FIGHTING AGAINST FAKE NEWS THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AS A DEFENSE MECHANISM

ANCIENT LAND ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (03) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Asmar Azer Aliyeva ◽  

Fake news and propaganda are an issue that the whole world is struggling to prevent. In particular, it is very arduous for the states to manage fake news disseminate on the Internet that harms the interests of the states. In particular, it is very tough for states to adjust fake news that harms the authority of the state, because the information shared via the Internet is not abstracted from the Data Base. The purpose of this article is to analyze the utility of the right to be forgotten as a method, which is a novel concept in the realm of human rights. Key words: right to be forgotten, fake news, propaganda, freedom of expression, freedom of information

Author(s):  
Richard Clements

The Q&A series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each chapter includes typical questions; diagram problem and essay answer plans, suggested answers, notes of caution, tips on obtaining extra marks, the key debates on each topic and suggestions on further reading. This chapter moves on from the previous one to examine the freedom of expression. Under common law, freedom of speech is guaranteed unless the speaker breaks the law, but this is now reinforced by the right of free expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. The questions here deal with issues such as obscenity law and contempt of court; the Official Secrets Act; freedom of information; breach of confidence and whether there is a right of privacy in English law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 1023-1042
Author(s):  
Ljiljana Mijović

Internet as a means of communication, whatever the type of information it might be used for, falls within the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As established in the European Court's case law, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essentials of a democratic society, therefore limitations on that freedom foreseen in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention are to be interpreted strictly. In order to ensure effective protection of one's freedom of expression on the Internet, States bear a positive obligation to create an appropriate regulatory framework, balancing the right to freedom of expression on one and the limitations prescribed in Article 10 § 2, on the other hand. Special attention in doing so is to be paid to the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of other human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention, particularly the right to respect for private life. While it is the fact that the electronic network, serving billions of users worldwide, will never be subject to the same regulations and control, because of the national authorities' margin of appreciation, the European Court established commonly applicable general principles regarding the Internet as a media of exercising right to freedom of expression.


This chapter concerns the statutory prohibitions on unauthorized disclosures of information contained in the Official Secrets Act 1989, and their interrelationship with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It identifies the categories of information protected by, and the persons subject to, the 1989 Act. The elements of the various offences created by that Act are discussed, in particular the requirements for disclosures to be made without lawful authority and to be damaging to a specified national interest. The chapter examines the question of compatibility between the 1989 Act and the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, focusing on the House of Lords’ decision in the case of David Shayler. It concludes by considering which of the exemptions from the right of access under the 2000 Act may apply to information within the scope of the 1989 Act.


Author(s):  
Jamal Barafi ◽  
Ali Hadi Al-Obeidi

Abstract The development of the Internet and mass media has facilitated access to information and freedom of expression in unprecedented ways, but in so doing there have been many violations, especially of the right to privacy. Such violations have led to calls for the establishment of the right to be forgotten. In this paper, we focus on clarifying the concept of the right to be forgotten and the conditions for establishing this. Moreover, we consider the European approach to the right to be forgotten (RTBF), showing how different European instruments have been employed to recognize this right, such as recommendations, regulations, and directives, in order to coordinate national efforts on this issue. In addition, this paper will analyze the stance of some national Arabic legislation regarding the RTBF.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daragh Murray

As a result of the ‘War on Terror’ domestic governments and the international community have paid increasing attention to counter-terrorism legislation. Given the meteoric rise in prominence of the Internet, and the ever-expanding ‘terrorist’ use of this entity, it is unsurprising that the Internet has now become the focus of legislative attention. However, what does this mean for one of the most fundamental of human rights, the right to freedom of expression? This article will analyse the concepts of incitement, glorification and dissemination as they relate to the Internet, and evaluate their place within the broader framework of the right to freedom of expression. Consequently, ‘context’, the quantifiable circulation of content, and other relevant issues are evaluated through the prism of the Internet. Similarly, the role of the ‘blogger’ is discussed as it relates to the dissemination of information, and the overarching concept of participatory democracy. For illustrative purposes, the United Kingdom's Terrorist Act 2006, and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will be of primary interest.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (32) ◽  
pp. 39-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Manu ◽  
Felipe Romero Moreno

Abstract While freedom of expression has a long and well-established constitutional foundation as a self-governing concept, the right to privacy is a relatively recent norm in the constitutional orientation of the United Kingdom. Until the Human Rights Act 1998, the right to privacy had little standing constitutionally. Following on from this standard-setting, notably, both rights have taken on added importance in our modern technological society. Nevertheless, the formulation of privacy into a legal doctrine of human rights seems to have presented a fundamental tension in relation to freedom of expression. As a matter of legal logic, the courts, through a consideration of the law, examine the substantive legal issues in terms of a balancing process, whereby the interest in privacy is balanced against the interest in freedom of expression. It is a matter of broad principle for the courts to rely on injunctions as ancillary instruments of equity in doing justice in this field. Significantly, while the elementary norm of an injunction is that it commands an act that the court regards as an essential constituent to justice, unfortunately, many contend that judges have gone beyond this point, and this is shifting opinions. In fact, serious concerns have been frequently expressed about the extent to which the rich are easily able to invoke the discretion of the court to grant injunctions in a fashion that remains an antithesis to the principle of open justice and also undermines the exercise of freedom of speech. While this suspicion is not entirely new to matters of procedural law, the recent case, PJS v News Group Newspapers turned on this controversy. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine the complexity of celebrity privacy injunctions in the age of the internet and question its relevance, as we outline the extent to which social media is challenging the authority of the state (judiciary) in this direction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 701
Author(s):  
Daniel Capodiferro Cubero

Resumen:El objetivo de este trabajo es confrontar la caracterización constitucional y jurisprudencial de la libertad de información con la realidad de su ejercicio a través de Internet, donde no es posible aplicar directamente las soluciones que el Ordenamiento ha ido construyendo para la comunicación por medios analógicos, ya que ésta se basa en la intervención preponderante de los medios de comunicación como canalizadores de la información y moduladores de la opinión pública, otorgando una mínima capacidad de intervención al ciudadano,que esencialmente venía ocupando una posición pasiva. Las nuevas tecnologías de la información han acabado con el monopolio de estos medios, permitiendo a cualquier no profesional convertirse en sujeto activo y participativo de un proceso que ya no es unidireccional, sino que se articula a través de una Red donde todos los intervinientes son receptores y creadores de contenidos, lo cual plantea nuevos retos desde el punto de vista jurídico que son particularmente difíciles de abordar. La regulación de la comunicación, diseñada para un contextoconcreto, se enfrente ahora a una situación donde los mecanismos de control que permiten proteger los derechos de terceros frente a injerencias excesivas o el propio sistema democrático ya no resultan efectivos teniendo en cuenta que más que un proceso social, la comunicación en el entorno digital se plantea en clave individual. La premisa de la información de origen periodístico que se presentaba a través de un medio, que permitía considerar a las libertades comunicativas como una garantía institucional del sistema y les otorgaba una protección reforzada, ya no se cumple, de manera que es necesario cuestionarse si el alcance de la libertad de información de los individuos debe ser equiparable al de los profesionales o hasta qué punto estos pueden seguir gozando de un papel especial en la sociedad digital. En la Red, la vinculación con un medio ha dejado de ser un requisito previo para poder informar de manera efectiva. Basta con gozar de acceso a determinada tecnología para poder hacerlo, lo que lleva a tener que preguntarse en primer lugar hasta qué punto el poder público debe garantizar a los particulares tal posibilidad. En cuanto a la protección de la libertad de información en Internet, quizá convendría focalizar la atención en la formación del sujeto como periodista para identificar a quienes poseen un determinado conocimiento de la técnica y la deontología y, por tanto, están en condiciones de actuar de manera que su aportación no incurra en excesos y contribuya verdaderamente al debate público en términos constructivos. Del mismo modo, conceptos como la veracidad de la información, que además puede tener una nueva aplicación en relación a la publicidad, o la prohibición de censura deben repensarse para poder ser aplicados al entorno digital, pues en ningún caso parece conveniente prescindir de su vigencia. Summary:1. Introduction. 2. The decontextualization of the freedom of expression and information constitutional regulation in the digital environment. 3. Differences between the citizens’ freedom of information and the journalistic activity. 4. The particularities of exercising the freedom of information in the internet. 4.1 The previous constraints for the full exercise of the right. 4.2 The adaptation of the veracity criterion to the Internet reality. 4.3 The possible control of information contents. 5. The commercial communications as a manifestation of the freedom of information in the internet. 6. Conclusions. 7. Bibliography.Abstract:The aim of this paper is to compare the constitutional and jurisprudential characterization of the freedom of information with the reality of its exercise in the Internet, where the classic legal solutions cannot be implemented directly because they are designed for an analogical communication developed by media, which used to work as the only channels of information and modulators of public opinion, putting citizens in a passive position with a minimum capacity to act. The new information technologies have broken the media monopoly, allowing anyone to become an active and participatory subject of a process that is no longer unidirectional, but articulated through a network where all the participants are receivers and creators of content, which poses new legal challenges that are particularly difficult to address. The communication regulations, designed for a specific context, is now facing a reality where its mechanisms of control, intended to protect fundamental rights against excessive interferences and the democratic system itself, are no longer effective considering that now communication is an individual process more than a social one. The premise of the journalistic information presented through a media that substantiated the privileged position of communicative freedoms as institutional guarantees with a reinforced protection is no longer fulfilled, so key questions now are whether the scope of individual freedom of information should be comparable to the professionals’ oneor what role should play journalists in the digital society. Subjects no longer need mass media for effective reporting. They simply have to get access to a specific technology to do so, which opens a new debate: if the public powers should guarantee the access to it and how. With regard to the protection of freedom of information in the Internet, it may be useful to focus attention on the training of the subject as a journalist to identify who possess certain knowledge of the technique and deontology and, therefore, is able to act in a responsible manner contributing to public debate in constructive terms. Likewise, concepts such as the veracity of information, which may also have a new application in relation to advertising, or the prohibition of prior censorship must be reconsidered to their implementation in the digital environment, since it does not seem appropriate to renounce them in digital communications.


Author(s):  
Richard Clements

The Q&A series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each chapter includes typical questions; diagram problem and essay answer plans, suggested answers, notes of caution, tips on obtaining extra marks, the key debates on each topic and suggestions on further reading. This chapter moves on from the previous one to examine the freedom of expression. Under common law, freedom of speech is guaranteed unless the speaker breaks the law, but this is now reinforced by the right of free expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. The questions here deal with issues such as obscenity law and contempt of court; the Official Secrets Act; freedom of information; breach of confidence and whether there is a right of privacy in English law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-40
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Demczuk ◽  

The measure of civilizational progress is not only economic development, which for several years has been determined by the development of computer science, but also an increase in the level of respect for human rights and freedoms guaranteed in various international legal documents. The Internet is increasingly determining the use of personal, political, social, and economic rights. Public authorities, as part of positive obligations, should be more actively involved in the protection of human rights, especially the freedom of expression and the right to privacy, which are currently being violated quite widely and especially in the horizontal dimension in cyberspace.


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