scholarly journals Il disallineamento tra orientamenti elettorali e posizioni sui temi: una questione giovanile o di famiglia politica?

Author(s):  
Dario Tuorto

The transformation of politics in contemporary democracies has led to the emergence of a new ideological conflict, alongside the traditional left-right scheme, described as liberal–authoritarian or cosmopolitan–nationalist cleavage (Norris and Inglehart 2018; Kriesi 2008; 2012; Hooge and Marks 2009; 2018). This brought to a redefinition of the linkages between issue and voting preferences, as many voters decide to support a party independently of their positions or change positions on the issues while voting for the same party. Within such framework, the contribute of the new generations to the growth of the electoral dealignment and volatility has been largely analysed (Franklin 2004; Miller and Shanks 1996; Plutzer 2006). Issue incongruency is part of the process. Young people are often considered to be tolerant and inclusive because they grew up under prosperous and secure conditions and developed post-materialist values of freedom, multiculturalism, progressivism (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Janmaat and Keating 2019). However, the perspective of left-cosmopolitans engaged in electoral politics contrasts with the image of economically-insecure left-behind group of young people who don’t share the same progressive values (Sloam and Henn 2017; Sanders and Twyman 2016) and support right-wing political parties. What is still unknown is the extent to which extreme ideological traits and attitudes (e.g. negative discourses on immigration) combine with positions of openness on individual freedom. Likewise, the same contradiction can be found among left-wing voters who assume liberal position on economy or those economically left and culturally conservative. The article aims at analysing the relationship between issue positions and vote (propensity to vote). We test the hypotheses of a coherent vs incoherent ideological space by looking at the structure of voters’ preferences on economic (State vs. free market) and cultural issues (individual rights, attitudes towards minorities, European integration) and the differences between young people and older component of the electorate. The analysis is focused on the Italian case. Data are taken from the 2020 Itanes survey.

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arne Roets ◽  
Alain Van Hiel ◽  
Ilse Cornelis

Previous research reported that Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) constitute the individual's ideological space and are strong dispositional determinants of racism. In the present study, materialism was examined as a third social attitude and a potential predictor of racism. In a student (N = 183) and heterogeneous adult sample (N = 176) analyses revealed that RWA, SDO and materialism constitute three separate dimensions and that each of them explains a unique part of the variance in racism. In addition, Structural Equation Modelling showed that the relationship between materialism and racism was largely mediated by selfish motives. In the discussion we go further into the role of materialism as a third social attitudinal dimension. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 560-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen van der Waal ◽  
Willem de Koster

Leftist and rightist populist parties in Western Europe both oppose trade openness. Is support for economic protectionism also relevant for their electorates? We assess this in the Netherlands, where both types of populist parties have seats in parliament. Analyses of representative survey data ( n = 1,296) demonstrate that support for protectionism drives voting for such parties, as do the well-established determinants of political distrust (both populist constituencies), economic egalitarianism (leftist populist constituency) and ethnocentrism (rightist populist constituency). Surprisingly, support for protectionism does not mediate the relationship between economic egalitarianism and voting for left-wing populists, or the link between political distrust and voting for either left-wing or right-wing populist parties. In contrast, support for protectionism partly mediates the association between ethnocentrism and voting for right-wing populists. We discuss the largely independent role of protectionism in populist voting in relation to the cultural cleavage in politics and electoral competition, and also provide suggestions for future research.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Kossowska ◽  
Paulina Szwed ◽  
Gabriela Czarnek

In three experimental studies we investigate the role of contextual (i.e. issue politicization) and individual (i.e. active open-mindedness) factors, assuming that they influence the manner in which people of different political affinities perceive policy-relevant facts. We focus on political beliefs in the cultural domain, expecting that right-wing beliefs, compared to left-wing beliefs are associated with more inaccurate perceptions of facts (i.e. misperceptions) in ways that are politically congenial to right-wing ideology and official right-wing party narratives. We also argue that the level of accuracy in perceptions held by right-wingers (vs. lefts-wingers) is even lower when assessing highly-politicized (vs. less-politicalized) facts. Then, we postulate that assessments of highly-politicized facts are driven by political beliefs. In contrast, when assessing less-politicized facts, active open-mindedness modifies the relationship between ideology and accuracy assessment. The results of the study confirm the hypotheses proposed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Marcelo Lopes de Souza

This chapter explores the relationship between populism and environmental justice in Latin America. It was not only within the framework of overtly dictatorial regimes during the 20th century that the struggles for social justice and human rights in Latin America faced severe obstacles and suffered setbacks. They have also been badly hampered by populism — both right-wing neo-populism with its component of intolerance and conservatism, and left-wing populism, which, by means of co-opting civil society, helps demobilise it and slow down or limit processes of awareness and radicalisation of democracy. The struggles for environmental justice are a crucial example of this. The chapter then addresses the main aspects of how left-wing neo-populism has undermined environmental justice in Latin America, and particularly in Brazil. It focuses more closely on the political and ideological consequences of left-wing populism's contradictions and failure in terms of a deepening of social tensions and struggles. The chapter argues that left-wing neo-populism has been ultimately part of the problem rather than of the solution.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 146-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Huber ◽  
Christian H. Schimpf

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob-Moritz Eberl

Abstract In the context of decreasing media trust as well as the rise of populist movements in many Western Democracies, this study sets out to revisit the relationship between political preferences and perceived media bias. It investigates perceived bias of the entire media system, the perceived bias of individual outlets as well as perceived beneficiaries of this favorable coverage. Analyses are based on an online survey in Austria in 2015 (n ~ 1,679) and compare citizens’ perceived biases towards eight newspapers and television outlets. Results show that media system bias in Austria is strongly related to right-wing but not to left-wing extremism. Furthermore, there are not only differences between single outlets but also between media genres, as particularly tabloids are less afflicted by right-wing perceptions of bias. Finally, there is evidence of hostile media perceptions irrespective of actual media exposure.


2020 ◽  
pp. 014616722094618
Author(s):  
Mark J. Brandt ◽  
Felicity M. Turner-Zwinkels ◽  
Beste Karapirinler ◽  
Florian Van Leeuwen ◽  
Michael Bender ◽  
...  

Theories link threat with right-wing political beliefs. We use the World Values Survey (60,378 participants) to explore how six types of threat (e.g., economic, violence, and surveillance) are associated with multiple political beliefs (e.g., cultural, economic, and ideological identification) in 56 countries/territories. Multilevel models with individuals nested in countries revealed that the threat-political belief association depends on the type of threat, the type of political belief, and the country. Economic-related threats tended to be associated with more left-wing economic political beliefs and violence-related threats tended to be associated with more cultural right-wing beliefs, but there were exceptions to this pattern. Additional analyses revealed that the associations between threat and political beliefs were different across countries. However, our analyses identified few country characteristics that could account for these cross-country differences. Our findings revealed that political beliefs and perceptions of threat are linked, but that the relationship is not simple.


1996 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 915-927
Author(s):  
Carolyn Greco-Vigorito

4- to 10-month-old infants were tested in 2 experiments to determine whether they used a similar attribute or a similar relationship among attributes to make visual judgments of similarity and categorization. In Exp. 1 infants were familiarized with a single stimulus composed of several attributes and a prescribed relationship among the attributes, left wing smaller than right wing. When tested in a novelty-preference procedure with novel stimuli that either preserved a single attribute but violated the relationship (Attribute Test Stimulus) or preserved the relationship with a new set of attributes (Relational Test Stimulus), 4-mo.-olds treated the Attribute Test Stimulus as familiar, whereas 6-mo.-olds treated the Relational Test Stimulus as familiar. Neither 8- nor 10-mo.-olds showed a preference for either test stimulus. In Exp. 2 a category containing 3 exemplars was constructed. In each exemplar a single attribute, left wing, was held constant, and all 3 exemplars shared the same relational structure, left wing smaller than right wing, but the remaining attributes varied across exemplars. Four-, 6-, and 8-mo.-olds in Exp 2 reliably included the novel Attribute Test Stimulus in the category. These data suggest that, although infants under 8 months can recognize relational information, they may not always use that information when making categorization judgments, particularly if a single, well-defined attribute is available as the basis for categorization.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Felicity Mary Turner-Zwinkels ◽  
Beste Karapirinler ◽  
Florian van Leeuwen ◽  
Michael Bender ◽  
...  

Theories link threat with right-wing political beliefs. We use the World Values Survey (60,378 participants) to explore how six types of threat (e.g., economic, violence, and surveillance) are associated with multiple political beliefs (e.g., cultural, economic, and ideological identification) in 56 countries/territories. Multilevel models with individuals nested in countries revealed that the threat-political belief association depends on the type of threat, the type of political beliefs, and the country. Economic-related threats tended to be associated with more left-wing economic political beliefs and violence-related threats tended to be associated with more cultural right-wing beliefs, but there were exceptions to this pattern. Additional analyses revealed that the associations between threat and political beliefs were different across countries. However, our analyses identified few country characteristics that could account for these cross-country differences. Our findings revealed that political beliefs and perceptions of threat are linked, but that the relationship is not simple.


2022 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-43
Author(s):  
Frederic Guerrero-Solé

The news media have a strong influence on people’s perception of reality. But despite claims to objectivity, media organizations are, in general, politically biased (Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; Gaebler, 2017). The link between news media outlets and political organizations has been a critical question in political science and communication studies. To assess the closeness between the news media and particular political organizations, scholars have used different methods such as content analysis, undertaking surveys or adopting a political economy view. With the advent of social networks, new sources of data are now available to measure the relationship between media organizations and parties. Assuming that users coherently retweet political and news information (Wong, Tan, Sen & Chiang, 2016), and drawing on the retweet overlap network (RON) method (Guerrero-Solé, 2017), this research uses people’s perceived ideology of Spanish political parties (CIS, 2020) to propose a measure of the ideology of news media in Spain. Results show that scores align with the result of previous research on the ideology of the news media (Ceia, 2020). We also find that media outlets are, in general, politically polarized with two groups or clusters of news media being close to the left-wing parties UP and PSOE, and the other to the right-wing and far-right parties Cs, PP, and Vox. This research also underlines the media’s ideological stability over time.


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