Collaboration and Gender Focality in Stag Hunt Bargaining

Knowing the gender of a counterpart can be focal in the willingness to collaborate in team settings that resemble the classic coordination problem. This paper explores whether knowing a co-worker’s gender affects coordination on the mutually beneficial outcome in a socially risky environment. In an experimental setting, subjects play a one-shot stag hunt game framed as a collaborative task in which they can “work together” or “work alone.” We exogenously vary whether workers know the gender of their counterparts pre-play. When gender is revealed, female players tend to gravitate to collaboration and efficient coordination regardless of the knowledge. Males, when knowingly paired with another male, tend to collaborate less, and thus, are less likely to coordinate on the Pareto optimal outcome. These results demonstrate one way that gender focality can lead to inefficient outcomes and provide insight for organizations looking to induce collaboration among workers.

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The reduction of race and gender bias in clinical treatment recommendations using clinician peer networks in an experimental setting

Nature Communications ◽

10.1038/s41467-021-26905-5 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Damon Centola ◽

Douglas Guilbeault ◽

Urmimala Sarkar ◽

Elaine Khoong ◽

Jingwen Zhang

Keyword(s):

Chest Pain ◽

Female Patient ◽

White Male ◽

Treatment Recommendations ◽

Black Female ◽

Peer Networks ◽

Standardized Patient ◽

Experimental Setting ◽

Race And Gender ◽

And Gender

AbstractBias in clinical practice, in particular in relation to race and gender, is a persistent cause of healthcare disparities. We investigated the potential of a peer-network approach to reduce bias in medical treatment decisions within an experimental setting. We created “egalitarian” information exchange networks among practicing clinicians who provided recommendations for the clinical management of patient scenarios, presented via standardized patient videos of actors portraying patients with cardiac chest pain. The videos, which were standardized for relevant clinical factors, presented either a white male actor or Black female actor of similar age, wearing the same attire and in the same clinical setting, portraying a patient with clinically significant chest pain symptoms. We found significant disparities in the treatment recommendations given to the white male patient-actor and Black female patient-actor, which when translated into real clinical scenarios would result in the Black female patient being significantly more likely to receive unsafe undertreatment, rather than the guideline-recommended treatment. In the experimental control group, clinicians who were asked to independently reflect on the standardized patient videos did not show any significant reduction in bias. However, clinicians who exchanged real-time information in structured peer networks significantly improved their clinical accuracy and showed no bias in their final recommendations. The findings indicate that clinician network interventions might be used in healthcare settings to reduce significant disparities in patient treatment.

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A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198915500048 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 17 (03) ◽

pp. 1550004 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Friedel Bolle

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Equilibrium Selection ◽

Costs And Benefits ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Public Project ◽

Binary Decision ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽

Stag Hunt Game ◽

Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

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Risk Aversion and Coordination in a Simple Stag Hunt Game: Agent Based Modelling

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1623063 ◽

2010 ◽

Author(s):

Ch'ng Kean Siang

Keyword(s):

Risk Aversion ◽

Agent Based ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Agent Based Modelling ◽

Stag Hunt Game

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Who Takes the Floor and Why

Administrative Science Quarterly ◽

10.1177/0001839212439994 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 56 (4) ◽

pp. 622-641 ◽

Cited By ~ 95

Author(s):

Victoria L. Brescoll

Keyword(s):

Positive Relationship ◽

Past Research ◽

Data Sets ◽

Negative Consequences ◽

Experimental Setting ◽

Mediation Analyses ◽

Strong Positive Relationship ◽

And Gender ◽

The Relationship ◽

Positive Effect

Although past research has noted the importance of both power and gender for understanding volubility—the total amount of time spent talking—in organizations, to date, identifying the unique contributions of power and gender to volubility has been somewhat elusive. Using both naturalistic data sets and experiments, the present studies indicate that while power has a strong, positive effect on volubility for men, no such effect exists for women. Study 1 uses archival data to examine the relationship between the relative power of United States senators and their talking behavior on the Senate floor. Results indicate a strong positive relationship between power and volubility for male senators, but a non-significant relationship for female senators. Study 2 replicates this effect in an experimental setting by priming the concept of power and shows that though men primed with power talk more, women show no effect of power on volubility. Mediation analyses indicate that this difference is explained by women’s concern that being highly voluble will result in negative consequences (i.e., backlash). Study 3 shows that powerful women are in fact correct in assuming that they will incur backlash as a result of talking more than others—an effect that is observed among both male and female perceivers. Implications for the literatures on volubility, power, and previous studies of backlash are discussed.

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Coordination and growth: the Stag Hunt game on evolutionary networks

Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment ◽

10.1088/1742-5468/2011/05/p05008 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 2011 (05) ◽

pp. P05008 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Michele Starnini ◽

Angel Sánchez ◽

Julia Poncela ◽

Yamir Moreno

Keyword(s):

Stag Hunt ◽

Stag Hunt Game ◽

Evolutionary Networks

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Detecting Defectors When They Have Incentives to Manipulate Their Impressions

Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science ◽

10.5178/lebs.2010.5 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 1 (1) ◽

pp. 19-22 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Toko Kiyonari

Keyword(s):

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Hard Core ◽

Coordination Game ◽

The Other ◽

Monetary Incentives ◽

Not Given ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Stag Hunt Game ◽

Monetary Gain

We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.

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Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game

Scientific Reports ◽

10.1038/s41598-019-50556-8 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 9 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Marianna Belloc ◽

Ennio Bilancini ◽

Leonardo Boncinelli ◽

Simone D’Alessandro

Keyword(s):

Time Pressure ◽

Time Constraints ◽

Control Group ◽

Pressure Treatment ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Social Conventions ◽

Time Limits ◽

Social Coordination ◽

Stag Hunt Game

Abstract We present an incentivized laboratory experiment where a random sample of individuals playing a series of stag hunt games are forced to make their choices under time constraints, while the rest of the players have no time limits to decide. We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag-hunters as opposed to 52.32% when no time limits are imposed. These results offer the first experimental evidence on the role of intuition and deliberation in strategic situations that entail social coordination. In interpreting our findings, we provide a discussion on ruling social conventions in daily-life interactions.

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