scholarly journals Motivations and Limits for COVID-19 Policy Compliance in Germany and Switzerland

Author(s):  
Bettina M. Zimmermann ◽  
Amelia Fiske ◽  
Stuart McLennan ◽  
Anna Sierawska ◽  
Nora Hangel ◽  
...  

Background: In contrast to neighboring countries, German and Swiss authorities refrained from general curfews during the first pandemic wave in spring 2020, calling for solidarity and personal responsibility instead. Using a qualitative methodology, this study aims to explore why people in Germany and Switzerland were motivated to comply with policy measures during the first wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and what factors hindered or limited their motivation. While quantitative surveys can measure the level of compliance, or broadly ask what motives people had for compliance, we here strive to explain why and how these motives lead to compliance. Methods: This publication has been made possible by the joint work of the members of the "Solidarity in times of pandemics" (SolPan) research commons. Seventy-seven semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with members of the general public in Germany (n = 46) and the German-speaking part of Switzerland (n = 31) in April 2020. Interviews were transcribed and analyzed following a grounded theory approach. Results: Three themes were identified that summarize factors contributing to compliant or noncompliant behavior. (1) Social cohesion was, on the one hand, an important motivator for compliance, but at the same time related to conflicting needs, illustrating the limits of compliance. (2) Consequences were considered on both the individual level (eg, consequences of individual infection) and societal level (eg, the societal and economic consequences of restrictions). (3) While for some participants following the rules was perceived as a matter of principle, others stressed the importance of making their own risk assessment, which was often associated with with a need for evidence on the effectiveness and reasons behind measures. Conclusion: A variety of motives contribute to COVID-19 related compliance. Authorities should seek to address these multi-faceted aspects to support motivation for compliance in a large proportion of the population.

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Warren James Donnellan ◽  
Kate Mary Bennett ◽  
Natalie Watson

Purpose Research has shown that informal carers of people living with dementia (PLWD) can be resilient in the face of caregiving challenges. However, little is known about resilience across different kinship ties. This study aims to update and build on our previous work, using an ecological resilience framework to identify and explore the factors that facilitate or hinder resilience across spousal and adult daughter carers of PLWD. Design/methodology/approach This study conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with a purposive sample of 13 carers from North West England and analysed the data using a constructivist grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2003). Findings Adult daughters were motivated to care out of reciprocity, whereas spouses were motivated to care out of marital duty. Spouses had a more positive and accepting attitude towards caregiving and were better able to maintain continuity, which facilitated their resilience. Research limitations/implications Resilience emerged on multiple levels and depended on the type of kinship tie, which supports an ecological approach to resilience. The implications of these findings are discussed. Originality/value This paper makes a novel contribution to the literature as it uses an in-depth qualitative methodology to compare resilience across spousal and adult daughter carers of PLWD. This study adopts an ecological approach to identify not just individual-level resilience resources but also interactive community- and societal-level resources.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 265-266
Author(s):  
Caroline Kramer

Abstract. This project deals with the question of what the overall social and economic consequences of dismantling a nuclear power station are for the population and the site. Various disciplines and specialist fields are concerned with questions that touch on the topic of dismantling nuclear technical facilities; however, there are so far no research projects that examined these processes from social scientific, geographic and engineering scientific perspectives. This article concentrates predominantly on the former perspective of the dismantling. Within the framework of this project the affected population and experts from the communities were asked how they deal with the dismantling of the nuclear power stations, which were triggered by the rapid change in energy policy following the accident in Fukushima in 2011. It became clear that there were various strategies for dealing with this process depending on the location. This was the reason to follow up the question of coping with this process at different locations. It could be shown, for example, that the consequences of this event were essentially determined by how the community was already positioned beforehand, e.g. whether the economic situation was a monostructure or whether long-term considerations about the future had already been made during the operating time of the power station. At the individual level, the “prerequisites” in the sense of individual value orientation and the spatially related identity, were also essentially responsible for how the risks of the dismantling and the further development of the community were perceived and evaluated. Furthermore, it was compiled from where the people extracted their information, which sources had a high or low credibility, which worries they have with respect to the near future and whether they have the intention to leave the community. In this project it became clear that there were examples of best practice with respect to dealing with this rapid and fundamental change at the locations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-663
Author(s):  
Rebekah Russell–Bennett ◽  
Rory Mulcahy ◽  
Kate Letheren ◽  
Ryan McAndrew ◽  
Uwe Dulleck

PurposeA transformative service aims to improve wellbeing; however, current approaches have an implicit assumption that all wellbeing dimensions are equal and more dimensions led to higher wellbeing. The purpose of this paper is to present evidence for a new framework that identifies the paradox of competing wellbeing dimensions for both the individual and others in society – the transformative service paradox (TSP).Design/methodology/approachData is drawn from a mixed-method approach using qualitative (interviews) and quantitative data (lab experiment) in an electricity service context. The first study involves 45 household interviews (n = 118) and deals with the nature of trade-offs at the individual level to establish the concept of the TSP. The second study uses a behavioral economics laboratory experiment (n = 110) to test the self vs. other nature of the trade-off in day-to-day use of electricity.FindingsThe interviews and experiment identified that temporal (now vs. future) and beneficiary-level factors explain why individuals make wellbeing trade-offs for the transformative service of electricity. The laboratory experiment showed that when the future implication of the trade-off is made salient, consumers are more willing to forego physical wellbeing for environmental wellbeing, whereas when the “now” implication is more salient consumers forego financial wellbeing for physical wellbeing.Originality/valueThis research introduces the term “Transformative Service Paradox” and identifies two factors that explain why consumers make wellbeing trade-offs at the individual level and at the societal level; temporal (now vs. future) and wellbeing beneficiary.


1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard H. Maassen ◽  
Jos L. van der Linden ◽  
Wies Akkermans

In 1944, U. Bronfenbrenner remarked on the need for a two-dimensional model of sociometric status. The low value of the correlation between the variables liking and disliking-assumed basic dimensions of sociometric status-is often cited as evidence for the correctness of Bronfenbrenner’ssuggestion. Sociometric status is derived from a coalescence of judgements at the individual level. In this article we argue that score attribution at this level (where one group member assesses another) is one-dimensional along the liking-disliking continuum. Two-dimensionality of sociometric status arises at the group level. However, we also show that at this level liking and disliking are not two distinct dimensions, but the poles of just one, the other being visibility (or impact). If the one-dimensional model of liking score attribution on the individual level is accepted, the obvious thing to do is to instruct respondents accordingly. Rating scales are suitable for this. The rating-scale methods we suggested in previous publications (e.g. Maassen, Akkermans, & van der Linden, 1996) are in keeping with this argument. Moreover, these methods may be recommended for their reliability, validity and for the variety of research designs to which they can be applied.


Africa ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzette Heald

AbstractThe literature has tended to deal with diviners only where they have been seen to play a notable role in the transformation of social relationships. This leads us to overlook their relative social invisibility in many African societies. Yet we may gain insight into the rise of prophets and charismatic healers by looking at the other side of this story in the multitude of very humble practitioners plying their trade. This is the context in which this article explores the role of diviners among the Gisu of Uganda.The privacy of consultation, the search for distant diviners, the way they are approached only at times of crisis and as agents of private counteraction or vengeance, go some way towards explaining why it is difficult for diviners to gain recognition. Added to which are the difficulties of another order which relate to what might here be regarded as divinatory success. For divination may be seen to fail at a number of different levels: in the lack of credibility of a given practitioner, i n a lack of unanimity among those consulted and in the multiplicity of causal agents evoked.An argument put forward here is that scepticism is endemic to the system and, possibly, distinctive to it. We should ask not, as Evans-Pritchard did, how belief i s sustained despite the presence of scepticism but what it is about these beliefs which encourages scepticism. It is not useful to explore this issue in terms of the rationality question or the ‘truth’ of belief systems. If we are to draw a comparison with modern attitudes, of greater significance are the organisation and differentiation of knowledge and its relationship to power. It is suggested that diagnostic systems used by societies such as the Gisu encourage an agnostic attitude in a way i n which those of the modern West do not.In the final part of the article the social role of divination is reconsidered and some of the positive functions proposed for it are questioned. Gisu divination can be seen to have evolved into a very narrow niche whose parameters are bound, on the one hand, by the limits of belief and, on the other, by a system of interpersonal vengeance. We may say that the socially marginal attributes of diviners, exclusively concerned with the negative aspects of social relationships, represent a real social marginality. At best they are agents by which the individual may be reconciled with harshnesses imposed by his own destiny, of ancestral affliction; at worst they are agents of individual vengeance and retribution. This may be taken as more or less disqualifying them from articulating a positive, future-oriented vision on behalf of the community. Clearly it is not impossible but it is a huge jump from these humble practitioners, interpreting the present in terms of the past and trading evil with evil at an individual level, to prophets capable of formulating a positive social vision, a means forward, on behalf of a wider moral or social community.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen N. Breidahl ◽  
Nils Holtug ◽  
Kristian Kongshøj

Social scientists and political theorists often claim that shared values are conducive to social cohesion, and trust and solidarity in particular. Furthermore, this idea is at the heart of what has been labeled the ‘national identity argument’, according to which religious and/or cultural diversity is a threat to the shared (national) values underpinning social cohesion and redistributive justice. However, there is no consensus among political theorists about what values we need to share to foster social cohesion and indeed, for example, nationalists, liberals, and multiculturalists provide different answers to this question. On the basis of a survey conducted in Denmark in 2014, this study empirically investigates the relation between, on the one hand, commitments to the community values of respectively conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism, liberal citizenship, and multiculturalism, and on the other, trust and solidarity. First, we investigate in what ways commitments to these four sets of values are correlated to trust and solidarity at the individual level and, then, whether the belief that others share one’s values is correlated to these aspects of social cohesion for individuals committed to these four sets of values. We find that conservative and liberal nationalism are negatively correlated to our different measures of trust and solidarity, whereas liberal citizenship and (in particular) multiculturalism are positively correlated. In broad terms, this picture remains when we control for a number of socio-economic factors and ideology (on a left-right scale). Finally, individuals who believe that others share their values do not, in general, have higher levels of trust and solidarity. Rather, this belief works in different ways when associated with different sets of community values.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-93
Author(s):  
Domingos Faria ◽  

Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-258
Author(s):  
Andrea Martani ◽  
Georg Starke

Fostering the personal responsibility of patients is often considered a potential remedy for the problem of resource allocation in health care systems. In political and ethical debates, systems of rewards and punishments based on personal responsibility have proved very divisive. However, regardless of the controversies it has sparked, the implementation of personal responsibility in concrete policies has always encountered the problem of practical enforceability, i.e.how causally relevant behaviour can be tracked, allowing policies of this kind to be applied in a fine-grained, economically viable and accurate fashion. In this paper, we show how this hurdle can be seemingly overcome with the advent of digitalisation in health and delineate the potential impact of digitalisation on personal responsibility for health. We discuss how digitalisation – by datafying health and making patients transparent – promises to close the loophole of practical enforceability by allowing to trace health-related lifestyle choices of individuals as well as their exposure to avoidable risk factors. Digitalisation in health care thereby reinforces what Gerald Dworkin has called the causal aspect of personal responsibility and strengthens the implicit syllogism that – since exposure to risk factors happens at the individual level – responsibility for health should be ascribed to the individual. We conclude by addressing the limitations of this approach and suggest that there are other ways in which the potential of digitalisation can help with the allocation of resources in health care.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Zagórski ◽  
Jose Rama ◽  
Guillermo Cordero

AbstractThe recent success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe has given rise to different explanations. Economic factors have proven to be significant mainly at the aggregate level. As for the individual level, it has been argued that the so-called ‘losers of globalization’ – the less educated and less skilled, profiles with higher job insecurity – are more likely to support RPPs. Nevertheless, RPPs perform strikingly well in countries less affected by the Great Recession, gathering high levels of support among profiles not considered the losers of globalization. Moreover, the effect of age on support for RPPs is not clear, as, on the one hand, the young are better educated and skilled, but, on the other, they suffered the effects of the economic crisis more. To address this puzzle, we focus on the impact of unemployment and employment insecurity among the youth on voting for RPPs in 17 European countries. We find that youth support for RPPs can be explained by the precariousness of the youth labour market.


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