An Economic and Social Assessment of the Syrian Civil War

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-23
Author(s):  
Viorela-Beatrice Iacovoiu ◽  
Mirela Panait ◽  
Alexandru-Cristian Enache

Starting from the theories and studies on armed conflicts and in particular civil wars, and based on relevant figures, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the Syrian Civil War. The Syrian conflict developed into a civil war with a sectarian dimension and has lasted longer mostly because of major powers, as well as some Middle Eastern countries that were directly and actively involved in the conflict, supporting the government forces or rebel groups. According to the analysed data, the war deeply affected the Syrian economy and its citizens due to the loss of governmental control over oil fields, the destruction of infrastructure and households, and the great number of forcibly displaced people and casualties. At the same time, the Syrian Civil War created great opportunities for arms-producing companies to sell their products without cutting off profits. Thus, the conclusion is that there is no benefit to war except for those who profit of it, namely the countries as well as the arms manufacturers that use conflicts as a proxy to promote their interests.

Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roos Haer ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt

While we know why rebels may recruit children for their cause, our understanding of the consequences of child soldiering by non-state armed groups remains limited. The following research contributes to addressing this by examining how rebels’ child recruitment practice affects the duration of internal armed conflicts. We advance the argument that child soldiering increases the strength of rebel organizations vis-a-vis the government. This, in turn, lowers the capability asymmetry between these non-state actors and the incumbent, allowing the former to sustain dispute. Ultimately, the duration of armed conflicts is likely to be prolonged. We analyse this relationship with quantitative data on child soldier recruitment by rebel groups in the post-1989 period. The results confirm our main hypothesis: disputes are substantially longer when rebels recruit children. This work has important implications for the study of armed conflicts, conflict duration and our understanding of child soldiering.


Author(s):  
Desirée Nilsson ◽  
Isak Svensson

Abstract There is a large research field focusing on the recurrence of civil wars, yet this literature has omitted to seriously consider religious dimensions and ideational features of armed conflicts. To address this gap, we provide the first global study exploring whether, and why, Islamist civil wars—armed conflicts fought over self-proclaimed Islamist aspirations—are more or less likely to recur compared to other conflicts. We argue that civil wars fought over Islamist claims are more likely to relapse because the ideational features of these conflicts increase the uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the warring actors in terms of the extent and nature of transnational support that may be forthcoming, for rebels as well as the government. In line with our argument, we find that Islamist civil wars are significantly less likely to be terminated and more likely to recur once ended. Thus, our results demonstrate that Islamist civil wars represent a particular challenge with regard to the goal of achieving durable peace.


Author(s):  
Mohammed Nuruzzaman

Dominant International Relations theories—realism/neorealism, liberalism/neoliberalism, and constructivism—have so far developed no rigorous theoretical attempts to interpret the Arab Spring, though some marginal efforts have been made to critique the failure of realism to interpret this historical development. This article presents a neorealist interpretation of the Arab Spring focusing on the Syrian civil war, where conflicts between the pro- and anti-status quo forces have unfolded in alignments and counter-alignments centering around rival domestic and external groups. To explain the involvements of rival alliances in the post-2011 Syrian conflict, namely, the United States–Saudi Arabia–Israel alliance and the Russia–Iran–Syria alliance, this analysis employs neorealist theories of alliance formation—the balance of power and balance of threat theories—as articulated by Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, respectively. The dynamics of these formations in Syria lend more support to Walt’s theory that states balance against threats rather than against power. The complex nature and dynamics of the Syrian war, however, calls for refinements of Walt’s balance of threat theory. Accordingly, the article also explores various refinements of Walt’s theory to better explain future complex civil wars involving highly polarized domestic and external parties.


Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

This chapter defines highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and examines their temporal and spatial evolution. It then describes the role that these organizations can play during civil war development. We argue that highly structured IGOs have an inherent, vested self-interest in the domestic peace and stability of member-states; the institutional structure and substantial resources that allow them both to act quickly and to be able to alter the cost-benefit calculations of both the government and rebel sides; and an enduring preference for member-states’ internal peace and stability. These features of highly structured IGOs satisfy all three conditions for successful civil war prevention identified in Chapter 2. The chapter further elaborates on why and how highly structured IGOs sanction member-states at risk of civil war and develops our main hypothesis: states’ memberships in highly structured IGOs decrease the risk that low-level armed conflicts escalate to full-scale civil wars.


2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakana L. Thomas ◽  
William Reed ◽  
Scott Wolford

AbstractThis article examines why rebel groups make large demands of governments that are inconsistent with their fighting capacity, especially when such demands are almost always rejected. We show that making large demands, even if ultimately rejected by the government, makes sense for rebels who face a credibility dilemma. Such a dilemma is most likely to arise when militarily weak rebel groups face governments of uncertain strength and can commit to fight credibly only when they believe the government is also weak. This results in a counterintuitive set of strategic incentives for weak rebels, who choose their demands to ensure that they are rejected even when the government is weak. Thus, to make their threat to fight credible, weak rebels make large demands that, when rejected, result in inefficient fighting. Since most civil wars are characterized by weak rebels bargaining with much stronger governments, it is important to understand how this particular feature of civil war shapes intrawar negotiations between the rebels and the government. We develop a model of bargaining between a government and rebel group and evaluate its implications using historical data on civil conflict in Africa from 1989 to 2010. The results suggest that the tendency for the government to be significantly stronger than rebels induces rebel groups to make unrealistically large demands.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirssa Cline Ryckman

Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.


Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

Two low-level armed conflicts, Indonesia’s East Timor and Ivory Coast’s post-2010 election crises, provide detailed qualitative evidence of highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) engaging in effective civil warpreventing activities in member-states. Highly structured IGOs threatened and sanctioned each of these states and offered (long-term) benefits conditional on successful crisis resolution. The governments were aware of and responded to these IGOs’ concerns, as did the rebels in these respective cases. The early stages of the conflict in Syria in 2011 provide a counterpoint. With Syria’s limited engagement in only few highly structured IGOs, the Syrian government ignored international calls for peace. And, without highly structured IGOs’ counterweight to curtail the government, the rebels saw little reason to stop their armed resistance. The result was a brutal and deadly civil war that continues today.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gema Alcaraz-Mármol ◽  
Jorge Soto-Almela

AbstractThe dehumanization of migrants and refugees in the media has been the object of numerous critical discourse analyses and metaphor-based studies which have primarily dealt with English written news articles. This paper, however, addresses the dehumanizing language which is used to refer to refugees in a 1.8-million-word corpus of Spanish news articles collected from the digital libraries of El Mundo and El País, the two most widely read Spanish newspapers. Our research particularly aims to explore how the dehumanization of the lemma refugiado is constructed through the identification of semantic preferences. It is concerned with synchronic and diachronic aspects, offering results on the evolution of refugees’ dehumanization from 2010 to 2016. The dehumanizing collocates are determined via a corpus-based analysis, followed by a detailed manual analysis conducted in order to label the different collocates of refugiado semantically and classify them into more specific semantic subsets. The results show that the lemma refugiado usually collocates with dehumanizing words that express, by frequency order, quantification, out-of-control phenomenon, objectification, and economic burden. The analysis also demonstrates that the collocates corresponding to these four semantic subsets are unusually frequent in the 2015–16 period, giving rise to seasonal collocates strongly related to the Syrian civil war and other Middle-East armed conflicts.


Author(s):  
Jun Koga Sudduth

Political leaders face threats to their power from within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’état undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject has focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, more recent scholarship has begun to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities also increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began.


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