scholarly journals The Applications and Complexity Analysis Based on Network Embedding Behaviors under Evolutionary Game Framework

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Xin Su ◽  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Shubing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Biological Evolution ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Network Embedding ◽  
Convergence Process ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
Embedding Strategy

In this paper, we use the dynamic mechanism of biological evolution to simulate the enterprises’ bounded rational game. We construct game models of network embedding behaviors of horizontal and vertical enterprises in supply chain, explain the repeated games of random pairs of enterprises by replication dynamic differential equations, study the characteristics and evolution trend of this flow, conduct simulation experiments, clarify the evolution direction and law of network embedding strategy selection of supply chain enterprises, and discuss the stable state of evolutionary game and its dynamic convergence process. The results show that the probability of supply chain enterprises choosing a network embedding strategy is related to the enterprises’ special assets investment cost, cooperation cost, network income, and cooperation benefits. Supply chain enterprises should reduce the special assets investment cost and cooperation cost, maximize network income and cooperation income, narrow the gap between the extra-cooperation profit and the current cooperation profit, and restrain them from violating cooperation contracts or taking opportunistic actions.

scholarly journals Research on the Evolutionary Game of Construction and Demolition Waste (CDW) Recycling Units’ Green Behavior, Considering Remanufacturing Capability

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (17) ◽  
pp. 9268
Author(s):  
Xingwei Li ◽  
Ruonan Huang ◽  
Jiachi Dai ◽  
Jingru Li ◽  
Qiong Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Construction And Demolition Waste ◽  
Demolition Waste ◽  
Construction Waste ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Effective Development ◽  
The Impact

At present, China has not yet formed an effective development model for the industrialization of construction waste. The level of construction waste treatment and resource utilization is still low, and recycled products also lack market competitiveness. In order to promote the effective development of the remanufactured construction and demolition waste supply chain better, and based on the present situation, this manuscript establishes a game model for recycling units in two different situations: with and without remanufacturing capabilities. However, most existing studies have determined that all recycling units have remanufacturing capabilities. In the first situation, the main players of the game are recycling units with remanufacturing capabilities and consumers. In the second situation, the main players of the game are recycling units without remanufacturing capabilities and the third-party remanufacturer with remanufacturing ability. Therefore, our research can ascertain the optimal strategy choices of both parties in the game under different return situations and discuss the impact of changes to related parameters through numerical simulations. The results show: (1) When the recycling unit has remanufacturing capabilities, corporate leadership and government supervision rate have positive effects on its evolution to strict manufacturing. Only a high supervision rate can effectively suppress the negative impact of speculative gains and drive the system to (strict manufacturing; positive). Furthermore, the higher the supervision rate, the faster the system will converge. Then, the consumer’s payment difference coefficient has a negative effect on the evolution of the recycling unit to strict manufacturing. The larger the payment difference coefficient, the faster the system will converge to a stable state (tendency to formal manufacturing; negative). (2) When the recycling unit does not have the ability to remanufacture, the government cost subsidy rate and the recycling unit’s effort profit coefficient have positive effects on the recycling unit’s evolution to the direction of effort. Meanwhile, the larger the profit coefficient of the recovery unit’s effort, the faster the system will converge. The conclusions obtained provide certain theoretical guidance for the decision making of CDW recycling supply chain recovery units and relevant government departments.

scholarly journals The Applications and Complexity Analysis Based on Supply Chain Enterprises’ Green Behaviors under Evolutionary Game Framework

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 10987
Author(s):  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Xin Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Reference Value ◽  
Collaborative Management ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
Green Investment ◽  
Green Behavior ◽  
The Government

Green behaviors adopted by supply chain companies are conducive to resource conservation and environmental protection and enhancing their core competitive advantages. By constructing a game model of green behavior of supply chain companies, this research deeply analyzes the main influencing factors of green behaviors adopted by supply chain companies. It uses dynamic evolution game analysis and simulation experiment methods to explore the path evolution direction and dynamic convergence process of green behavior strategy choices of these companies, so as to provide reference value for green behavior decision-making of supply chain enterprises. The research results show that the probability of supply chain enterprises choosing green behavior strategies is related to factors such as enterprise green investment income and costs, co-benefits, spillover benefits, greenness and output of raw materials or products, government green subsidy coefficients, and fines. Supply chain enterprises should reduce the cost of green investment, maximize the profit of green investment, and increase the greenness of raw materials or products; the government should increase the coefficient of green subsidies and encourage supply chain enterprises to actively participate in the collaborative management of the green supply chain.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

scholarly journals On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics

1999 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 169-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Barkley Rosser
Keyword(s):  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Interacting Particle Systems ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Dynamics ◽  
Self Organized ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Interacting Particle ◽  
Self Organized Criticality

Complex economic nonlinear dynamics endogenously do not converge to a point, a limit cycle, or an explosion. Their study developed out of earlier studies of cybernetic, catastrophic, and chaotic systems. Complexity analysis stresses interactions among dispersed agents without a global controller, tangled hierarchies, adaptive learning, evolution, and novelty, and out-of-equilibrium dynamics. Complexity methods include interacting particle systems, self-organized criticality, and evolutionary game theory, to simulate artificial stock markets and other phenomena. Theoretically, bounded rationality replaces rational expectations. Complexity theory influences empirical methods and restructures policy debates.

A decision framework for the analysis of green supply chain contracts: An evolutionary game approach

2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 2965-2976 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sikhar Barari ◽  
Gaurav Agarwal ◽  
W.J.(Chris) Zhang ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty ◽  
M.K. Tiwari
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Framework ◽  
Supply Chain Contracts

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

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