Survey of Public Interest Group Members, 1982

Interest groups' increased use of centrally managed mass communications technologies has reduced opportunities for social networking among group members. This study examines the relationship between organizational democracy, or rank-and-file participation in decision making, and two indicators of social network opportunities: existence of local chapters and extent of direct-mail usage. Control variables include membership incentives, organizational resources, group age and size, and competition with other groups for members. Multivariate analyses of two interest group survey data sets, using ordinal logit, indicate that social network organizations are no more likely to involve their members in decision making than are centralized direct-mail organizations. The variables that are significantly related to grassroots involvement in organizational decision making include purposive and solidary membership incentives as well as some organizational resources, size, and age. Implications for further study of organizational democracy are discussed.

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Leaders' Communications in Public-interest and Material-interest Groups

Canadian Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0008423900022678 ◽

1991 ◽

Vol 24 (3) ◽

pp. 525-540

Author(s):

R. A. Young ◽

Shirley M. Forsyth

Keyword(s):

Interest Groups ◽

Interest Group ◽

Public Interest ◽

Patent Protection ◽

Group Leaders ◽

Material Interest ◽

Policy Debates ◽

Public Interest Groups ◽

Internal Communications ◽

Insight Into

AbstractThis article analyzes the internal communications between interest group leaders and their memberships. The case is Bill C-22, which increased patent protection for Pharmaceuticals in Canada. The object was to test for differences between “material” groups seeking benefits for their members and “purposive” groups pursuing policies which will benefit others. Significant differences were found in the kinds of appeals made by group leaders. This implies that it can be realistic and useful to distinguish between types of group according to their purposes and the motivations of their members. The findings also provide some insight into the language of policy debates and allow some speculation about the perennial question of why people adhere to large public-interest groups.

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Competing for Endorsements

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.89.3.501 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 89 (3) ◽

pp. 501-524 ◽

Cited By ~ 78

Author(s):

Gene M Grossman ◽

Elhanan Helpman

Keyword(s):

Interest Groups ◽

Interest Group ◽

General Public ◽

Policy Outcomes ◽

The Political ◽

Special Interests ◽

Group Leaders ◽

Simple Language ◽

Group Members

Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. (JEL D72)

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