scholarly journals The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. Its Meaning and Significance

Author(s):  
А.Ф. Агарев ◽  
В.П. Курышкин

Все 1930-е годы Советский Союз прилагал значительные усилия для создания системы коллективной безопасности в Европе и заслона на пути гитлеровской агрессии, но правящие круги Великобритании, Франции и Италии, подписав с Германией позорное Мюнхенское соглашение, свели их на нет. Неудачей закончились и переговоры военных представителей Англии, Франции и СССР, проходившие в Москве в августе 1939 года. Западные партнеры затягивали эти переговоры, одновременно пытаясь за спиной СССР договориться с Берлином. Дальнейшее затягивание бесплодных переговоров грозило нашей стране опасностью оказаться перед угрозой войны с объединенным фронтом западных стран. В своих намерениях создать систему коллективной безопасности в Европе советское правительство столкнулось с саботажем правящих кругов Англии и Франции и было вынуждено дать согласие на приезд в Москву фон Риббентропа для ведения переговоров о заключении Пакта о ненападении. Германский министр, в отличие от англо-французских переговорщиков, имел полномочия для подписания необходимых документов. 23 августа 1939 года он и В. М. Молотов подписали Пакт о ненападении. На принятие такого решения оказала влияние и угроза войны на два фронта: в это время на востоке, в районе реки Халхин-Гол, шли ожесточенные бои, которые могли перерасти в полномасштабную войну с Японией. Договор о ненападении между Германией и СССР дал возможность выиграть время для укрепления обороны страны и ослабил единство агрессивного фашистско-милитаристского блока. С нападением Германии на Польшу и началом Второй мировой войны договор не связан. Не нарушал он и норм международного права. During the 1930s, the Soviet Union did its best to build a collective security system in Europe in order to prevent the spread of the Nazi menace. However, the ruling circles of Great Britain, France and Italy nullified the efforts by signing the ignoble Munich Agreement. The military negotiations between England, France and the USSR that were held in Moscow in August 1939 were a dismal failure. The western partners delayed the negotiations trying to reach an agreement with Berlin behind the back of the Soviet Union. Further delay threatened to put Russia in a position when it had to oppose a united western front. Trying to build a collective security system in Europe, the Soviet government had to handle the sabotage campaign launched by the ruling circles of England and France and had to accept the arrival of the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact. Unlike British and French ministers, the German minister was authorised to sign such documents. On 23 August 1939, J. von Ribbentrop and V. M. Molotov signed the non-aggression pact. The decision was taken under a two-front military threat (there were outbursts of fierce fighting near the Khalkhin-Gol river, which could escalate into a full-scale confrontation with Japan. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact gave the USSR a chance to enhance its defence and diminished the aggressive efforts of fascist militarists. The pact cannot be treated as violation of international law. It is in no way related to the German invasion of Poland preceding World War II.

2018 ◽  
Vol 216 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-92
Author(s):  
Assist. Prof. Dr. Mohammed Abdul Majid Abdul Baqi

The indicators of Europe returning increasing rapidly as an active part at the current time, where the French differentiation pattern towards the American situation towards Palestinian issue, also the Germany-French-Belgian differentiation pattern towards the American situation during the Military aggression on Iraq in 2003, all of that Allows multiple and diverse indicators for this role Which had declined after the end of World War II and the end of the European occupation of the Arab homeland, Europe has suffered great losses militarily, economically, lose of population and socially  during the World War II, and this loss  had impacted its ability to continue its old strategic role of colonizing in confronting other international poles that had become the first power over Europe account and started to impose its influence on the former colonies of Europe in the Arab region, where America has struggled to impose its full control over the Arab homeland As an alternative for the old European colonialism , where the independence of the situation of the European had declined significantly towards the Arabian issues, so, it turns to the dialogue with  the Arabian governments, Which  had actually embodied as (The Arabian-European dialogue), considering that a new stage has begun to rearrange the international influence in the region, Also, Europe has regained its colonial power that was lost after the World War II particularly  with the decline of the Arab unity factors because of the weakness of governments and systems, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, The level of this orientation has expanded with the launch of '' Middle East" project , according to (American-Zionist) belief that Excludes the European interests, and this pushed the researcher to analyze the constant and the variable in that study towards the Arabian issues as a framework to answer the queries about the future nature of the Arabian-European relations.              


Author(s):  
Stephanie Trombley Averill

This chapter looks at how, in the former Axis powers of Japan and Germany, the United States occupation authorities initially pursued policies that treated democratization and demilitarization as virtually synonymous. They believed a democracy could not flourish in either Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany until the military traditions had been purged from their national character and consciousness. The former aggressors faced total disarmament. Initial plans—embodied most drastically by the Morgenthau Plan to turn Germany into a pastoral country—were severe and uncompromising. However, once the Soviet Union had successfully acquired the atomic bomb, the United States concluded that measured rearmament in both countries was essential for the defense of democracy and the free world.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (02) ◽  
pp. 255-268
Author(s):  
Basil Dmytryshyn

Literature in many languages (documentary, monographic, memoir-like and periodical) is abundant on the sovietization of Czechoslovakia, as are the reasons advanced for it. Some observers have argued that the Soviet takeover of the country stemmed from an excessive preoccupation with Panslavism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by a few Czech and Slovak intellectuals, politicians, writers and poets and their uncritical affection and fascination for everything Russian and Soviet. Others have attributed the drawing of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet orbit to Franco-British appeasement of Hitler's imperial ambitions during the September 1938, Munich crisis. At Munich, Czechoslovakia lost its sovereignty and territory, France its honor, England its respect and trust; and the Soviet Union, by its abstract offer to aid Czechoslovakia (without detailing how or in what form the assistance would come) gained admiration. Still others have pinned the blame for the sovietization of Czechoslovakia on machinations by top leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who, as obedient tools of Moscow, supported Soviet geopolitical designs on Czechoslovakia, who sought and received political asylum in the USSR during World War II, and who returned to Czechoslovakia with the victorious Soviet armed forces at the end of World War II as high-ranking members of the Soviet establishment. Finally, there are some who maintain that the sovietization of Czechoslovakia commenced with the 25 February 1948, Communist coup, followed by the tragic death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk on 10 March 1948, and the replacement, on 7 June 1948, of President Eduard Beneš by the Moscow-trained, loyal Kremlin servant Klement Gottwald.


Author(s):  
Galina N. Kaninskaya ◽  
Natalya N. Naumova

The article is devoted to the participation of French pilots of the Normandy squadron in battles on the Soviet-German front as part of the Red Army in 1943-1945. After the defeat of France at the first stage of World War II (1940), the occupation of its territory by Germany and the organization of the Resistance movement “Fighting France” in London by General Charles de Gaulle, the pilots joined him expressed a burning desire to fight the enemy in the skies over Soviet soil. Their participation in the ranks of the Soviet Air Force was a unique event in the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1945-1945). The article analyzes the information of the Soviet press during the war years about the French squadron “Normandie-Niemen”, which fought in the Soviet Air Force on the Soviet-German front. It is shown that Soviet readers during the Great Patriotic War could get a very complete and reliable idea of the military exploits of French pilots, find out the names of heroes, get acquainted with the military everyday life of officers, appreciate their patriotism and sincere friendly feelings for the Soviet Union and its people. Along with stories about the air battles of the Normandy, the articles of Soviet correspondents contained information about the history of France, how the pilots reacted to the defeat of their country, how and where they fought in the first stage of the Second World War. The press of the war years gave brief sketches of the everyday life of French fighters on Soviet soil, about the curious events that happened to the pilots of the squadron. On the example of newspaper publications 1943-1945. about the military alliance of our and French pilots, you can get an idea of how the cooperation of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition developed and strengthened.


Author(s):  
L. M. Efimova

Victorious ending of the World War 2 on May, 9, 1945, stroke a crushing blow on the military axis Berlin - Rome - Tokyo. The USSR played a decisive role both on European and Asian fronts. Fulfilling its allied duty the Soviet Union entered the war in the Far East on 9 August, 1945 and defeated the Japanese army in Manchuria. This act became a great contribution to liberation of Asian peoples from the Japanese occupation. On the 17 August 1945 the Republic of Indonesia declared its independence. The recognition on the side of international community as well as diplomatic support became\e vital for the survival of the newly emerged Republic.The Soviet victory together with the allied nations in the Second World War, the new status of the USSR as a superpower, its constant anticolonial stance stimulated former colonies to appeal to the Soviet Union for backing and support. One of the first was the Republic of Indonesia, to which the USSR rendered all kind of help and encourages. The present article which is a result of the study of newly available documents from several recently opened Soviet archives shows the Soviet backing of Indonesia in the UN, its diplomatic recognition, in strengthening of Indonesian status as a sovereign state on the international arena as a whole.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-148
Author(s):  
Karl D. Qualls

AbstractSevastopol, since becoming a part of independent Ukraine in 1991 (and part of the Ukrainian SSR for decades before) has consistently and overwhelmingly voted for pro-Russian candidates in each national election. While many political commentators have noted the demographics of predominately Russian speakers and the presence of the Russian fleet in the ports to explain recent voting patterns, we must also take note of postwar myth creation. Although since 1917 Sevastopol has been juridically Soviet or Ukrainian, residents and outsiders alike usually view Sevastopol as a Russian city. The development of local identification after World War II by the military, local officials, and guidebook authors helps to explain how Sevastopol so easily shed its identification with the Soviet Union while also avoiding identification with Ukraine.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 140-144
Author(s):  
Cynthia Roberts

In the lead-up to World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941–1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German and Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg and the Soviet conception of “deep battle” have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German and Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years.


Slavic Review ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben-Cion Pinchuk

As a result of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and Northern Bucovina in 1939-40, the Soviet Union was left with the largest Jewish population in Europe. Given this large population, the fact that the Soviet Union had the greatest number of Jews who survived World War II has aroused the interest of researchers and drawn attention to the role of Soviet policy in the rescue of Jews during the Holocaust. Some of the reasons for the survival of Jews in Soviet-annexed territories seem obvious. In contrast to other European countries, only part of the USSR was occupiéd by German armies. Therefore, Jews could find refuge in the unoccupied regions. This simple and generally sufficient explanation is not the only one which has been offered, however. Some Western scholars have argued that the Soviet government had a specific policy designed to rescue Jews from the danger of annihilation. Soviet propaganda, particularly that aimed at Western audiences, maintained that millions of Jews owed their lives to Soviet rescue operations during the Holocaust.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-121
Author(s):  
Lauri Hannikainen

In September 1939, after having included a secret protocol on spheres of influence in the so-called Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland and divided it between themselves. It was not long before the Soviet Union approached Finland by proposing exchanges of certain territories: ‘in our national interest we want to have from you certain territories and offer in exchange territories twice as large but in less crucial areas’. Finland, suspicious of Soviet motives, refused – the outcome was the Soviet war of aggression against Finland by the name of the Winter War in 1939–1940. The Soviet Union won this war and compelled Finland to cede several territories – about 10 per cent of Finland’s area. After the Winter War, Finland sought protection from Germany against the Soviet Union and decided to rely on Germany. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland joined the German war effort in the so-called Continuation War and reoccupied the territories lost in the Winter War. Finnish forces did not stop at the old border but occupied Eastern (Soviet) Karelia with a desire eventually to annex it. By that measure, Finland joined as Germany’s ally in its war of aggression against the Soviet Union in violation of international law. In their strong reliance on Germany, the Finnish leaders made some very questionable decisions without listening to warnings from Western States about possible negative consequences. Germany lost its war and so did Finland, which barely avoided entire occupation by the Soviet Army and succeeded in September 1944 in concluding an armistice with the Soviet Union. Finland lost some more territories and was subjected to many obligations and restrictions in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, dictated by the Allies. This article analyses, according to the criteria of international law, Finland’s policy shortly prior to and during the Continuation War, especially Finland’s secret dealings with Germany in the months prior to the German attack against the Soviet Union and Finland’s occupation of Eastern Karelia in the autumn of 1941. After Adolf Hitler declared that Germany was fighting against the Soviet Union together with Finland and Romania, was the Soviet Union entitled – prior to the Finnish attack – to resort to armed force in self-defence against Finland? And was Finland treated too harshly in the aftermath of World War ii? After all, its role as an ally of Germany had been rather limited.


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