Narrative Reasoning

2012 ◽  
pp. 144-178
Keyword(s):  
Formal Reasoning ◽  
Informal Reasoning

A large proportion of our knowledge and indeed our reasoning is not received or communicated as formal reasoning or informal reasoning but, in fact, as stories. When we focus on this as a reality, it demands that we consider what can be said about reasoning that is conveyed and represented in stories and how it relates to other forms of representing and communicating reasoning. Given that stories are so commonly used, is it possible that they are a form of coalesced reasoning that a community can use, or do they confuse and detract from the main concerns and aspirations of reasoning communities?

A Protest Against Informal Reasoning as an Approach to Demonstrative Geometry

1936 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 178-180
Author(s):  
Gertrude Hendrix
Keyword(s):  
Formal Reasoning ◽  
Informal Reasoning ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
The Third ◽  
Three Stages

Three stages are commonly recognized in current recommendations for a secondary geometry course: (1) the intuitive stage, (2) the stage of informal reasoning,1 and (3) the stage of formal reasoning, or demonstrative geometry. The second stage does not provide the transition to the third that is desirable. In fact, that informal reasoning has any value at all as an approach to the formal reasoning stage is questionable. An attempt to present reasons for doubts is set forth with care in the succeeding pages of this discussion. If the conclusion to which these reasons lead is valid, a decided change in the present methods of approach to demonstrative geometry should be effected.

Do informal reasoning fallacies really shape decisions? Experimental evidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312110336
Author(s):  
Lucie Vrbová ◽  
Kateřina Jiřinová ◽  
Karel Helman ◽  
Hana Lorencová
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Slippery Slope ◽  
Paired Comparisons ◽  
Anecdotal Evidence ◽  
Informal Reasoning ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Fallacious Reasoning

Informal reasoning fallacies belong to a persuasive tactic, leading to a conclusion that is not supported by premises but reached through emotions and/or misleading and incomplete information. Previous research focused on the ability to recognize informal reasoning fallacies. However, the recognition itself does not necessarily mean immunity to their influence on decisions made. An experiment was designed to study the relationship between the presence of informal reasoning fallacies and a consequent decision. Having conducted paired comparisons of distributions, we have found some support for the hypothesis that informal reasoning fallacies affect decision-making more substantially than non-fallacious reasoning—strong support in the case of a slippery slope, weak in that of appeal to fear, anecdotal evidence argument defying evaluation. Numeracy and cognitive reflection seem to be associated with higher resistance to the slippery slope, but do not diminish appeal to fear.

Ascertaining the Critical Thinking and Formal Reasoning Skills of Students

1998 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-18
Author(s):  
Tock Keng Lim
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
The United States ◽  
Philosophy For Children ◽  
Cognitive Level ◽  
Formal Reasoning ◽  
Concrete Objects ◽  
Reasoning Skills ◽  
Matthew Lipman ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Relationship

Ascertaining the critical thinking and formal reasoning skills of students With the critical thinking movement gaining momentum at all levels of education in the United States and other countries, many thinking programmes have been developed. A thinking programme that emphasises process, teaching students how to think, rather than what to think, is the Philosophy for Children (P4C) programme, currently carried out in Singapore. A child, according to Matthew Lipman, the founder of the P4C programme, can reason deductively and logically, using concrete objects. In his specially written stories for children Lipman translated the abstract formulations to reasoning in a concrete way that children could understand. To determine whether primary and secondary pupils in Singapore can reason and do philosophy, a study was set up in 1992 to ascertain their reasoning skills. Two instruments were used: the New Jersey Test of Reasoning, developed in the early 1980s to evaluate the P4C programme, and the Test of Formal Reasoning, written by P. K. Arlin to measure the stage of intellectual and cognitive level of the student: concrete, high concrete, transitional, low formal or high formal. This article reports the findings of the study concerning the relationship between critical thinking as measured by the NJTR and concrete and formal reasoning as measured by the ATFR.

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