network Embedding ◽  
Convergence Process ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
Embedding Strategy

In this paper, we use the dynamic mechanism of biological evolution to simulate the enterprises’ bounded rational game. We construct game models of network embedding behaviors of horizontal and vertical enterprises in supply chain, explain the repeated games of random pairs of enterprises by replication dynamic differential equations, study the characteristics and evolution trend of this flow, conduct simulation experiments, clarify the evolution direction and law of network embedding strategy selection of supply chain enterprises, and discuss the stable state of evolutionary game and its dynamic convergence process. The results show that the probability of supply chain enterprises choosing a network embedding strategy is related to the enterprises’ special assets investment cost, cooperation cost, network income, and cooperation benefits. Supply chain enterprises should reduce the special assets investment cost and cooperation cost, maximize network income and cooperation income, narrow the gap between the extra-cooperation profit and the current cooperation profit, and restrain them from violating cooperation contracts or taking opportunistic actions.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Financial Risk Decision-Making in Global Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi Li ◽  
Guanghao Jin ◽  
Shen Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Financial Risk ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Global Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Environment ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Cooperation Strategy

This paper focuses on the game evolution process and its influencing factors of financial risk cooperation behavior between suppliers and manufacturers in global supply chain system. Using two-population evolutionary game theory, the performance of supply chain members under financial risk environment is modeled. Further, the proposed financial risk game model is applied to simulation cases of global supply chain. Based on the theory analysis and simulation results, it is shown that the cooperation strategy is the optimal evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for all supply chain members, when facing the high financial risk. The financial risk-sharing coefficient can be regarded as an adjuster that affects risk ESS of both suppliers and manufacturers under the low financial risk setting. By reducing the financial risk-sharing ratio of one supply chain player, his intention of adopting cooperation strategy would be enhanced. Finally, it is observed that financial risk sharing approach may lead to the alignment among supply chain members. Therefore, setting up an effective financial risk-sharing mechanism is beneficial to realize sustainable development of global supply chain.

Reciprocal Social Strategy in Social Repeated Games and Emergence of Social Norms

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 1760007
Author(s):  
Chi-Kong Chan ◽  
Jianye Hao ◽  
Ho-Fung Leung
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Social Utility ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Artificial Society ◽  
Social Strategy ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Individual ◽  
High Level

In an artificial society where agents repeatedly interact with one another, effective coordination among agents is generally a challenge. This is especially true when the participating agents are self-interested, and that there is no central authority to coordinate, and direct communication or negotiation are not possible. Recently, the problem was studied in a paper by Hao and Leung, where a new repeated game mechanism for modeling multi-agent interactions as well as a new reinforcement learning based agent learning method were proposed. In particular, the game mechanism differs from traditional repeated games in that the agents are anonymous, and the agents interact with randomly chosen opponents during each iteration. Their learning mechanism allows agents to coordinate without negotiations. The initial results had been promising. However, extended simulation also reveals that the outcomes are not stable in the long run in some cases, as the high level of cooperation is eventually not sustainable. In this work, we revisit he problem and propose a new learning mechanism as follows. First, we propose an enhanced Q-learning-based framework that allows the agents to better capture both the individual and social utilities that they have learned through observations. Second, we propose a new concept of \social attitude" for determining the action of the agents throughout the game. Simulation results reveal that this approach can achieve higher social utility, including close-to-optimal results in some scenarios, and more importantly, the results are sustainable with social norms emerging.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Games with Fuzzy Payoffs

2020 ◽  
pp. 63-71
Author(s):  
Haozhen Situ
Keyword(s):  
Fuzzy Set ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Fuzzy Decision ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Fuzzy Payoff ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
The Membership Function

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in symmetric two player games with fuzzy payoffs. Particularly, every strategy is assigned a fuzzy membership that describes to what degree it is an ESS in presence of uncertainty. The fuzzy set of ESS characterize the nature of ESS. The proposed approach avoids loss of any information that happens by the defuzzification method in games and handles uncertainty of payoffs through all steps of finding an ESS. We use the satisfaction function to compare fuzzy payoffs, and adopts the fuzzy decision rule to obtain the membership function of the fuzzy set of ESS. The theorem shows the relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy Nash equilibrium. The numerical results illustrate the proposed method is an appropriate generalization of ESS to fuzzy payoff games.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Behavior of Green Technology Innovation in Construction Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

Buildings ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Qing’e Wang ◽  
Wei Lai ◽  
Mengmeng Ding ◽  
Qi Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism

The dynamic evolution game model is built by using evolutionary game theory, and the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed by matlab2018b software in this paper. The cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism are comprehensively considered in this model, and numerical simulations of the influence of various influencing factors on the cooperation strategy selection of green technology innovation for construction enterprises are carried out. Then, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that the cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism have a significant impact on the cooperative evolution direction of green technology innovation for construction enterprises, separately. Stronger cooperation willingness or higher relative value of positive spillover, or reasonable income distribution can promote partners to adopt active cooperative strategies, while appropriately increasing punishment intensity can prevent opportunistic behaviors and improve the probability of success of cooperative innovation.

The sustainable development of university student loans based on the evolutionary game

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Xiaoqiong You ◽  
Wenke Wang ◽  
Ting Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Student Loans ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
University Student ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Impacting Factors

Purpose National student loans help solve the problem of tuition fees for students from poor families to a great extent. This paper aims to study the behavior of three main players involved in university student loans, namely, universities, banks and students and explores necessary conditions for promoting the steady development of student loans, as well as the sustainability of cooperation and coordination among players, thus promoting the further development of student loans. Design/methodology/approach First, from the perspectives of the three related players of banks, students and universities and their behavior, this paper establishes a three-player behavioral evolutionary game model, conducts a sustainable game analysis among the different players, and by replicating the dynamic equations with the Jacobian matrix solve the evolutionarily stable strategy. Finally, applying MATLAB tools, a sensitivity analysis of relevant impacting factors is carried out to explore the influencing mechanism of the sustainable development of student loans. Findings To achieve the mechanism of mutual coordination and cooperation between participants, banks need to be guided to actively issue student loans and conduct strict loan review. College students should be encouraged to establish good credit and strengthen penalties should be implemented for violations of regulations. Universities should be encouraged to help banks reduce information asymmetry, promote financial knowledge and student integrity education and promote the sustainable development of national student loans. Originality/value This research will help scholars better understand the interaction mechanism among universities, banks and students, and promote the sustainable development of national student loans.

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