scholarly journals The Complementary Role of the WTO in the Enhancement of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project

World ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-295
Author(s):  
Lijun Zhao ◽  
Angelina Karaivanova ◽  
Pengfei Zhang

The current rules on international tax do not function properly due to the gaps which allow for tax manipulation. Whereas most tax agreements largely contribute to the prevention of double taxation, they do not effectively approach double non-taxation matters arising from tax competition based on the agreements’ bilateral nature. In order to tackle this issue, the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project was introduced. Developed under the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development framework, the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project deals with tax avoidance practices that use mismatches and gaps in tax rules. Nevertheless, the success of this new soft law initiative requires a forum that can promote and enforce its recommendations. The structural nature of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has led to the consideration of the World Trade Organization to be this forum by many. However, the World Trade Organization covered agreements are drafted in a way that includes some of the tax competition matters but not others, including traditional tax havens. This paper aims to bridge the gaps in the area of the international tax regime. By examining the international trade and international tax regimes, it is shown that there is space for variations in the World Trade Organization broadly drafted agreements for such matters to find a resolution. It is argued that the World Trade Organization can play a complementary role in the enforcement of the new international tax rules.

Author(s):  
Reuven Avi-Yonah ◽  
Haiyan Xu

The International tax regime (ITR) has been transformed after the Great Recession of 2008–2009. The G20/Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project (2013–2015) has fundamentally changed the ITR, giving new life to the single tax principle (income should be taxed once, i.e., no double taxation and no double non taxation). Reaction to BEPS has varied dramatically between the EU and the US, the two largest markets in the world. In the EU BEPS is taken very seriously, as shown for example by the new Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives that implement the single tax principle. In the US BEPS is almost invisible; while the US model tax treaty has been amended to incorporate it the US has refused to sign the Multilateral Instrument to implement BEPS in its treaties and the only other BEPS action that the US has taken is country by country reporting. It thus appears that the future of BEPS and the ITR depends on whether the EU or the US view prevails, i.e., whether multinationals can be forced to pay significant tax on the 160–240 billion that are currently not taxed annually because of BEPS. While US multinationals as well as EU multinationals are exposed to the EU ATAD and related measures while operating in Europe, they are less subject to EU anti BEPS measures elsewhere in the world. It therefore is crucial to assess the reaction to BEPS in the other large economy that was involved in its development, namely China. This article attempts to assess China’s reaction to BEPS based on Chinese sources. It shows that China takes BEPS seriously. Therefore, given the reactions of China (as well as India, which is even more aggressive than China for example in taxing the digital economy) it seems likely that eventually the EU view of BEPS will prevail and US based multinationals will eventually be forced to pay tax on the over 100 billion they shift offshore each year.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-220
Author(s):  
Patricia Yurie Dias

RESUMOO trabalho analisa o papel complementar dos regulamentos e padrões privados dos Estados e das entidades não estatais às regras da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) com o intuito de gerar maior segurança e qualidade para os produtos no âmbito do comércio internacional. A OMC visa promover a liberalização e eliminação da discriminação do comércio internacional. Dessa forma, por meio do estudo de alguns casos submetidos ao Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC, em que pese a maioria dos casos submetidos ao OSC terem tido desfechos distintos, constatou-se que os padrões privados podem complementar as regras da OMC, desde que não sejam medidas protecionistas  disfarçadas de barreiras não tarifárias ao comércio internacional.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Internacional; Jurisdição Internacional; Padrões privados; Comércio Internacional; OMC.ABSTRACTThe paper examines the complementary role of the private regulations and standards of States and non-state entities to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to promote safety and quality for products in the scope of international trade. The WTO aims to promote the liberalization and elimination of discrimination in international trade. Thus, through the study of some cases submitted to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), despite the fact that most cases submitted to the DSB had different conclusions, it was found that private standards can complement the rules of the WTO, if they are not protectionist measures disguised as non-tariff barriers to international trade.KEYWORDS: International Law; International Jurisdiction; Private Standards; International Trade; WTO.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

We saw in Section 2, Theories of Globalized Ethics, that there is a need for institutions with transnational ethical authority. Such authority would be needed for: Preventing war; dealing with genocides; dealing with transnational legal problems; and a global economic authority would be needed to deal with problems such as fairness in transnational economic distribution, transnational competition, multinational tax avoidance, and common tax policies to deal with global warming. Without ethical oversight, transnational authority can easily be misused. Thus the World Trade Organization prevents effective environmental regulation of transnational trade and economic action against repressive states, and there are no channels to consider changing these policies other than street demonstrations. But just creating another authority with enough power to oversee transnational institutions effectively will also create the same oversight problem. That is, who oversees the new, more powerful authority? One way around this apparent paradox is a social contract. A social contract is a way for parties to acknowledge that they need to limit their own interests in order to achieve greater cooperative benefits, and can assume that others will do so.1 Oversight may still be necessary if a social contract exists, but the bulk of compliance will rest with observance of the contract for mutual benefit. So much less oversight will be required, and the overseeing institution will need that much less power.


2012 ◽  
pp. 132-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Uzun

The article deals with the features of the Russian policy of agriculture support in comparison with the EU and the US policies. Comparative analysis is held considering the scales and levels of collective agriculture support, sources of supporting means, levels and mechanisms of support of agricultural production manufacturers, its consumers, agrarian infrastructure establishments, manufacturers and consumers of each of the principal types of agriculture production. The author makes an attempt to estimate the consequences of Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization based on a hypothesis that this will result in unification of the manufacturers and consumers’ protection levels in Russia with the countries that have long been WTO members.


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Ruzita Mohd. Amin

The World Trade Organization (WTO), established on 1 January 1995 as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has played an important role in promoting global free trade. The implementation of its agreements, however, has not been smooth and easy. In fact this has been particularly difficult for developing countries, since they are expected to be on a level playing field with the developed countries. After more than a decade of existence, it is worth looking at the WTO’s impact on developing countries, particularly Muslim countries. This paper focuses mainly on the performance of merchandise trade of Muslim countries after they joined the WTO. I first analyze their participation in world merchandise trade and highlight their trade characteristics in general. This is then followed by a short discussion on the implications of WTO agreements on Muslim countries and some recommendations on how to face this challenge.


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