scholarly journals Profiling Attack against RSA Key Generation Based on a Euclidean Algorithm

Information ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 462
Author(s):  
Sadiel de la Fe ◽  
Han-Byeol Park ◽  
Bo-Yeon Sim ◽  
Dong-Guk Han ◽  
Carles Ferrer
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Euclidean Algorithm ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Key Generation ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
The Public ◽  
Simple Power ◽  
Extended Euclidean Algorithm ◽  
Single Power

A profiling attack is a powerful variant among the noninvasive side channel attacks. In this work, we target RSA key generation relying on the binary version of the extended Euclidean algorithm for modular inverse and GCD computations. To date, this algorithm has only been exploited by simple power analysis; therefore, the countermeasures described in the literature are focused on mitigating only this kind of attack. We demonstrate that one of those countermeasures is not effective in preventing profiling attacks. The feasibility of our approach relies on the extraction of several leakage vectors from a single power trace. Moreover, because there are known relationships between the secrets and the public modulo in RSA, the uncertainty in some of the guessed secrets can be reduced by simple tests. This increases the effectiveness of the proposed attack.

scholarly journals Side-Channel Vulnerabilities of Unified Point Addition on Binary Huff Curve and Its Countermeasure

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sung Cho ◽  
Sunghyun Jin ◽  
HeeSeok Kim
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Power Consumption ◽  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Equivalence Class ◽  
Trace Analysis ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Addition Method ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Single Power

Unified point addition for computing elliptic curve point addition and doubling is considered to be resistant to simple power analysis. Recently, new side-channel attacks, such as recovery of secret exponent by triangular trace analysis and horizontal collision correlation analysis, have been successfully applied to elliptic curve methods to investigate their resistance to side-channel attacks. These attacks turn out to be very powerful since they only require leakage of a single power consumption trace. In this paper, using these side-channel attack analyses, we introduce two vulnerabilities of unified point addition on the binary Huff curve. Also, we propose a new unified point addition method for the binary Huff curve. Furthermore, to secure against these vulnerabilities, we apply an equivalence class to the side-channel atomic algorithm using the proposed unified point addition method.

scholarly journals Side-Channel Power Resistance for Encryption Algorithms Using Implementation Diversity

Cryptography ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Ivan Bow ◽  
Nahome Bete ◽  
Fareena Saqib ◽  
Wenjie Che ◽  
Chintan Patel ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration ◽  
Channel Power ◽  
Diversity Techniques ◽  
Gate Arrays ◽  
Field Programmable ◽  
Programmable Gate Arrays ◽  
Encryption Algorithms

This paper investigates countermeasures to side-channel attacks. A dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) method is proposed for field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)s to make techniques such as differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA) difficult and ineffective. We call the technique side-channel power resistance for encryption algorithms using DPR, or SPREAD. SPREAD is designed to reduce cryptographic key related signal correlations in power supply transients by changing components of the hardware implementation on-the-fly using DPR. Replicated primitives within the advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm, in particular, the substitution-box (SBOX)s, are synthesized to multiple and distinct gate-level implementations. The different implementations change the delay characteristics of the SBOXs, reducing correlations in the power traces, which, in turn, increases the difficulty of side-channel attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed countermeasures depends greatly on this principle; therefore, the focus of this paper is on the evaluation of implementation diversity techniques.

scholarly journals The Design of Compact SM4 Encryption and Decryption Circuits That Are Resistant to Bypass Attack

Electronics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 1102
Author(s):  
Fang Zhou ◽  
Benjun Zhang ◽  
Ning Wu ◽  
Xiangli Bu
Keyword(s):  
Linear Transformation ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Random Delay ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Differential Power Analysis ◽  
Operation Method ◽  
Encryption And Decryption ◽  
Power Curves ◽  
Random Insertion

In order to achieve the purpose of defending against side channel attacks, a compact SM4 circuit was designed based on the mask and random delay technique, and the linear transformation module was designed with random insertion of the pseudo operation method. By analyzing the glitch data generated by the S-box of SM4 with different inputs, the security against glitch attacks was confirmed. Then, the DPA (Differential Power Analysis) was performed on the designed circuit. The key could not be successfully obtained even in the case of 100,000 power curves, so that the safety of SM4 against DPA is verified. Finally, using Synopsys DC (Design Compiler, Mountain View, CA94043DC, USA) to synthesize the designed circuit, the results show that the area of the designed circuit in the SMIC 0.18 process is 82,734 μm2, which is 48% smaller than results reported in other papers.

Advanced modes in AES: Are they safe from power analysis based side channel attacks?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darshana Jayasinghe ◽  
Roshan Ragel ◽  
Jude Angelo Ambrose ◽  
Aleksandar Ignjatovic ◽  
Sri Parameswaran
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks

scholarly journals An Efficient Correlation Power Analysis Attack Using Variational Mode Decomposition 

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-25
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Variational Mode Decomposition ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Intrinsic Mode Functions ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Mode Decomposition ◽  
Noisy Conditions ◽  
Correlation Power Analysis ◽  
Evaluation Board

Side channel attacks (SCAs) are now a real threat to cryptographic devices and correlation power analysis (CPA) is the most powerful attack. So far, a CPA attack usually exploits the leakage information from raw power consumption traces that collected from the attack device. In real attack scenarios, these traces collected from measurement equipment are usually contaminated by noise resulting in a decrease in attack efficiency. In this paper, we propose a variant CPA attack that exploits the leakage information from intrinsic mode functions (IMFs) of the power traces. These IMFs are the results of the variational mode decomposition (VMD) process on the raw power traces. This attack technique decreases the number of power traces for correctly recovering the secret key by approximately 13% in normal conditions and 60% in noisy conditions compared to a traditional CPA attack. Experiments were performed on power traces of AES-128 implemented in both microcontroller and FPGA by Sakura-G/W side channel evaluation board to verify the effectiveness of our method.

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