Rational Decision Making, Dual Processes, and Framing

Decisions, decisions, decisions, we are constantly faced with them everyday. Should I get out of bed or sleep 10 more minutes? Should I hit the delete key or save as a new document? Should I take the dishes to the sink or wait and see if my spouse will do it? Inherent in most decisions is the tradeoff between some benefit and decrement we may face along with an element of risk. The course of action that we choose to take has always been of interest to scholars. Fitting the principles of decision-making into an a priori developed plan to choose which alternative is “best” is, by and large, what most consider to be rationality. Because the decisions that we make have so much influence in our life, their importance cannot and should not be underestimated. While we cannot always know which decision will eventually hold the greatest benefit, it is an aspect of human nature to gamble on the best option, but only when the gamble seems warranted. Determining what is the “rational” choice allows us to at least rest easy in the assumption that the decisions that we have made are the right ones. Interestingly, as time immortal has shown, making the right or “rational” decision does not always provide the most favorable outcome.

Publicity and Common Commitment to Believe

Erkenntnis ◽

10.1007/s10670-021-00393-x ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

J. R. G. Williams

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Rational Choice ◽

Functional Role ◽

A Priori ◽

Public Information ◽

Common Belief ◽

A Posteriori ◽

Standard Analysis ◽

Joint Intention ◽

Normative Role

AbstractInformation can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions.

Author reply: Empathy Does Provide Rational Support for Decisions. But Is It the Right Decision?

Emotion Review ◽

10.1177/1754073911421394 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 96-97 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Fritz Breithaupt

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Rational Decision ◽

Author Reply ◽

Rational Support ◽

The One ◽

This article examines the relation of empathy and rational judgment. When people observe a conflict most are quick to side with one of the parties. Once a side has been taken, empathy with that party further solidifies this choice. Hence, it will be suggested that empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice.

Enhancing Rationality: Heuristics, Biases, and The Critical Thinking Project

Informal Logic ◽

10.22329/il.v36i2.4662 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 36 (2) ◽

pp. 99 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Mark Battersby

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Critical Thinking ◽

Rational Choice ◽

Rational Decision ◽

Critical Thinking Instruction

Abstract: This paper develops four related claims: 1. Critical thinking should focus more on decision making, 2. the heuristics and bias literature developed by cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists provides many insights into human irrationality which can be useful in critical thinking instruction, 3. unfortunately the “rational choice” norms used by behavioral economists to identify “biased” decision making narrowly equate rational decision making with the efficient pursuit of individual satisfaction; deviations from these norms should not be treated as an irrational bias, 4. a richer, procedural theory of rational decision making should be the basis for critical thinking instruction in decision making.

The emotive causes of recurrent international conflicts

Politics and the Life Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0730938400006262 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 22 (1) ◽

pp. 24-35 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

William J. Long ◽

Peter Brecke

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

International Relations ◽

Rational Choice ◽

International Relations Theory ◽

Rational Decision ◽

International Conflicts ◽

Constructivist Approaches

Many international conflicts are recurrent, and many of these are characterized by periods of violence, including wars, that are hard to describe as planned products of rational decision-making. Analysis of these conflicts according to rational-choice international-relations theory or constructivist approaches has been less revealing than might have been hoped. We consider the possibility that emotive causes could better explain, or at least improve the explanation of, observed patterns. We offer three emotive models of recurrent conflict and we outline a method by which the reliability of emotive explanations derived from these models could be tested prospectively.

A Solution to the Predictor Paradox

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1977.10716184 ◽

1976 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 147-154

Author(s):

Michael F. Stack

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Rational Choice ◽

Rational Decision ◽

Robert Nozick ◽

Available Information

William Newcomb and Robert Nozick have provided us with the following problem in rational decision-making. There are two boxes, A and B. A contains either a million dollars (M) or nothing (0). B contains a thousand dollars (T). I come into the room in which we have the boxes, closed. I must make one of two choices. Either I open A and take whatever money is present, M or O, or I open both and take whatever money is present, M + T or O + T. What is the rational choice for me to make?Nothing unusual is meant by “rational” in this context. We assume that a person making the choice desires as much money as possible. We assume that he will take into account all relevant available information as to what decision will lead to more money. If he believes that doing X will, or is likely to, lead to more money than doing not-X, then he will do X.In the above case, it would seem that the rational choice is both. T is there for the taking, whether or not I get M, and I might as well try for both.

Reason and necessity: Thucydides iii 9–14, 37–48

The Journal of Hellenic Studies ◽

10.2307/630193 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 98 ◽

pp. 64-78 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

C. W. Macleod

Keyword(s):

Human Nature ◽

Human Error ◽

Human Beings ◽

Course Of Action ◽

Historical Truth ◽

The speeches concerning the Mytilenean revolt in Thucydides III present three speakers trying to justify or commend a decision: they are, in Aristotelian terms, examples of symbuleutic oratory. The purpose of such oratory is naturally to identify the right course of action, to achieve ϵὐβουλία. But Thucydides is writing about facts; he is also intensely aware of human nature, a force more powerful than reason. So his characters cannot be simply models of wisdom. They are human beings, and they feel the pressure of war or empire. Thus the rhetoric which they employ to convince their hearers is for the historian a way of discovering to his readers the limits, or the failures, as well as the powers, of reasoning; and in this exposure of human weakness Thucydides' work is both rationalistic and tragic, an analysis of human error, be it corrigible or otherwise. If, then, he puts into his speakers' mouths the arguments he himself thought they should have used (i 22.1 τὰ δέοντα), he does so in the service of historical truth (i 22.4 τὸ σαφές). Reality is portrayed realistically, through a portrayal of the minds of those who were part of it; for all action must originate from beliefs and be contemplated through them. Further, the complex or problematical nature of reality is mirrored in his speakers' opposing interpretations of the issues at stake.

معاشرے کو فتنوں سے محفوظ رکھنے کے مناہج وتدابیراحادیث نبویہ کی روشنی میں

rahatulquloob ◽

10.51411/rahat.4.2.2020.155 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 81-95

Author(s):

Muhammad Kamran Khan ◽

Prof Dr Ali Asghar Chishti

Keyword(s):

Human Nature ◽

Human Behavior ◽

Research Paper ◽

Crucial Issue ◽

Course Of Action ◽

Human Attitude ◽

The Right ◽

And Behavior

The article aims to highlight the methods of avoiding "fitan" in the light of tradit-ions of prophet Muhammad (PBUH), The literature of Hadiths of prophet Muhammad (PBUH) regarding "Fitan" has been discussed by Muhadditheen under the title of "Kitab-ul-Fitan", which deals with the issues caused by intemperate human behavior, self-directed interests, and subsequent endeavors to gratify them. Confrontation, collusion of interests, infighting and so on-are the offshoots of these immoderate human attitude and behavior. Hadiths of Prophet Muhammad are beacon of light; and impart such instructions and guidance in the realm of virtues and vices, which have panacea to uproot all these crookedness and gaps found in human nature and behavior. It has such a celestial message and guidance, which cannot only uproot all evasiveness from human nature, but also to safeguard a society at large. The right understanding and compre-hension of the crux of these Hadiths is paramount and crucial in this regard. Therefore, this research paper deals with this crucial issue and expounds right course of action in this regard. The method of study adopted in this paper is descriptive and analytical.

Difficult Decisions in Cancer Care — Conducting an Ethics Case Analysis

European Oncology & Haematology ◽

10.17925/eoh.2011.07.02.101 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 07 (02) ◽

pp. 101 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ann Gallagher ◽

Craig Gannon ◽

◽

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Best Interests ◽

Ethical Framework ◽

Difficult Decision ◽

Ethical Decisions ◽

Course Of Action ◽

Wide Range ◽

Oncology Practice ◽

Four Quadrant ◽

In everyday oncology practice, practitioners make a wide range of ethical decisions. Many of these decisions will seem straightforward, with those involved agreeing on the right course of action. Other decisions will be difficult, with conflicting perspectives regarding the wishes, needs and best interests of patients. This article suggests an ethical framework to facilitate the decision-making of practitioners in relation to challenging practice situations. We provide an anonymised ‘ethics case’ to examine one difficult decision made by a hospice team. The four-quadrant approach can be used to facilitate reflection and collaborative decision-making.

Hobbes, Harsanyi and the Edge of the Abyss

Canadian Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0008423900007241 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 29 (1) ◽

pp. 47-70 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Gabriella Slomp ◽

Manfredi M. A. La Manna

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Political Philosophy ◽

Rational Choice ◽

Rational Decision ◽

Natural Conditions ◽

State Of Nature ◽

Special Cases ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Strategy Game

AbstractThe authors present a new game-theoretic interpretation of Hobbes's state of nature that, unlike existing rational-choice models, questions the possibility of individually rational decision making. They provide a general formulation of the two-player two-strategy game applied to the state of nature and derive existing models as special cases. A nonstandard version of Chicken under incomplete information, that interprets “death” as infinitely bad, provides an explanation for important and hitherto unaccounted for claims by Hobbes. The authors suggest that rational choice in Hobbesian political philosophy ought to examine not so much the mechanics of rational action in natural conditions, but rather the means whereby citizens already living in civil associations can be persuaded of the irrationality of civil war.

EPISTEMIC TRANSFORMATION AND RATIONAL CHOICE

Economics and Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0266267116000274 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 125-138 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Krister Bykvist ◽

H. Orri Stefánsson

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Rational Choice ◽

Point Of View ◽

Rational Decision ◽

Transformative Experience ◽

Cultural Paradigm ◽

Conscious Decision ◽

Influential Book

Most people at some point in their lives face transformative decisions that could result in experiences that are radically different from any that they have had, and that could radically change their personalities and preferences. For instance, most people make the conscious decision to either become or not become parents. In a recent but already influential book, L. A. Paul (2014) argues that transformative choices cannot be rational – or, more precisely, that they cannot be rational if one assumes what Paul sees as a cultural paradigm for rational decision-making. Paul arrives at this surprising conclusion due to her understanding of transformative experience as being both epistemically and personally transformative. An experience is epistemically transformative if it ‘teaches [a person] something she could not have learned without having that kind of experience’ (11), but it is personally transformative if it changes the person's point of view and her fundamental preferences (16).