Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring

Liquidity ratios – as well as Basel III leverage ratios were not only consequence of the recent global financial crises – having been introduced under Basel III in 2010, but serve as complements, rather than substitutes, to a risk based capital adequacy framework whose deficiencies were brought to light during the recent financial crisis. This chapter considers and highlights the need for such vital complements – as well as challenges which may still necessitate further revisions to such ratios.

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Nabil Georges Badr ◽  
Somaya Nasif El Ahmadieh

Objective: Lebanese banks have shown immunity towards the 2008 financial crisis that was attributed to many factors including a strong regulatory and supervisory system of conservative practices and structural economic factors such as the recurrence and non-speculative nature of capital inflows towards Lebanon supported by a large pool of offshore savings from diaspora and investors around the globe. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between capital adequacy ratios (CARs) and lending spread ratio (LSR). This paper presents the first assessment of the Basel III capital requirements on lending spread ratio before, during and after the financial crisis among commercial banks operated in Lebanon. Methodology: We consider King’s approach and assess his model’s applicability in the Lebanese context. Findings indicate some deviations, specifically related to the practices and financial performance of commercial banks in Lebanon. Results: We found no indication of impact of the change in CAR on LSR among Lebanese commercial banks in years prior to the recent financial crises; Nevertheless, the impact of changing CAR by 1 pp on LSR has a modest effect on Lebanese commercial banks during the years of financial crises; this effect is lowered to become modest after the crisis. Implication: The results of the current study reveal significant implications for managers in commercial banks in particular and all banks in general. Given that Lebanese commercial banks are well-capitalized and their Capital Adequacy Ratios are above international benchmarks, bank managers must carefully monitor the cost of the implementation of Basel III requirements


Author(s):  
Imad Kutum ◽  
Khaled Al-Jaberi

<p><em>The aim of this research paper is to examine the Jordanian banks using financial soundness indicators. This is to establish if Jordanian banks were affected because of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and determine the underlying reasons. The research paper was conducted on 25 banks in Jordan listed in the countries securities exchange. The research methodology used consisted of examining the banks financial records in order to derive four crucial Basel III ratio such as the capital adequacy ratio, the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio and finally the Total Provisions (As % Of Non-Performing Loans) %. The results revealed that out of the four hypotheses under examination Jordan Banks do not meet Basel financial Indicators for Capital Adequacy Ratio, Jordan Banks does not meet Basel financial Indicators for Liquidity Ratio , Jordan Banks do not meet Basel financial Indicators for Leverage Ratio and Jordan Banks do not meet Basel financial Indicators for Total Provisions (As % Of Non-Performing Loans) ratio. Only one hypothesis was accepted based on the research outcomes. The rest of the hypothesis was rejected since the average trend line did not go below the Basel III required ratio level. The general outcome of the research revealed that Jordanian banks were not affected significantly by the financial crisis.</em></p>


This chapter examines the advantages and disadvantages of the risk estimate approach—Value-at-Risk (VaR) which has been extensively embraced by regulators and practitioners in financial markets under the Basel II & III framework as the basis of risk measurement, both for the purpose of ensuring regulatory capital adequacy, and risk management and strategic planning at industry level.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Mathias Binswanger

Zusammenfassung: Als Folge der jüngsten Finanzkrise ist der Einfluss der Zentralbanken auf die Geldschöpfung weitgehend verloren gegangen. Denn die Kontrolle über Reserven funktioniert nur solange, wie diese knapp sind und deren Bezug an bestimmte Bedingungen geknüpft werden kann. Seither halten die Geschäftsbanken in den ökonomisch wichtigsten Ländern de facto dermaßen viele Reserven, dass sie nicht mehr auf die jeweilige Zentralbank angewiesen sind. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich sowohl für die FED als auch für die EZB aufzeigen. Dies führt zu geldpolitisch neuen Herausforderungen, die bisher kaum beachtet wurden. Die Einflussmöglichkeit der Zentralbanken auf den Geldschöpfungsprozess der Geschäftsbanken wurde noch nie in so großem Stil ausgehebelt. Deshalb müssen Zentralbanken in Zukunft ihr Repertoire an geldpolitischen Massnahmen erweitern. Nur mit dem Drehen an der Zinsschraube wird man den Geldschöpfungsprozess in Zukunft kaum mehr in gewünschter Weise beeinflussen können. Summary: As a result of the recent financial crisis, the influence of central banks on money creation has largely disappeared. Controlling this process only works as long as money creation of commercial banks also leads to a need for additional reserves from the central bank. However, the large asset purchase programs of monetary authorities after the financial crises resulted in an enormous increase in reserves at commercial banks. Therefore, commercial banks have enough reserves to create additional money at large amounts and do not depend on central banks any more. This development is indicative for both the FED and the ECB. Therefore central banks face the challenge how they can restore their influence on the process of money creation. Just lowering or increasing interest rates, which was the major way of conducting monetary policy in the past, will not work anymore in the future.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peiyi Yu ◽  
Jessica Hong Yang ◽  
Nada Kakabadse

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.


2019 ◽  
pp. 329-406
Author(s):  
Iris H-Y Chiu ◽  
Joanna Wilson

This chapter studies capital adequacy regulation, which prescribes that banks can only take certain levels of risk that are supported by adequate levels of capital. In this way, capital adequacy rules provide a form of assurance that banks with adequate levels of capital are likely able to withstand losses that may result from their risk-taking. The Basel Committee developed its first set of capital adequacy standards in the Basel I Capital Accord of 1988. It was subsequently overhauled into the Basel II Capital Accord in 2003. After the global financial crisis of 2007–9, the Basel II Accord’s shortcomings were extensively discussed and the Basel Committee introduced a package of reforms in order to plug the gaps in Basel II. The Basel III package is the most extensive suite of micro-prudential regulation reforms seen to date, as they deal with capital adequacy and a range of other micro-prudential standards.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiltrud Thelen-Pischke

The challenge of perfect regulation! Comments to the debate on reforms of the financial sector. In the light of the recent financial crisis the question was raised, if there is any chance of regulation at all to help prevent future crises. As lessons learned from the financial crisis regulators have already adopted numerous measures that aim to enhance financial regulation. Most prominent is the reform of the well-known Basel II soon to be Basel III framework. The following paper takes a closer look on the most important measures against the background of the economic aspects of financial intermediation. The overall focus of this paper is the question if the reform of Basel II can improve the regulatory environment. This includes an analysis of how the changes in financial regulation will affect financial institutions. As a result the paper will show that most of the discussed and adopted measures actually lead to greater regulatory effectiveness. Nevertheless, the key factor for more effective financial regulation is a deep knowledge with regard to financial institutions and their business models. Only a thourough understanding of each individual bank and the system as a whole puts the regulator in the position to assess risks which might lead to the next financial crisis and to react appropriately.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
Siti Nor Amira Mohamad ◽  
Mohamad Yazis Ali Basah ◽  
Muhammad Ridhwan Ab Aziz

Until recently, there has been only muted debate on the stability of RWA and after the recent financial crisis, the new regulatory framework was introduced that will enrich the quality and level of capital ratios for the banking system. However these capital ratios required to be based on specific risk measurement that permits for appropriate comparison as these gives new prominence to the stability of the underlying RWA. The aim of this paper is to examine the RWA performance after recent global financial crisis in Malaysian banking system. The study uses quantitative approach to examine in detail the RWA performance from year 2012 to 2016 using secondary analysis of bank’s annual report.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Laurens

Financial crises have had a significant impact on bank regulation and supervision. Reforms are often focussed on correcting past failings. Following the 2007 financial crisis, Basel III reforms have been introduced with a view to promote a more resilient banking sector and to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial distress. A review of the Basel III reforms and the literature on the link between capital adequacy regulations and bank stability indicates that these regulations are unlikely to prevent the failure of banks resulting in systemic crises


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