scholarly journals Support of Socialist Countries during Vietnam War: Training Officers of Soviet Union for Vietnam, 1954-1975

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Nguyen Duy Phuong ◽  
Nguyen Van Sang

The victory of the Vietnamese people in the war is inseparable from the great support of the international community and the peacekeeping force worldwide. Not only receiving material support, but more importantly, Vietnam also received the support on intellectual resources from international friends through the training of officers in all fields. The Soviet Union's role as the leader of the socialist bloc held the most important position in that immense help. Based on archived sources that are diplomatic documents between the two countries, as well as the latest research achievements, the article analyzes the support of The Soviet Union for Vietnam in the field of officer training in many aspects. The results confirm the great contributions of The Soviet Union to the Vietnam war against the United States to build and protect the independence of Vietnamese people, and at the same time contribute to explain the effects of the “Soviet model” in Vietnam in the past as well as nowadays.   Received: 19 August 2020 / Accepted: 2 December 2020 / Published: 17 January 2021

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Novita Mujiyati ◽  
Kuswono Kuswono ◽  
Sunarjo Sunarjo

United States and the Soviet Union is a country on the part of allies who emerged as the winner during World War II. However, after reaching the Allied victory in the situation soon changed, man has become an opponent. United States and the Soviet Union are competing to expand the influence and power. To compete the United States strive continuously strengthen itself both in the economic and military by establishing a defense pact and aid agencies in the field of economy. During the Cold War the two are not fighting directly in one of the countries of the former Soviet Union and the United States. However, if understood, teradinya the Korean War and the Vietnam War is a result of tensions between the two countries and is a direct warfare conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Cold War ended in conflict with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the winner of the country.


1983 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leszek Buszynski

Southeast Asia in United States policy fell from a region of high priority during the Vietnam war to become, after the fall of Indochina, an area of relatively minor interest. For the United States, Southeast Asia evoked memories of misperception, intensified over-commitment, and simplistic assumptions that characterized the American effort to defeat local Vietnamese national communism. Since the formulation of the Nixon doctrine of disengagement in 1969, United States policy towards Southeast Asia has been undergoing a process of long-term readjustment in recognition of the exaggerated significance that the region had assumed in American thinking. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was a major stimulus to this readjustment as it gave the Americans compelling reasons to anticipate a reassertion of Soviet influence in the region. Successive American administrations attempted to place the region in a wider global context to avoid the dangers of extreme reaction to local national communism while developing the flexibility to coordinate a response to the Soviet Union at a global level. The main concern of American policy was to remove the basis for direct United States involvement in the region in a way that would satisfy post-Vietnam war public and congressional opinion and the demands of strategic planners for greater freedom of manoeuvre against the Soviet Union.


1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht

An examination of the past relationships between nuclear proliferation and American security policy substantiates several propositions. First, the political relationship between the United States and each new nuclear weapon state was not fundamentally transformed as a result of nuclear proliferation. Second, with the exception of the Soviet Union, no new nuclear state significantly affected U.S. defense programs or policies. Third, American interest in bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations has been confined to the Soviet Union. Fourth, a conventional conflict involving a nonnuclear ally prompted the United States to intervene in ways it otherwise might not have in order to forestall the use of nuclear weapons.In all respects, however, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and American security policy is changing. The intensification of the superpower rivalry and specific developments in their nuclear weapons and doctrines, the decline of American power more generally, and the characteristics of nuclear threshold states all serve to stimulate nuclear proliferation. It will be increasingly difficult in the future for American security policy to be as insulated from this process as it has been in the past.


1960 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick C. Barghoorn

InSpite of a continued gradual increase of American-Soviet contacts, the official Soviet image of the United States in 1959 was shaped, as before, largely by a combination of preconcert tion and contrivance. The massive Soviet machinery of communication continued to present to the peoples of the Soviet Union a picture of America based less on empirical judgment than on the application to changing circumstances of unchanging attitudes. As in the past, the Kremlin's image of America and of the West in general appeared to be as much an instrument for the manipulation of foreign and Soviet public opinion as it was a reflection of Moscow's appraisal of international political forces. The official doctrine of irreconcilable struggle between Soviet “socialism” and Western “capitalism” held undiminished significance for the rationalization and legitimization of Kremlin power and policy.


Author(s):  
Ivan Desiatnikov ◽  

The article focuses on the analysis of US-Vietnam relations during the period from 1945 to 1975. The aim of the article is to trace the changes that took place in the US-Vietnam relationship over that period, to identify the factors that influenced them, as well as the approaches used by the heads of the countries to tackle their foreign policy objectives in the region. The author traces the evolution of US policy in Vietnam pursued by Presidents H. Truman, D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, L. Johnson and R. Nixon. The United States had diametrically opposed position on relations with the Vietnamese governments, namely, confrontation and military conflict with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and cooperation, military and economic aid to the Republic of Vietnam. The author concludes that the US attitude towards Vietnam was determined by the international situation at that time, including the beginning of the Cold War. The policies of Presidents D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy were to restrain the expansion of the Communist bloc's sphere of influence. The direct involvement of the US military in the Vietnam conflict, initiated by L. Johnson, pursued the goal of enhancing the prestige of the United States in the global confrontation with the USSR. The split between the Soviet Union and China was used by the US to get out of the Vietnam War and mend relations with China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the Republic of Vietnam, which had been the "junior partner" of the United States, was left to its fate.


Author(s):  
Ellen A. Ahlness

Tajikistan has experienced numerous barriers to economic and political development over the past 100 years. Pressured into joining the Soviet Union, which lasted nearly 70 years, Tajikistan sank into a civil war upon achieving its independence. This resulted in numerous deaths, displacement, and infrastructural devastation. Since the conflict, Tajikistan has experienced tremendous economic growth and positive social developments; however, Western media overwhelmingly focuses on isolated incidences of violence and socioeconomic trends that casts Tajikistan in a negative light. This also creates a “horn effect” that frames the Tajik socioeconomic situation as underdeveloped and lacking freedoms. A narrative analysis of stories on Tajikistan from the United States' top 10 news outlets from 1998 to 2018 portrays unrepresentative and paternal pictures of Tajikistan's political, economic, and social developments.


Author(s):  
James Cameron

The chapter analyzes the Johnson administration’s failure to begin substantive strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Johnson and McNamara were overly optimistic regarding the USSR’s willingness to concede nuclear superiority to the United States, believing that the strain of an arms race on the Soviet economy would be too great. The chapter argues that this economic determinism based on a US-centric model of modernization that privileged living standards over other goals was similar to that which underpinned the administration’s bombing strategy in the Vietnam War. Rather than being a completely separate initiative, Johnson’s strategy of détente with the USSR based on arms control stemmed from the same outlook as that which underpinned Vietnam. When Soviet willingness to enter talks failed to materialize, the Johnson White House was unable to agree to talks that would be based on strategic parity, fearing the domestic political consequences of doing so.


1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-160
Author(s):  
P.S. Jayaramu

In any analysis of the role that the Super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—would play in the international system in the 1980s and beyond, one has to be careful of the fact that the projections that can be made cannot bear the stamp of definitiveness and are therefore debateable. Consciousness of this limitation notwithstanding, this paper attempts such an analysis. It is the belief of this writer that any projection of the Super Powers' role in the future has its roots in an understanding of the role they played in the past and are playing at present.


1971 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 439-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Weakland

It is clear that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic is very concerned about national defence and possible foreign attack – especially from the United States, but increasingly from the Soviet Union also. Obviously, such concerns are largely relatable to both historical and current political and military realities – such as 100-odd years of western and Japanese encroachments on China, the Vietnam war, American military bases around China, Chinese-Soviet border clashes, and both ideological and practical political conflicts between China and the United States, and China and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, these practical realities alone cannot provide a full basis for understanding the nature and strength of Chinese concerns about potential invasion. In the first place, such attitudes are both too deep and too wide. Traditionally, from long before the West became powerful in Asia, China has been concerned to keep foreigners out or at least carefully restricted, and long before the bitter attacks by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on “cultural imperialism” this concern extended to economic and cultural as well as direct military or political influence. Second – more generally, but more fundamentally – political behaviour and attitudes are never so neatly and completely rational and compartmentalized as to depend only on the “real” political circumstances. As with anyone else, both what the Chinese perceive as “real” and as “political,” and the significance attributed to these perceptions, depends also on the lenses they use to view the world. And the nature of the lenses used to view international affairs may be shaped by matters that at first seem remote from international relations, and by unconscious and emotional as well as conscious and rational calculations.


1954 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 412-437
Author(s):  
J. B. Duroselle

We are living at a time when events move more rapidly than in the past. It is therefore very difficult, even in an article for a review, to sum up the situation, and still more difficult to see even a short distance into the future. This is true for any country, even for those, like the United States and the Soviet Union, which have greater autonomy and greater power in the bipolar world in which we live. But it is probably in the case of France that the task is most difficult of all, for in this country the general problems are complicated by a particular kind of crisis growing out of internal conditions. As I write these lines, it is impossible for me to have the slightest idea as to what French foreign policy will be when the article is published.


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