scholarly journals CONTAGION AND DOWNSIDE RISK IN THE REIT MARKET DURING THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-Chi CHEN ◽  
Hsiu-Jung TSAI ◽  
Tien-Foo SING ◽  
Chih-Yuan YANG

This study empirically tests the contagion effects in stock and real estate investment trust (REIT) markets during the subprime mortgage crisis by using daily stock- and REIT-markets data from the following countries and international bodies: the United States, the European Union, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and the global REIT market. We found a significant and positive dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) coefficient between stock returns and REIT returns. The results revealed that the REIT markets responded early to market shocks and that the variances were higher in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. Evidence supporting the contagion effects includes increases in the means of the DCC coefficients during the post-crisis period. The Japanese and Australian REIT markets possess the lowest time-varying downside systematic risks. We also demonstrated that the “DCC E-beta” captures more significant downside linkages between market portfolios and expected REIT returns than does the standard CAPM beta.

Ekonomika ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaidotas Pajarskas ◽  
Aldona Jočienė

The main purpose of this article is to determine which factors and how contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007–2008, what their causal links and effects on the markets and the whole economy were, and to assess what actions could have been taken by the Federal Reserve and the Government in order to mitigate or prevent the consequences of subprime mortgage crisis and housing bubble. In order to obtain the research results, the authors performed a qualitative analysis of the scientific literature on the course of events and their development that led to the subprime mortgage crisis, and focused on the insufficiently regulated home mortgage market expansion, the impact on the subprime mortgage crisis of financial innovations and financial engineering, poorly evaluated systemic risks and policy undertaken by both the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve before and after the crisis. The quantitative research focused on two main parts: firstly, analysis of the dependence between the causes of subprime mortgage crisis and the consequences, using a statistical and regression analysis, and secondly, an alternative path the Government and the Federal Reserve could have taken in their policy actions and the results they could have produced. The authors believe that the results of the research could give useful guidelines to the central bankers and government officials on how to make long-term decisions that can help in preparing for the financial distress, mitigating the consequences when the crisis strikes, accelerating the recovery and even preventing the crisis it in the future. The second part of the qualitative research will appear in the next issue of the journal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4586
Author(s):  
Alan Wang ◽  
Yu-Hong Liu ◽  
Yu-Chen Chang

This paper examines the abnormal returns of acquiring real estate investment trusts (REITs) around the announcement of acquisitions before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. Based on 182 domestic and cross-border US REIT acquisition announcements from 2005 to 2010, the acquiring trusts experienced a 0.73% abnormal return, on average. When the sample was divided into pre-crisis, crisis, and after-crisis subsamples, the acquiring trusts enjoyed the largest abnormal returns (1.86%) for domestic acquisitions during the crisis period. Before the crisis, when the acquisition was cross-border, the target was private, or the transaction was cash-financed, the acquiring trust experienced larger abnormal returns. During the crisis period, the acquiring trust gained larger abnormal returns when the transaction value was larger. After the crisis period, the acquiring trust achieved less abnormal returns in cross-border mergers. For both pre- and after-crisis periods, the shareholders of the acquirer enjoyed larger abnormal returns when the mergers were cash-financed, regardless of whether the target was public or privately held. Neither the blockholder monitoring nor the signaling hypothesis can explain such value gains. The structural changes in the acquirer’s abnormal returns are possibly due to the increased risk aversion of the market participants following the crisis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 235 ◽  
pp. 02033
Author(s):  
Wen Yin

The interconnectedness of markets is a useful measure of risk and therefore an indicator of economic stability. In this paper, the interconnectedness among housing markets in different metropolitan areas was analyzed. Interconnectedness between the housing market and other markets were also calculated. In regional studies, West Coast housing markets were found to be the most influential on housing markets elsewhere. Interestingly, overall connectedness across regions steadily increased prior to the subprime mortgage crisis, representing a systematic risk increase. When analyzing diverse markets in relation to the housing market, the stock market was found to have the highest interconnectedness, suggesting that financial health of stock market depend on financial health of housing market. The increased systematic risk due to high housing market interconnectedness coupled with the interdependence between the stock market and the housing market were key indicators of the subprime mortgage crisis. Such measures should be monitored in the future to avoid a similar economic disaster.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (06) ◽  
pp. 1420-1426
Author(s):  
Muhammad Andri Radiany ◽  
Ali Farhan ◽  
Roy Sumaryono ◽  
Wulandari Harjanti

Subprime mortgage crisis is a phenomenon that has a major impact on the world economy. The crisis that began in the United States has infected many other economically related countries with the United States. This study tries to parse how the economic conditions of the United States in the era before and after the crisis. From the results of the descriptive statistical analysis test on the economic conditions of the United States in the period 1998 - 2017, it was found that in the variables of inflation, investment, GDP, and interest rates there were negative differences between before and after the crisis, even though statistically did not show a significant effect, except for interest rate variable. This phenomenon shows that monetary policy oriented to controlling interest has the potential to trigger systemic risks to the economy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (01) ◽  
pp. 1850060
Author(s):  
YOUNGNA CHOI

We use the case of the 2007 United States subprime mortgage crisis to investigate the impact of borrowing capacity limitations on financial instability and contagion. We divide an economy into agents that interact via flow of funds and express the financial instability level of each agent as a function of time derivatives of its wealth, cash inflows, and borrowing capacity. We show that among these factors, the borrowing capacity, which is determined by other economic constraints, has the largest impact on financial instability. It is suggested that borrowing capacity limitations could even cause contagion through feedback loop formed by flow of funds. We use historical time series of the integrated macroeconomic accounts of the United Stated from 1960 to 2017 to verify our conjecture by quantifying the financial instability levels of the agents under different levels of borrowing capacity and how they affect one another during the period of the subprime mortgage crisis. Finally, the constraints of data collecting practice outside the United States in assessing borrowing capacity is addressed, accompanied by partial, yet compatible, results of selected Eurozone countries.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Jason Earl Thomas

The subprime mortgage crisis was the most devastating financial crisis since the Great Depression. The steady rise of housing purchases and seemingly limitless increase in home values drew many investors to the United States real estate market. The business growth in this sector was so compelling that financial firms created new secondary markets that were perceived as diversifying risk, which in turn prompted lenders to create innovative funding vehicles and loose and fast loan qualification processes. The federal government was ill prepared to deal with this shift in the financial world to market-based demand, and the results were disastrous. Lenders embraced predatory lending practices, borrowers with bad credit overextended themselves beyond their means, and foreclosures occurred at startling rates as home values plummeted, resulting in a world-wide economic depression. Ten years later, we reflect on the events that led up to and caused the subprime mortgage crisis for lessons learned to improve management, marketing, and finance incentive practices.


Ekonomika ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaidotas Pajarskas ◽  
Aldona Jočienė

This is the second part of the qualitative and quantitative research on the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007–2008. The main purpose of this research is to determine the factors and how they contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis, what their causal links and effects on the markets and the whole economy were, and to assess what actions could have been taken by the Federal Reserve and the Government in order to mitigate or prevent the consequences of the subprime mortgage crisis and the housing bubble. In order to obtain the results, the authors performed a qualitative analysis of the scientific literature on the course of events and their development that led to the subprime mortgage crisis and focused on insufficiently regulated home mortgage market expansion, the impact on subprime mortgage crisis of financial innovations and financial engineering, poorly evaluated systemic risks and policy undertaken by both the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve before and after the crisis. The quantitative research focused on two main parts: firstly, the analysis of dependencies between the causes of subprime mortgage crisis and the consequences using the statistical and regression analysis; secondly, an alternative path the Government and the Federal Reserve could have taken in their policy actions, and the results they could have produced have been explored. The authors believe that the results of the research could give useful guidelines to the central bankers and government officials on how to make long-term decisions that can help in preparing for the financial distress, mitigating the consequences when the crisis strikes, accelerating the recovery and even preventing the crisis in the future.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-58
Author(s):  
I-Chun Tsai ◽  
◽  
Che-Chun Lin ◽  

This paper uses the house price indices of 20 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) across the United States from January 1991 to April 2018 to analyze the dynamic connectedness of the housing markets in these MSAs. By estimating the connectedness of the entire sample before, during, and after the subprime mortgage crisis, this paper compares the changes in the impact of each regional housing market in the abovementioned MSAs during the stated time period. The results show that housing markets in west coast MSAs are the most influential, and the spatial distribution of this influence is affected by the subprime mortgage crisis because, compared to other periods, the fewest MSAs have a positive net impact during the crisis period and are found along the coast. The influence of the west coast cities increases after the subprime mortgage crisis compared to that before the crisis, probably because the house prices in these cities recover more quickly. In addition, an increase in connectedness represents more systematic risks and also influences the connectedness of the housing markets with other financial markets. The results of this paper also indicate that if the Federal Reserve uses monetary policies to interfere with the housing market, this might increase the default risks of the entire housing market across the United States, and a financial crisis from the spread of default risks might ensue. By discussing the linkage of the regional housing markets across the United States, we provide another warning indicator for the risks of housing markets, risks linked to other financial markets, and uncertainty risks for the overall economy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document