scholarly journals Individual Abuse of Collective Dominance in Cellular Communications: Problems of Identification

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 50-70
Author(s):  
Andrey E. Shastitko ◽  
◽  
Karina A. Ionkina ◽  
Natalia S. Pavlova ◽  
◽  
...  

Recently, discussions about the validity of the Russian practice of establishing the facts of individual abuse of collective dominance have been escalating: many experts point to a contradiction between the meaning of collective dominance, in which a small number of companies have a joint dominant position, in connection with each other, and the possibility of an individual company to abuse this position. The purpose of the article is to assess the correctness of this approach in the context of recent antitrust cases in the cellular communications market – in particular, two cases against the mobile operator “Tele2”. In the article, the applied practice is assessed in relation to the currently known results in the field of economic theory, as well as international best practices in the application of the concept of collective dominance. The findings indicate that the conclusion of the FAS Russia on the presence of the dominant position of Tele2 as part of collective dominance and the possibility of the company to exercise its market power does not correspond to either foreign practice or industrial organization theory. The source of error in the qualification of behavior is largely due to the focus of the antimonopoly authority on quantitative criteria of collective dominance to the detriment of the analysis of qualitative criteria and behavior. This case illustrates a typical tendency for such cases not to investigate the behavior of other collectively dominant market participants in relation to the behavior of the company accused of individual abuse, as well as not to investigate consumer behavior, and, in particular, their real possibilities to switch and switching actions. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.

2021 ◽  
pp. 68-88
Author(s):  
A. E. Shastitko ◽  
K. A. Ionkina

The paper defines the features of the collective dominance institute in Russia as well as the relation between collective dominance and oligopoly in the spheres of law and economic theory. The article evaluates the grounds and consequences of the collective dominance legal norm application; it suggests an approach to examining the relation between effects and expected results of this legal norm application and outlines the potential ways to harmonize the best international practices of the collective dominance norm application with the existing economic standards of product market analysis for the purpose of competition law enforcement. Results of the oligopoly theory and the Russian version of collective dominance institution key elements comparison show: the collective dominance institution concept is inadequately applied to identify individual abuse of dominant position due to possible law enforcement errors. The Russian version of collective dominance institution reflects one fundamental tendency intrinsic to Russian antitrust: examined more closely, law enforcement, which is de jure aimed at protecting competition, appears to be economic regulation, which de facto can lead to competition restriction. One of the possible structural alternatives for the collective dominance institution reforming is based on presumption of the need to analyze the joint impact exerted by a group of undertakings on the market.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (10/11) ◽  
pp. 1354-1362
Author(s):  
Bhavneet Walia ◽  
Christopher John Boudreaux

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on hospital mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Design/methodology/approach The authors conduct a systematic review of the literature on hospital M&As to summarize their effects upon cost of health care delivery (access), efficiency, market power, cost and price. Implications for health care industry policy are provided. Findings A significant majority of results conclude lower costs, increased efficiency, but higher prices (due to a market concentration effect) following hospital merger or acquisition. These results are consistent with industrial organization theory and suggest that regulatory policy (e.g. price cap regulation) will raise allocative efficiency, consumer surplus and overall market surplus within markets for hospital services. Originality/value This is the first study to review the price, cost and efficiency effects of M&As with respect to industrial organization theory in the context of hospitals. This study also provides regulatory policy implications.


2013 ◽  
Vol 798-799 ◽  
pp. 936-940
Author(s):  
Mei Hu ◽  
Jie Su

As an important form of agricultural industrialization in China, facility agriculture industry has been greatly developed in recent years, but due to fierce market competition, facility agriculture industry is suffering low effectiveness. Taking Yanqing County, Beijing as an example, supported by industrial organization theory, the paper attempts to make a thorough analysis of Yanqing facility agriculture industry by using SCP paradigm, the result shows that industry operation is troubled by two dilemmas: Scale dilemma and prisoner’s dilemma, and the solution to free the industry from the difficulties is government policies. Based on the conclusion of the analysis, the paper adjusted the traditional SCP paradigm, highlighted the importance of government policies, and made some suggestions for the formulating facility agriculture industrial policies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Donohoe ◽  
Gary A. McGill

ABSTRACT We use event study techniques to gauge market participants' ex ante perceptions regarding the benefits and burdens of the Schedule M-3, and structural break analysis to investigate whether managers make ex ante or ex post changes in book-tax differences as a result of this mandatory change in federal tax return disclosures. We find evidence suggesting investors believe ex ante the substantial increase in book-tax difference disclosures will increase future tax burdens and/or tax-compliance costs. Investors also appear to believe the M-3 may be more costly for firms having the types of book-tax differences that attract additional IRS scrutiny (e.g., discretionary permanent differences) and when such firms are weakly monitored. Further, we find evidence of a substantial reduction in our proxy for discretionary permanent book-tax differences prior and subsequent to the implementation of the M-3 and other regulatory events, suggesting both ex ante and ex post real effects on firm behavior. JEL Classifications: G14; H25; H26; M48. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.


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