scholarly journals Dochodzenie alimentów na podstawie art. 60 k.r.o. w razie właściwości prawa obcego do rozwiązania małżeństwa

2017 ◽  
pp. 123-153
Author(s):  
Jakub Pawliczak

The applicable rules on jurisdiction and conflict of laws do not preclude situations in which the law of one country governs dissolution of the marriage, while the law of the other is applicable to the alimony claims between the former spouses. These kinds of rules cause difficulties for courts resolving family disputes, if in a particular legal system the regulation on maintenance between formers spouses is closely linked to the rules governing dissolution of marriage. Further complications occur when the law governing the divorce does not provide for ruling on the matrimonial fault and the maintenance claims are governed by the law, under which, like in the case of article 60 of the Polish Family and Guardianship Code, the existence, extent or duration of the maintenance obligations between former spouses are dependent on the ruling on the fault. The principal aim of the article is to analyse legal issues related to claiming alimony on the basis of article 60 of the Polish Family and Guardianship Code, when the foreign law governs dissolution of the marriage. Due to the complex character of these issues international rules on jurisdiction and conflict of laws, as well as domestic rules of material and procedural character shall be analysed.

Author(s):  
V.C. Govindaraj

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the jurisprudential distinction between substance and procedure. Substance relates to rights and obligations of the parties to a dispute, whereas procedure is the means employed to determine such rights and obligations. Matters of substantive law are governed by the lex causae (that is, the law that governs the cause of action), the law found applicable under the concerned country’s rules for the choice of law. Matters of procedure, on the other hand, are governed by the lex fori (that is, the law of the forum), the law of country where the action is brought. The chapter covers procedural matters of interlocutory character; remedial measures for enforcing a right; conflict of laws and the law of limitations; matters of enforcement; underlying norms and principles of stay of proceedings; and proof of foreign law.


1963 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wallace Mendelson

A generation ago “legal realists” led by Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn dismissed law as a myth—a function of what judges had for breakfast. The important thing, they insisted, was what a court did, not what it said. No doubt this was good medicine for the times. Yet, however broad Frank's 1930 language, later on the bench he loyally acknowledged the compulsive force of legal rules. As a lower court judge, he decided cases in accordance with what he found the law to be—and on occasion he made clear in addenda what he thought it ought to be.Llewellyn, too, changed his mind. In 1934 he had said, “The theory that rules decide cases seems for a century to have fooled, not only library-ridden recluses, but judges.” Seventeen years later he confessed that his earlier behavioral descriptions of law contained “unhappy words when not more fully developed, and they are plainly at best a very partial statement of the whole truth.”In short, after their initial enthusiasm, these and other legal realists recognized that there is and must be law in the judicial process, as well as discretion. This was inevitable, for society can no more dispense with order and coherence than it can deny the demands of changing circumstance. We must have stability, yet we cannot stand still; and so the legal system inevitably has both static and dynamic qualities. Holmes put it in a thimble: “The … law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.”


2019 ◽  
pp. 172-194
Author(s):  
Adrian Briggs

This chapter examines of the role of the lex fori in English private international law before proceeding to examine the rules of the conflict of laws applicable in an English court. Issues for which the rules of the conflict of laws select the lex fori as the law to be applied include grounds for the dissolution (as distinct from nullity) of marriage, even if the marriage has little or nothing to do with the United Kingdom; or settlement of the distribution of assets in an insolvency even though there may be significant overseas elements. Where the rules of the conflict of laws select a foreign law, its application, even though it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, may be disrupted or derailed by a provision of the lex fori instead. The remainder of the chapter covers procedural issues; penal, revenue, and public laws; and public policy.


1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friedmann

This series of articles is intended to deal with one aspect of the sources of Israel law, namely the influence of foreign legal systems and principles derived therefrom on Israel law and on the attempt in recent years to independent creation of local law.Foreign law constitutes on occasion an actual legal source for the law of Israel. This occurs when a local enactment refers to foreign law and makes it applicable in certain situations. In such case the foreign law which we are to apply constitutes an obligatory legal norm in Israel and is, in fact, part of the Israel legal system. In other cases foreign law influences the process of creation of local law but does not constitute a formal source of law in the Israel system. This happens, for example, when Israel case law relies for authority upon some rule established in an American decision (which is, of course, not binding in Israel) or when the Israel legislator is influenced by a principle of law derived from another legal system. We might say there that the foreign law is an historical source for the Israel rule.


1993 ◽  
Vol 163 (S20) ◽  
pp. 29-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. Daly

In psychiatry, the law, and economics, there are many areas of overlap where our knowledge and appreciation are growing and developing. Many doctors ‘understand the words but not the music’, and the same is true for the other professions involved. This is exemplified in relation to suicide.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 801-825 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS

AbstractThis article examines the law of self-defence as applied to non-state attacks in light of the coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria. It critiques the two current interpretations of the law of self-defence – one based on attribution and the other on the ‘unable or unwilling’ test – for failing to address adequately the security threat posed by non-state actors or for not addressing convincingly the legal issues arising from the fact that the self-defence action unfolds on the territory of another state. For this reason, it proposes an alternative framework which combines the primary rule of self-defence to justify the use of defensive force against non-state actors, with the secondary rule of self-defence to excuse the incidental breach of the territorial state's sovereignty.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-42
Author(s):  
Folker Bittmann

The aim of German criminal procedural law is not to convict the accused at any cost. Even a guilty party can only be convicted if the criminal procedure is held in accordance with the law. If this is not possible, the German legal system accepts the risk of possibly acquitting a guilty party; it finds this more tolerable than the irregular conviction of the culprit. A criminal procedure seeks the truth. Only on the basis of a judicial conviction of the crime and its culprit may a sentence be imposed. This, though, can only be based on the so-calledprocedural truth.On the one hand, the past can never be reconstructed precisely; on the other hand, clarification can only be found through legal means and by following designated paths allowed by procedural law. Therefore, further investigation must cease if it is only possible to proceed by violating procedural law.


1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Lipstein

(1) Legal BasisWhen the first issue of the Cambridge Law Journal appeared in 1921, the English rules of the conflict of laws were those stated and reformulated by Dicey and by the editors of Westlake and Foote. Their progress between 1858 and 1912 had been charted by Dicey himself in a survey published in 1912. The legal basis for the application of foreign law in England was and remained Lord Mansfield's pronouncement in Holman v. Johnson: “Every action here must be tried by the law of England, but the law of England says that in a variety of circumstances … the law of the country where the cause of action arose shall govern.” Dicey never waivered in his adherence to this rule of English law, but he supplemented it with an argument drawn from the doctrine of acquired rights which bedevilled English lawyers for a long time, until in 1949 the editors of the sixth edition of Dicey took what they believed to be a bold, but substantially honest, step by restricting the concept to its proper boundaries and thus by depriving it of its capacity to serve as a general principle of the Conflict of Laws.


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Folkard

AT common law, in cases where the substantive claim is governed by foreign law, questions of procedure are nonetheless governed by the lex fori. In the context of damages, although the existence of damage is a question for the lex causae, its quantification and assessment is determined according to the law of the forum (Boys v Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356). The distinction between substance and procedure is preserved by Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 (“Rome II”) which provides, with certain exceptions, that Rome II “shall not apply to evidence and procedure”. That rule is, however, qualified by Article 15, which requires the law applicable under the Regulation (i.e. “the law applicable to non-contractual obligations”) to govern, inter alia, “the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed” (Article 15(c)). The decision of the Court of Appeal in Wall v Mutuelle De Poitiers Assurances [2014] EWCA Civ 138; [2014] 3 All E.R. 340 concerns the definition of “procedure” in Article 1(3) and the meaning of “applicable law” in Article 15(c). It raises the important question of how far Rome II has encroached on the traditional view of national procedural autonomy in the conflict of laws.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Fishman

Abstract Anthony Trollope (1815–1882) resides in the pantheon of nineteenth century English literature. While working full time in his postal position until 1867, he still managed to publish 47 novels, travel books, biographies, short stories, collections of essays, and articles on various topics. Trollope has been described as the novelist of the ordinary for his realistic description of English society. Law and legal issues flow through Trollope's fiction. The legal system held a special importance to him as the skeleton upholding the social and political framework of the country. Over one hundred lawyers appear in his work and eleven of his novels feature trials or hearings. The law intrigued and exasperated him. Along with the lawyers and legal issues he depicts are ideas of the law and legal system that are part of elaborate philosophical and jurisprudential traditions, which he recognized. This article examines Trollope's changing attitude toward lawyers. It describes the structure of the Bar in terms of class, status and reputation. Trollope believed the legal system should ensure justice, and those who labored in the law should be the vehicle of that pursuit. Justice for Trollope was the meting out of rewards and punishments as the consequence of a right or wrong decision. However, the law, as he depicted it, was often an impediment to this process, and lawyers were unreliable guides. Initially Trollope portrayed lawyers critically as caricatures as evinced by such names as Alwinde, O’Blather, Slow & Bideawhile, Haphazard, and Chaffanbrass. He was outraged that barristers (lawyers who appear in court) put loyalty to their clients ahead of the search for truth and justice. The adversary system was flawed as the enactment of laws in accord with the laws of nature assumes an inbuilt moral compass in humans that contains self-evident truths of right and wrong. Trollope felt there was no reason why a right-minded person could not intuitively recognize the truth, so criminal law's adversary system was unnecessary. The legal system sought not the discovery of the truth but was more interested in aiding the guilty defendant to escape punishment. As he matured as a writer and achieved success, Trollope's understanding and appreciation of the legal profession changed. He met and become friends with leaders of the Bar, and they influenced his descriptions of lawyers, who became realistic and often admirable human beings. Beyond the legal problems of its characters, Trollope's later novels incorporated the social, political, and jurisprudential issues of the times and engaged the Victorian legal culture in a broader sense of history, traditions, continuity and change. Natural law principles were challenged during the Victorian era by positivist notions that law is what the statute books say. These divisions lurk in the background of his later portraits of lawyers and the legal system. In his later period Trollope created a realistic characterization of the legal profession at the time that offered universal insights into human nature.


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