scholarly journals Competing for Endorsements

1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M Grossman ◽  
Elhanan Helpman
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
General Public ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Simple Language ◽  
Group Members

Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. (JEL D72)

Leaders' Communications in Public-interest and Material-interest Groups

1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-540
Author(s):  
R. A. Young ◽  
Shirley M. Forsyth
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Material Interest ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Public Interest Groups ◽  
Internal Communications ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractThis article analyzes the internal communications between interest group leaders and their memberships. The case is Bill C-22, which increased patent protection for Pharmaceuticals in Canada. The object was to test for differences between “material” groups seeking benefits for their members and “purposive” groups pursuing policies which will benefit others. Significant differences were found in the kinds of appeals made by group leaders. This implies that it can be realistic and useful to distinguish between types of group according to their purposes and the motivations of their members. The findings also provide some insight into the language of policy debates and allow some speculation about the perennial question of why people adhere to large public-interest groups.

scholarly journals Interest Groups in Multi-Level Contexts: European Integration as Cross-Cutting Issue in Party-Interest Group Contacts

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joost Berkhout ◽  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Patrick Statsch
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
European Policy ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
European Public ◽  
Multi Level

Policy-specific actor-constellations consisting of party- and group-representatives commonly drive the effective establishment of new policy programmes or changes in existing policies. In the EU multi-level system, the creation of such constellations is complicated because it practically requires consensus on two dimensions: the European public policy at stake and the issue of European integration. This means that, for interest groups with interests in particular policy domains, and with limited interest in the actual issue of European integration, non-Eurosceptic parties must be their main ally in their policy battles. We hypothesise that interest groups with relevant European domain-specific interests will ally with non-Eurosceptic parties, whereas interest groups whose interests are hardly affected by the European policy process will have party-political allies across the full range of positions on European integration. We assess this argument on the basis of an elite-survey of interest group leaders and study group-party dyads in several European countries (i.e., Belgium, Lithuania, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia) in a large number of policy domains. Our dependent variable is the group-party dyad and the main independent variables are the European policy interests of the group and the level of Euroscepticism of the party. We broadly find support for our hypotheses. The findings of our study speak to the debate concerning the implications of the politicisation of European integration and, more specifically, the way in which party-political polarisation of Europe may divide domestic interest group systems and potentially drive group and party systems apart.

Trade: Determinants of Policies

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc L. Busch ◽  
Edward D. Mansfield
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
The Political ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Face

A survey of the literature on trade has revealed that it is becoming more difficult for elected officials resist protectionist pressures by citing constraints imposed by global pacts and supply free trade. There are two main reasons why. First, the literature on the design and politics of international institutions increasingly emphasizes how they build in slack that can undermine government claims of being constrained. Second, as states accede to an ever-growing list of overlapping international institutions, there is often a choice among, or uncertainty over, which institution’s obligations apply. Where this situation creates more policy space for government officials, it also will make it more difficult for them to credibly tie their hands and supply free trade in the face of interest group pressures for protection. Currently, the literature is somewhat at a turning point. Questions about the design and politics of international institutions, and the growing thickness of the market for them, are very much in vogue. These questions have profound implications for the supply of free trade. The credibility of elected officials’ hands-tying strategies is likely undermined where institutions anticipate the political reactions of their members, or where members can shop for different rules on trade to accommodate domestic preferences. The irony is that the proliferation of international institutions may lead scholars of trade policy to renew their focus on domestic interest groups.

The Political Economy of Immigration Policy: Some Simple Interest Group Analytics

2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-168
Author(s):  
William H. Kaempfer ◽  
Anton D. Lowenberg ◽  
William Mertens
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Immigration Policy ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Skill Levels ◽  
Family Ties ◽  
Immigration Laws ◽  
Lengths Of Stay ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Political Effectiveness

Abstract Immigration policy is viewed as endogenously determined by interest group competition. The political effectiveness of each interest group depends on its ability to control free riding. Support maximizing politicians supply policies in response to the pressures exerted by interest groups of differing political effectiveness, such differences being the main factor accounting for the adoption of socially inefficient policies. The model demonstrates that immigration policy outcomes are explained by the skill levels of immigrant workers, lengths of stay in the destination country, ethnic and family ties, and the costs of enforcing immigration laws, together with possible voter prejudices toward immigrants.

How Standards Drive Taxes: The Political Economy of Tailpipe Pollution

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumeet Gulati ◽  
Devesh Roy
Keyword(s):  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Consumption Tax ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Product Standards ◽  
Complementary Relationship ◽  
Environmental Standard ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
Gasoline Taxes ◽  
Consumption Taxes

Abstract To control tailpipe pollution, governments often use environmental product standards and consumption taxes in conjunction (for example, the use of fuel economy standards and gasoline taxes to restrict automobile pollution in the US). Further, the choice of standards and consumption taxes is often independently influenced by special interests. For example, domestic producers have the incentive to influence environmental product standards, and likewise, domestic consumers have the incentive to influence the choice of the consumption tax. In this paper we explore the political link between environmental standards and consumption taxes in the presence of independent special interests. We find that despite the independence of special interests, the political outcome is inextricably linked. This political link is different from the welfare maximizing second-best link usually expected between two related policies, and is crucial in correctly anticipating policy outcomes. Specifically, we find that the government's choice of an environmental standard influences political incentives in the choice of the consumption tax. As the environmental standard falls, a higher demand for the environmentally damaging product develops. This higher demand increases the incentives for consumers to lobby for lower consumption tax. Under certain conditions, this political link is large enough to result in a complementary relationship between the two policies in equilibrium. The complementary relationship implies that a lower standard results in a lower consumption tax and vice versa when the standard is higher.

Interest Groups and Get Out the Vote Drives

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cadigan
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Candidate Model ◽  
Voter Mobilization ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Multiple Interest ◽  
Get Out The Vote

Abstract This article analyzes voter mobilization and interest group activity within a citizen-candidate model. Interest groups influence the decisions of 'high cost’ voters by running a 'get out the vote’ campaign. Membership fees paid by citizens joining an interest group finance the vote drives. Because citizens choose whether to join an interest group, size is an endogenous feature of equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that smaller groups may have greater influence. Importantly, this result does not depend on the ability of smaller groups to overcome the free rider problem. Intuitively, because smaller groups may have a less diverse membership, they can advocate more extreme policy outcomes. An interest group’s influence is shown to depend on voting costs and the separation between candidate positions. The presence of multiple interest groups mitigates an interest’s influence, resulting in inefficiency.

scholarly journals Do Interest Groups Cultivate Interest? Trajectories of Geriatric Interest Group Members

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-215
Author(s):  
Andrew Perrella ◽  
Ari B. Cuperfain ◽  
Amanda B. Canfield ◽  
Tricia Woo ◽  
Camilla L. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Health Care Providers ◽  
Response Rate ◽  
Care Providers ◽  
Canadian Universities ◽  
Electronic Survey ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Ongoing Support

Background Minimal exposure, misconceptions, and lack of interest have historically driven the shortage of health-care providers for older adults. This study aimed to determine how medical stu­dents’ participation in the National Geriatrics Interest Group (NGIG) and local Geriatrics Interest Groups (GIGs) shapes their career development in the care of older adults. Methods An electronic survey consisting of quantitative and qualita­tive metrics to assess the influence of Interest Groups was distributed to all current and past members of local GIGs at Canadian universities since 2017, as well as current and past executives of the NGIG since 2011. Descriptive statistics and thematic analysis were performed. Results Thirty-one responses (27.7% response rate) were collected from medical students (13), residents (16), and physicians (2). 79% of resident respondents indicated they will likely have a geriatrics-focused medical practice. 45% of respondents indicated GIG/NGIG involvement facilitated the establish­ment of strong mentorship. Several themes emerged on how GIG/NGIG promoted interest in geriatrics: faculty mentor­ship, networking, dispelling stigma, and career advancement. Conclusion The positive associations with the development of geriatrics-focused careers and mentorship compel ongoing support for these organizations as a strategy to increase the number of physicians in geriatrics-related practices.

The Political Economy of Immigration Policy: Some Simple Interest Group Analytics

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Kaempfer ◽  
Anton D. Lowenberg ◽  
William Mertens
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Immigration Policy ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Skill Levels ◽  
Family Ties ◽  
Immigration Laws ◽  
Lengths Of Stay ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Political Effectiveness

Abstract Immigration policy is viewed as endogenously determined by interest group competition. The political effectiveness of each interest group depends on its ability to control free riding. Support maximizing politicians supply policies in response to the pressures exerted by interest groups of differing political effectiveness, such differences being the main factor accounting for the adoption of socially inefficient policies. The model demonstrates that immigration policy outcomes are explained by the skill levels of immigrant workers, lengths of stay in the destination country, ethnic and family ties, and the costs of enforcing immigration laws, together with possible voter prejudices toward immigrants.

The Growth of Political Activism in the National Council of Churches

1972 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-341
Author(s):  
Henry J. Pratt
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
National Council ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Social Balance ◽  
National Council Of Churches

It has long been recognized that interest groups, formed in many cases for nonpolitical ends, have manifested an almost “inevitable gravitation toward government.” Truman has noted that modern industrial life involves disruptions of social equilibria established in an earlier and simpler era, and that interest group leaders, in an effort to restore some degree of social balance, turn to government as a mediating agent.

Interest Groups

2020 ◽  
pp. 432-449
Author(s):  
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
News Media ◽  
Early Mobilization ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Group System ◽  
Political Role

Interest groups are key actors in the Danish political system. This chapter discusses the origin and development of the interest group system and the political role of groups. The focus is on interest groups both as membership-based associations and as political actors. The chapter discusses how the early mobilization of farmers, workers, and businesses interacted with emerging corporatist structures in shaping the contours of the interest group system. Later developments led to a shift towards more groups representing citizen interests rather than economic groups. The political role of groups traditionally centred on access to public decision-making through, for example, representation in boards and committees. Today, interest groups operate across multiple arenas, and Parliament and the news media have become central. New actors such as think tanks and public affairs agencies have gained importance, but traditional interest groups remain the most prominent policy advocates in Denmark.

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