Volkswille: Reale Substanz oder notwendige Fiktion?

Der Staat ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-396
Author(s):  
Shu-Perng Hwang

Angesichts des markanten Aufstiegs des Rechtspopulismus in den vergangenen Jahren drängt sich die Frage immer wieder auf, ob oder inwiefern das Parlament den eigentlichen Volkswillen (noch) vertreten kann, und wie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung und Digitalisierung der eigentliche Volkswille überhaupt festzustellen und effektiv durchzusetzen ist. In dieser Hinsicht steht das Vertrauen in die Fähigkeit des Parlaments, den wahren Volkswillen herauszubilden und zu artikulieren, erneut vor großen Herausforderungen. Durch eine vergleichende Analyse zwischen den Demokratietheorien Böckenfördes und Kelsens zeigt der vorliegende Beitrag, weshalb und inwiefern das weitverbreitete Verständnis des Volkswillens und dessen Rolle in der parlamentarischen Demokratie gerade vor dem heutigen Hintergrund eine kritische Besinnung verdient. Es wird argumentiert, dass gerade in demokratischer Hinsicht nicht die Suche nach dem „wahren Volkswillen“, sondern nach wie vor die Gewährleistung der Menschen- bzw. Grundrechte der Einzelnen und insbesondere der Minderheiten von zentraler Bedeutung sein soll. In view of the spread of right-wing populism in recent years, the question as to how the will of the people is to be ascertained and expressed has attracted much attention in constitutional scholarship. In particular, the issue of whether or to what extent the parliament is (still) capable of representing and demonstrating the will of the people has been repeatedly discussed and debated. Through a comparative analysis of Böckenförde’s und Kelsen’s democratic theories, this article critically examines the problems of the widespread understanding of the will of the people as a real-empirical existence and its significance for the realization of democracy. Accordingly, it points out why and in what sense the reference to the so-called real will of the people would undermine rather than promote democracy. This article concludes by arguing that, precisely for the sake of democracy, what is crucial is not to determine what the “real will of the people” is, but rather to guarantee the freedom of the individual and especially of the minorities.

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-764
Author(s):  
Dmitry Y. Meshcheryakov

The article examines and compares main approaches to defining populism in modern Anglo-Saxon and German political science. The author points out some similarities between two schools: increasing interest of research communities in the USA, United Kingdom and Germany in examining right-wing populism due to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Furthermore, among the key features of populism, both schools see the allusion to “the will of the people”, as well as juxtaposition of “the people” against “the elite”. The article emphasizes the existing reciprocal influence of the two research traditions. On the other hand, the author outlines certain differences in the two schools’ approach to populism, such as historical dissimilarities in its interpretation (in the USA the concept used to bear a more “neutral” character, while in German political science, due to the Nazi regime carryover, it was regarded mostly negatively for a long time). Also, German academic works on populism have applied rather than theoretical nature and aim at stopping the expansion of the phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Christian Lamour

Abstract Leaders of European right-wing populism (RWP) have developed speeches about the state border control required to protect the “people” electing them. Nevertheless, are these RWP narratives necessarily circulated during populist media events that take place in the symbolic locations of European integration? It is argued that border control discourse in these EU places can be mitigated by RWP actors, but also emphasized by the media depending on the separated predispositions of politicians and reporters to address the border issue in a given context. Bourdieusian “field theory” is used in this article to grasp the potential differentiated discursive positioning. Based on a comparative analysis of RWP media events organized in the town of Schengen in Luxembourg, the investigation allows us to shed new light on the specificities of populism in the media.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Wodak

Abstract In this paper, I discuss the attempt by all right-wing populist parties to create, on the one hand, the ‘real’ and ‘true’ people; and on the other, the ‘élites’ or ‘the establishment’ who are excluded from the true demos. Such divisions, as will be elaborated in detail, have emerged in many societies over centuries and decades. A brief example of the arbitrary construction of opposing groups illustrates the intricacies of such populist reasoning. Furthermore, I pose the question why such divisions resonate so well in many countries? I argue that – apart from a politics of fear (Wodak 2015) – much resentment is evoked which could be viewed as both accompanying as well as a reaction to the disenchantment with politics and the growing inequalities in globalized capitalist societies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372091045
Author(s):  
Victor Kempf

This article explores the possibility of a notion of left-wing populism that is conceptually opposed to the identitarian logic of embodiment that characterises right-populist interpellations of ‘the people’. In the first part, I will demonstrate, that in Laclau’s constructivist approach, any populist embodiment of the people actually has a partial, subaltern and performative origin. On this basis, it becomes possible to distinguish between a radical-democratic version of the people that is self-reflexively aware of this origin and a regressive and reified one that ideologically betrays and negates its own subaltern tradition of democratic struggle by proclaiming to embody a positive, pre-established substance of ‘rooted’, ‘well-born’ community. In the second part of the article, I will focus on this self-negation as a starting point for an immanent critique of right-wing populism. Such an immanent critique is promising, because it could overcome the shortcomings of decisionism and moralism that limit the contemporary critique of right-wing populism. However, it remains still an open question how to defend and define a negativist truth of political community and subjectivation that is necessary for developing such a left-Hegelian critique of regressive and reified notions of ‘the people’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-108
Author(s):  
Innocent Ogbonna Nweke

Politics, they said is a dirty game. One tends to disagree with this assertion because man is a political being and everything man does is all about politics. It depends on the intention, and how each plays his or her own. Ozo title is one of the political institutions in Igbo land. It will be worthy to mention that the Ozo title meant in this paper is the primordial or original Ozo title in Igbo land and not the adulterated Ozo title today. It is one of the institutions that helps in governance, controls different sectors of the Igbo man’s life and equally checkmates the excesses in the land. This work tries to look at the politics in the Nigerian setting and that of the Igbo land as being championed by Ozo title men. It x-rays their day-to-day activities and compares them. The work equally will be able to evaluate the two. During the evaluation, it was discovered that politics is not dirty, it was also discovered that since the Ozo title men play this politics and play it very well, it now boils down on the makeup of the individual and the intentions of the people in it. It however suggests that the Nigerian leaders or politicians should look at the Ozo title institution and what it is for the Igbo man and borrow a leaf from them. The paper uses socio-cultural approach in the work. The paper finally warns that the Ozo title as used in this study is the primodial one and not the adulterated one. Thus, if the politicians in Nigerian today borrow from the Ozo title men in Igbo land, politics in Nigeria will be a better and an interesting one. Key words: Ozo title, Igbo land, Leadership, Politics, Nigeria


Politik ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Silas L. Marker

This paper examines the phenomenon of right-wing populism in Denmark in the year of 2019 by applying qualitative discourse analysis to a sample of central public texts from the right-wing populist parties New Right and The Danish People’s Party. Both parties utilize populist discourse by constructing a popular bloc (“the people”) stabilized by its constitutive outside: The elite and the Muslim immigrants. However, the discourses of the two parties differ from each other insofar as New Right articulates the strongest antagonism between the people and the elite, while The Danish People’s Party downplays this antagonism, most likely because the party has a central power position in Danish politics. 


Soundings ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 72 (72) ◽  
pp. 31-47
Author(s):  
David Featherstone ◽  
Lazaros Karaliotas

Populism refers to forms of politics that put 'the people' at their centre, but the way 'the people' is understood varies widely. Questions of left populism have gained significant traction and engagement in the last decade - and this is a key focus of this article. While recognising the importance of Ernesto Laclau's analysis in On Populist Reason, the authors argue that his work is hindered by an overly formalist account of the political. Stuart Hall's writings on Thatcherism offer a more contextual and situated engagement with particular populist strategies, and have continuing relevance for understanding right-wing populism. Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece offer actually existing experiences of left populism. We discuss three limitations in their strategies: their 'nationed' narratives of the crisis; the relationship between the parties' leadership and grassroots politics; and the nature of their engagement with internationalist political projects. Part of the critical terms series


2020 ◽  
pp. 147488512091130
Author(s):  
Andrew Reid

Populism – which positions a ‘true people’ in opposition to a corrupt elite – is often contrasted with liberalism. This article initially outlines the incompatibility between populism and normative theories of political liberalism. It argues that populism is an unreasonable form of politics by liberals’ standards because: it unfairly excludes those who are not deemed to be part of the true ‘people’; and it is objectionably anti-pluralist in the way that it assumes unity amongst the ‘people’. Despite this, it is hard to derive specific duties to contain or challenge populism per se from a liberal perspective, though such a duty might be present for some forms of contemporary right-wing populism that combine populism with illiberal goals. Underpinning this view is a belief that many populist movements articulate grievances that are at least somewhat legitimate. The article concludes by arguing that there might be circumstances where a populist movement could, against this backdrop of injustice, advance the liberal cause. However, this is not because there are ways of dissolving the tension between political liberalism and populism, but because political liberals might be justified in violating the regulatory norms that they believe ought to govern politics in some, exceptional, circumstances.


Author(s):  
Erzsébet Barát

This chapter reviews research on populism by describing the role of discourse in articulating a “we” as an empty signifier. The emergence of “gender-ideology” discourse is presented as key to contemporary forms of exclusionary populism, as demonstrated in a case study of Hungary’s recent modification of the national register to prevent transgender individuals from retroactively changing their “sex at birth” status. The chapter argues that the discrediting of gender as an ideology mobilizes not only exclusionary right-wing populism but also feminisms asserting binary distinctions of a biologized sex and gender. While the government defends “us, the Hungarian people” against a “gender” that is not material but pure propaganda, self-identified progressive feminists dismiss trans-politics for focusing on identity instead of political economy. Both groups thus use “gender ideology” to mobilize an exclusionary rhetoric of hate. The chapter proposes that “us, the people” may instead be used to motivate a radical left populism organized around a “feminist people” of flexible inclusivity.


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