scholarly journals Parties’ Preferences for Office and Policy Goals

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 6
Author(s):  
Anna Bassi
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Expert Survey ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Preference Ratings ◽  
The Government ◽  
Party Behavior ◽  
Survey Protocol

Although parties’ preferences for office and policy goals have been featured by many rational choice models of party behavior and a majority of coalition theories, the literature still lacks a measure and a comprehensive analysis of how parties’ preferences vary among parties and across countries. This study aims to fill this gap by presenting the results of an original expert survey protocol, which finds that parties pursue both goals simultaneously as office is sought both as and an end and as a means to affect policy, and that the degree to which they prefer policy versus office objectives varies across parties and countries. I provide an application of the preference ratings for policy versus office in the context of government formation, by using the ratings to solve for and predict the equilibrium coalition that should have formed in Spain after the 2015 elections. The government predicted by the model matches the government that formed, providing evidence of the ability of the preference ratings to generate reliable predictions of the composition of government coalitions.

Maximizing Utility vis-à-vis Developing Countries

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Blodgett Bermeo
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The Government ◽  
Development Outcomes

This chapter develops a formal model of targeted development. It starts from the assumption that governments in industrialized states seek to maximize their own utility in interactions with developing countries. Development concerns compete with other policy goals for scarce government resources. The level of development resources an industrialized country government targets to a particular developing country depends on the weight the government places on development in that country as well as the efficiency of the country in turning resources into development outcomes that the industrialized state values. One of the key insights of the model is that, as governments work to maximize the utility gained per dollar (or euro, yen, etc.) spent, development motives will influence policy in multiple issue areas. The chapter also draws out implications of the theory for each of the issue areas examined in the empirical chapters.

Coalitions and Government Formation: An Empirically Relevant Theory

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Budge ◽  
Valentine Herman
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Real World ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
The Real ◽  
Relevant Theory ◽  
The Government ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Government Coalition

Traditional theories of government coalition formation concentrate on formal criteria inspired by – if not directly drawn from – game theory. One such criterion is that the coalition which forms must be winning; another is that it should have no surplus members without whom it would still be winning, i.e. it should be minimal; and a third is that the number of parties should be as few as possible. The closest that such theories come to considering the substantive issues affecting the formation of coalitions in the real world is their focus on reducing the ideological diversity of parties within the government. On many occasions, however, such ideological considerations receive negligible attention from politicians, who often ignore size factors altogether.

scholarly journals The bastard verdict and its influence on jurors

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-35
Author(s):  
Lee J. Curley ◽  
Rory MacLean ◽  
Jennifer Murray ◽  
Phyllis Laybourn ◽  
David Brown
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Guilty Verdict ◽  
Anglo American

The Scottish legal system is a unique jurisdiction, as jurors are able to give not proven verdicts in addition to the well-known Anglo-American verdicts (guilty and not guilty). The not proven verdict has never been legally defined, meaning that currently legal practitioners can only estimate why a not proven verdict has been given. The main aim of this study was to investigate if jurors violate the regularity principle, which is commonly incorporated in many rational choice models, by testing if the introduction of the not proven verdict has an impact on the outcomes given by jurors. In addition, this study aimed to test if the introduction of the not proven verdict has an impact upon how the not guilty verdict is perceived by jurors. In this study, 128 participants listened to two vignettes centred on homicide trials. Jurors could give one of two verdicts in one of the vignettes and one of three verdicts in the other vignette. The vignettes were counterbalanced in regard to how many verdicts could be given at the end of them. It was found that jurors in a three-verdict system were less likely to give a not guilty verdict in comparison to jurors in a two-verdict system, showing that jurors violate the regularity principle and that the not proven verdict may change how the not guilty verdict is perceived. The findings of this research have implications in relation to juror communication, article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and juror rationality.

Rational Choice Models Of Crimes By Youth

2020 ◽  
pp. 129-187
Author(s):  
Llad Phillips ◽  
Harold L. Votey
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Choice Models

The Efficacy of Australia Adopting a Debarment Regime in Public Procurement

2020 ◽  
pp. 0067205X2097347
Author(s):  
Olivia Dixon
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The Government ◽  
Corporate Integrity ◽  
Robust Measures ◽  
Procurement Contracts

While transparent and efficient public sector procurement systems facilitate innumerable opportunities for stakeholders, the scale and scope of the global procurement market has rendered it increasingly vulnerable to corruption. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates that annually US$2 trillion of public funds is lost to corruption, yet governments have failed to respond with robust measures to deter such practice. Through comparing the debarment frameworks and policy goals across five jurisdictions, this article argues that Australia should consider adopting a discretionary debarment regime. By excluding bidders who have engaged in ‘corporate integrity offences’ from procurement contracts, debarment policies offer a potentially important mechanism in the fight against corruption. Debarment would not only protect the government from current threats, but it may also deter potential wrongdoers, encourage contractors to rehabilitate themselves, incapacitate actual offenders and facilitate development of a culture of compliance through the competitive advantage gains enjoyed by law-abiding firms.

Predicting the Outcome of the Government Formation Process: Fuzzy Single-Dimensional Models

2014 ◽  
pp. 51-80
Author(s):  
Peter C. Casey ◽  
Michael B. Gibilisco ◽  
Carly A. Goodman ◽  
Kelly Nelson Pook ◽  
John N. Mordeson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Dimensional Models ◽  
The Government

Government Formation and Endogenous Parties

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Formal Theory ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
System A ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
The Government

I provide a formal theory of government for a political system characterized by a proportional representation electoral system, a parliamentary government that exercises collective responsibility, and a government formation process. Political parties are assumed to be policy-oriented and to serve the interests of those who vote for them. Parties choose policy platforms that determine their representation in parliament; and given that representation, the parties bargain over the government to be formed and the policies that government will implement. The model yields equilibria with the property that parties choose dispersed policy positions. Thus, electoral incentives in proportional representation parliamentary systems need not lead to policy convergence. The theory provides predictions of party locations such as those developed in the manifesto project.

scholarly journals Data science ethics in government

2016 ◽  
Vol 374 (2083) ◽  
pp. 20160119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cat Drew
Keyword(s):  
Data Science ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Ethical Framework ◽  
Social Good ◽  
Science Ethics ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
Government Data ◽  
The Government

Data science can offer huge opportunities for government. With the ability to process larger and more complex datasets than ever before, it can provide better insights for policymakers and make services more tailored and efficient. As with all new technologies, there is a risk that we do not take up its opportunities and miss out on its enormous potential. We want people to feel confident to innovate with data. So, over the past 18 months, the Government Data Science Partnership has taken an open, evidence-based and user-centred approach to creating an ethical framework. It is a practical document that brings all the legal guidance together in one place, and is written in the context of new data science capabilities. As part of its development, we ran a public dialogue on data science ethics, including deliberative workshops, an experimental conjoint survey and an online engagement tool. The research supported the principles set out in the framework as well as provided useful insight into how we need to communicate about data science. It found that people had a low awareness of the term ‘data science’, but that showing data science examples can increase broad support for government exploring innovative uses of data. But people's support is highly context driven. People consider acceptability on a case-by-case basis, first thinking about the overall policy goals and likely intended outcome, and then weighing up privacy and unintended consequences. The ethical framework is a crucial start, but it does not solve all the challenges it highlights, particularly as technology is creating new challenges and opportunities every day. Continued research is needed into data minimization and anonymization, robust data models, algorithmic accountability, and transparency and data security. It also has revealed the need to set out a renewed deal between the citizen and state on data, to maintain and solidify trust in how we use people's data for social good. This article is part of the themed issue ‘The ethical impact of data science’.

scholarly journals POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (04) ◽  
pp. 407-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROD GARRATT ◽  
JAMES E. PARCO ◽  
CHENG-ZHONG QIN ◽  
AMNON RAPOPORT
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Data Support ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Minimal Winning Coalitions ◽  
Unique Potential

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strong/coalition-proof Nash equilibrium are also tested.

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