Case Evidence: Conflict Trajectories in Indonesia, Ivory Coast, and Syria

Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

Two low-level armed conflicts, Indonesia’s East Timor and Ivory Coast’s post-2010 election crises, provide detailed qualitative evidence of highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) engaging in effective civil warpreventing activities in member-states. Highly structured IGOs threatened and sanctioned each of these states and offered (long-term) benefits conditional on successful crisis resolution. The governments were aware of and responded to these IGOs’ concerns, as did the rebels in these respective cases. The early stages of the conflict in Syria in 2011 provide a counterpoint. With Syria’s limited engagement in only few highly structured IGOs, the Syrian government ignored international calls for peace. And, without highly structured IGOs’ counterweight to curtail the government, the rebels saw little reason to stop their armed resistance. The result was a brutal and deadly civil war that continues today.

Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

For a systematic, empirical test of this book’s main hypothesis, we develop a research design for a quantitative analysis of low-level armed conflicts. We define these conflicts as the occurrence of politically motivated violence resulting in at least twenty-five battle deaths. The analysis examines whether low-level armed conflict escalated to full-scale civil war and surpassed a threshold of 1,000 casualties. Since World War II, roughly one-third of more than 260 separate low-level armed conflicts have escalated to civil war. Analyzing systematic patterns among these conflicts, we find strong evidence favoring our hypothesis. Countries that belong to a larger number of highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) face a significantly lower risk that emerging low-level armed conflicts on their territories escalate to full-scale civil wars. The impact of a greater number of memberships in highly structured IGOs is substantial, cutting the risk of escalation by more than half.


Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

This chapter defines highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and examines their temporal and spatial evolution. It then describes the role that these organizations can play during civil war development. We argue that highly structured IGOs have an inherent, vested self-interest in the domestic peace and stability of member-states; the institutional structure and substantial resources that allow them both to act quickly and to be able to alter the cost-benefit calculations of both the government and rebel sides; and an enduring preference for member-states’ internal peace and stability. These features of highly structured IGOs satisfy all three conditions for successful civil war prevention identified in Chapter 2. The chapter further elaborates on why and how highly structured IGOs sanction member-states at risk of civil war and develops our main hypothesis: states’ memberships in highly structured IGOs decrease the risk that low-level armed conflicts escalate to full-scale civil wars.


Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

Civil wars are one of the most pressing problems facing the world. Common approaches such as mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping have produced some results in managing ongoing civil wars, but they fall short in preventing civil wars in the first place. This book argues for considering civil wars from a developmental perspective to identify steps to assure that nascent, low-level armed conflicts do not escalate to full-scale civil wars. We show that highly structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs, e.g. the World Bank or IMF) are particularly well positioned to engage in civil war prevention. Such organizations have both an enduring self-interest in member-state peace and stability and potent (economic) tools to incentivize peaceful conflict resolution. The book advances the hypothesis that countries that belong to a larger number of highly structured IGOs face a significantly lower risk that emerging low-level armed conflicts on their territories will escalate to full-scale civil wars. Systematic analyses of over 260 low-level armed conflicts that have occurred around the globe since World War II provide consistent and robust support for this hypothesis. The impact of a greater number of memberships in highly structured IGOs is substantial, cutting the risk of escalation by over one-half. Case evidence from Indonesia’s East Timor conflict, Ivory Coast’s post-2010 election crisis, and from the early stages of the conflict in Syria in 2011 provide additional evidence that memberships in highly structured IGOs are indeed key to understanding why some low-level armed conflicts escalate to civil wars and others do not.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mansoureh Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi

The history and development of land tenure in Iran have been affected by many factors, including climatic conditions, scarcity of water, lack of security, widespread tribalism, and legal and administrative confusion. In addition to limitations in resources, political instability in the premodern period molded systems of land tenure in Iran. Changes of dynasty were frequent and usually followed by the confiscation and redistribution of land. The Qajar dynasty (1788–1925), which came to power after a long period of anarchy and civil war, continued that general pattern. There were three classes of land ownership in Iran in this period: waqfs (religious endowments), arbābī (land owned by large landlords), and khāliṣah (state-owned lands). This last category was composed of lands confiscated by the government as punishment for rebellion or failure to pay taxes. As land was often the only form of wealth landlords had, the threat of government confiscation was an instrument of control as well as a source of revenue for the state. The khāliṣah were usually rented out on long-term leases or were granted as ṭuyul, that is in lieu of services rendered or salaries deferred. The khāliṣah were also in some instances farmed directly by the government. These lands were cultivated by peasants under conditions similar to those of the arbābī lands. They were scattered throughout the country and were also subject to various local and regional variations in agricultural taxes.


Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

After surveying the literature on the causes, consequences, and management of civil wars, we argue that novel ways of examining civil war management are needed. We advocate for a developmental view of civil wars in order to better understand how to prevent the escalation of low-level armed conflict to full-scale civil war. To prevent full-scale civil war, third parties need to (a) respond swiftly, (b) have the will and ability to impose tangible costs on (and offer benefits to) governments and rebels, and (c) remain involved over the long term. Our analysis shows that typical third-party civil war management approaches (mediation, peacekeeping, and intervention) fail to adequately address at least one of these issues. This motivates our argument in favor of focusing on a different type of third party that could arguably play a particularly constructive role in civil war prevention: highly structured intergovernmental organizations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph V Steinert ◽  
Janina I Steinert ◽  
Sabine C Carey

This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since these will likely have diminished after the conflict’s termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts compared to their role in the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disarmament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the government, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counterinsurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan A. Stewart ◽  
Karin E. Kitchens

How do political actors create and institutionalize revolutionary social transformation, and what are the consequences of their efforts? In this paper, we provide a framework for understanding the conditions under which revolutionary social transformation unfolds and becomes institutionalized over time. We argue that a direct consequence of social transformation and the institutionalization thereof, however, is violence against the revolution’s beneficiaries which can likewise endure over the long-term. We test our arguments using historical, county-level data on post-U.S. Civil War Reconstruction and we supply both quantitative and qualitative evidence for our mechanisms. We ultimately demonstrate that social transformation and violence are often causally linked, not mutually exclusive outcomes, thereby expanding our understanding of how social orders are created and maintained.


Author(s):  
Desirée Nilsson ◽  
Isak Svensson

Abstract There is a large research field focusing on the recurrence of civil wars, yet this literature has omitted to seriously consider religious dimensions and ideational features of armed conflicts. To address this gap, we provide the first global study exploring whether, and why, Islamist civil wars—armed conflicts fought over self-proclaimed Islamist aspirations—are more or less likely to recur compared to other conflicts. We argue that civil wars fought over Islamist claims are more likely to relapse because the ideational features of these conflicts increase the uncertainty regarding the capabilities of the warring actors in terms of the extent and nature of transnational support that may be forthcoming, for rebels as well as the government. In line with our argument, we find that Islamist civil wars are significantly less likely to be terminated and more likely to recur once ended. Thus, our results demonstrate that Islamist civil wars represent a particular challenge with regard to the goal of achieving durable peace.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuyang Harriet Logo Mulukwat

The conflict in South Sudan became the only viable violent way of expressing underlying discontentment with the style of governance adopted by the incumbent government and unresolved issues from the 1991 split which occurred when Dr. Riak Machar, one of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (splm/a) leaders at the time, now turned rebel leader, fell out with Dr. John Garang, the chairman of the splm/a. The split, notably referred to as the “Nassir split”, led communities from both the Dinka and Nuer tribes to turn against each other. The referendum, a consequence of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa) between the government in Khartoum, Sudan, and the splm/a, led to an overwhelming vote for secession, later paving way for the subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011. The existing tension took on a violent expression. The article analyses occurrences the splm/a command pursued on a secessionist agenda in the 21 years of armed struggle and the attainment of independence on the 9 July 2011. It further denotes the insurgents’ pursuit of armed confrontation and the government’s response to the belligerents’ actions, while providing a genesis of the belligerence and laws governing non–international armed conflicts.


Author(s):  
H. R. Kleb ◽  
R. L. Zelmer

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Office was established in 1982 to carry out the federal government’s responsibilities for low-level radioactive (LLR) waste management in Canada. In this capacity, the Office operates programs to characterize, delineate, decontaminate and consolidate historic LLR waste for interim and long-term storage. The Office is currently the proponent of the Port Hope Area Initiative; a program directed at the development and implementation of a safe, local long-term management solution for historic LLR waste in the Port Hope area. A legal agreement between the Government of Canada and the host community provides the framework for the implementation of the Port Hope Project. Specifically, the agreement requires that the surface of the long-term LLR waste management facility be “conducive to passive and active recreational uses such as soccer fields and baseball diamonds.” However, there are currently no examples of licensed LLR waste management facilities in Canada that permit recreational use. Such an end use presents challenges with respect to engineering and design, health and safety and landscape planning. This paper presents the cover system design, the environmental effects assessment and the landscape planning processes that were undertaken in support of the recreational end use of the Port Hope long-term LLR waste management facility.


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