scholarly journals The Right to an Artificial Reality? Freedom of Thought and the Fiction of Philip K. Dick

2021 ◽  
pp. 377
Author(s):  
Marc Blitz
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
Physical Universe ◽  
Experience Machine ◽  
Real People ◽  
Freedom Of Thought ◽  
The Right

n Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the philosopher Robert Nozick describes what he calls an “Experience Machine.” In essence, it produces a form of virtual reality (VR). People can use it to immerse themselves in a custom-designed dream: They have the experience of climbing a mountain, reading a book, or conversing with a friend when they are actually lying isolated in a tank with electrodes feeding perceptions into their brain. Nozick describes the Experience Machine as part of a philosophical thought experiment—one designed to show that a valuable life consists of more than mental states, like those we receive in this machine. As Nozick says, “we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.” An 80-year sequence of experiences generated by the machine would not be of equivalent value to the lifetime of the identical set of experiences we derive from interactions with real people (who are not illusions, but have minds of their own), and with a physical universe that lies outside of us. On the contrary, says Nozick, a solipsistic life in the Experience Machine is a deeply impoverished one.

scholarly journals The Experience Machine: Existential Reflections on Virtual Worlds

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Gualeni
Keyword(s):  
Video Games ◽  
Virtual Worlds ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Experience Machine ◽  
Technical Reproducibility ◽  
Self Discovery ◽  
Digital Simulations

Problems and questions originally raised by Robert Nozick in his famous thought experiment ‘The Experience Machine’ are frequently invoked in the current discourse concerning virtual worlds. Having conceptualized his Gedankenexperiment in the early seventies, Nozick could not fully anticipate the numerous and profound ways in which the diffusion of computer simulations and video games came to affect the Western world.This article does not articulate whether or not the virtual worlds of video games, digital simulations, and virtual technologies currently actualize (or will actualize) Nozick’s thought experiment. Instead, it proposes a philosophical reflection that focuses on human experiences in the upcoming age of their ‘technical reproducibility’.In pursuing that objective, this article integrates and supplements some of the interrogatives proposed in Robert Nozick’s thought experiment. More specifically, through the lenses of existentialism and philosophy of technology, this article tackles the technical and cultural heritage of virtual reality, and unpacks its potential to function as a tool for self-discovery and self-construction. Ultimately, it provides an interpretation of virtual technologies as novel existential domains. Virtual worlds will not be understood as the contexts where human beings can find completion and satisfaction, but rather as instruments that enable us to embrace ourselves and negotiate with various aspects of our (individual as well as collective) existence in previously-unexperienced guises.

scholarly journals Freedom of thought in Europe: do advances in ‘brain-reading’ technology call for revision?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sjors Ligthart
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Legal Context ◽  
Reading Technology ◽  
Freedom Of Thought ◽  
The Right

Abstract Since advances in brain-reading technology are changing traditional epistemic boundaries of the mind, yielding information from the brain that enables to draw inferences about particular mental states of individuals, the sustainability of the present framework of European human rights has been called into question. More specifically, it has been argued that in order to provide adequate human rights protection from non-consensual brain-reading, the right to freedom of thought should be revised, making it ‘fit for the future’ again. From the perspective of criminal justice, the present paper examines whether such a revision is necessary within the European legal context. It argues that under its current understanding, the right to freedom of thought would probably not cover the employment of most brain-reading applications in criminal justice. By contrast, the right to freedom of (non-)expression will provide legal protection in this regard and, at the same time, will also allow for certain exceptions. Hence, instead of revising the absolute right to freedom of thought, a legal approach tailored to non-consensual brain-reading could be developed under the already existing right not to convey information, ideas, and opinions as guaranteed under the freedom of (non-)expression. This might need to re-interpret the right to freedom of expression, rather than the right to freedom of thought.

The Quality of Life

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Kraut
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
No Value ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Experience Machine ◽  
The World ◽  
Better Than

The Quality of Life: Aristotle Revised presents a philosophical theory about the constituents of human well-being. It begins with Aristotle’s thoughts about this topic, but often modifies and sometimes rejects them. The principal idea is that what Aristotle calls “external goods” (wealth, reputation, power) have at most an indirect bearing on the quality of our lives. A good internal life—the way in which we experience the world—is what well-being consists in. Pleasure is one aspect of this experience, but only a small part of it. Far more valuable is the quality of our emotional, intellectual, social, and perceptual experiences. These aspects of our existence make it potentially richer and deeper than the quality of life available to many other animals. A good human life is immeasurably better than that of a simple creature that feels only the pleasures of nourishment. Even if it felt pleasure for millions of years, human life would be superior. Contemporary discussions of well-being often appeal to a thought experiment devised by Robert Nozick, which holds that we should not attach ourselves to an “experience machine”—a device that manipulates our brains and gives us any illusory experiences of our choosing. This is thought to show that one’s interior life has little or no value on its own; that we must live in “the real world” to live well. In fact, however, this thought experiment supports the opposite conclusion: the quality of our lives consists in the quality of our experiences.

scholarly journals Negotiating Fitness, From Consumption to Virtuous Production

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross D. Neville ◽  
Catherine Gorman ◽  
Sheila Flanagan ◽  
Frédéric Dimanche
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Frame Of Reference ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Experience Machine ◽  
Nous Examinons ◽  
Consumption Activity

By shifting our attention toward everyday life, its manifold commitments and responsibilities, this paper examines the potential for “fitness” to take on an extended meaning beyond consumption activity. In the opening sections, Robert Nozick’s (1974) “Experience Machine” thought experiment is presented as an alternative analytic frame for interpreting the problem of fitness in terms of a tension between mere activity and experience. In relation to this tension, the paper presents findings from a study of experienced participants and emphasizes the possibilities of a virtuous production through fitness. In particular, we emphasize that there is much work to be done in sedimenting (and maintaining) an appropriate frame of reference for “doing fitness” and that “being someone through fitness” might operate as an indexical marker of virtue.En dirigeant notre attention vers la vie de tous les jours et ses multiples engagements et responsabilités, nous examinons dans cet article le potentiel du « fitness » d’avoir une signification étendue au-delà de l’activité de consommation. Dans les premières sections, l’expérience de pensée de la « machine à expérience » de Robert Nozick (1974) est présentée comme un cadre analytique alternatif pour l’interprétation du problème de la condition physique en termes de tension entre simple activité et expérience. En lien avec cette tension, cet article présente les résultats d’une étude de participants expérimentés et met l’accent sur les possibilités d’une production vertueuse par l’intermédiaire de la condition physique. En particulier, nous soulignons qu’il y a beaucoup de travail à faire dans la sédimentation (et le maintien) d’un cadre de référence approprié pour « faire de l’activité physique » et qu’« être quelqu’un par l’intermédiaire de la condition physique » peut agir comme indicateur de vertu.

FREE EXPRESSION OR EQUAL SPEECH?

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-169
Author(s):  
Teresa M. Bejan
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Classical Liberal ◽  
Freedom Of Thought ◽  
The Right ◽  
Equal Right ◽  
To Receive ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractThe classical liberal doctrine of free expression asserts the priority of speech as an extension of the freedom of thought. Yet its critics argue that freedom of expression, itself, demands the suppression of the so-called “silencing speech” of racists, sexists, and so on, as a threat to the equal expressive rights of others. This essay argues that the claim to free expression must be distinguished from claims to equal speech. The former asserts an equal right to express one’s thoughts without interference; the latter the right to address others, and to receive a hearing and consideration from them, in turn. I explore the theory of equal speech in light of the ancient Athenian practice of isegoria and argue that the equality demanded is not distributive but relational: an equal speaker’s voice should be counted as “on a par” with others. This ideal better captures critics’ concerns about silencing speech than do their appeals to free expression. Insofar as epistemic and status-harms provide grounds for the suppression and exclusion of some speech and speakers, the ideal of equal speech is more closely connected with the freedom of association than of thought. Noticing this draws attention to the continuing—and potentially problematic—importance of exclusion in constituting effective sites of equal speech today.

The Right to Freedom of Thought in the United Kingdom

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Political Debate ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Repeated Calls ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
International Obligations ◽  
Freedom Of Thought ◽  
The Right

Abstract The United Kingdom is bound by international obligations to uphold ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ and domestic legislation reflects those obligations. The courts have held that to be protected, a belief must genuine, must not be a mere opinion, must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness and importance and must be ‘worthy of respect in a democratic society’. How this plays out, however, in areas such as education, children’s rights and employment is highly sensitive to the specific facts of each case – which are often inconsistent, as the article explains. Much of the article examines the decisions of the courts in individual cases. It concludes with a discussion of the possible trajectory of domestic political debate at a time when there have been repeated calls for a ‘British Bill of Rights’ and the Westminster Government is questioning more generally the constitutional role of the judiciary.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document