Numerical Simulation of Forward Green Supply Chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 722 ◽  
pp. 409-412
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Decision Making Model

The forward green supply chain consisting of the manufacturer and retailer is as the background. The Game Theory is used,and two kinds of green supply chain game models are set up: the Centralized decision-making model, and the Manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model.Then we carry out numerical simulation.We find that (1)With the increase of green level of green products, the market price of green product is increasing, the profit the manufacturer and the retailer are also increasing;(2)The manufacturer and the retailer will benefit from that consumers have strong environment consciousness.So we suggest the manufacturer and the retailer should cooperate to produce higher green level of products.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Financing and pricing strategies of construction supply chain under capital constraint

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Internal Financing ◽  
Decision Making Model

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.

Study on the Cooperation Decision-Making Model in Integrated Green Supply Chain for Industrial Wastes Reusing Considerations

2011 ◽  
Vol 361-363 ◽  
pp. 1397-1401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hai Yan Li ◽  
Bin Dan ◽  
Kai Rao ◽  
Hong Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Main Product ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Industrial Wastes ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Cooperation Scope ◽  
Product Output ◽  
Decision Making Model

Difference from traditional green single supply chain, this paper discusses a multiple supply chains cooperation model with the consideration of production wastes reusing, integrated green supply chain. We establish the uncooperative dynamic game model and the joint decision-making model. The different waste supply and demand quantificational conditions and the output and price strategy of product under the above condition are given. Especially, through comparing the joint decision-making with the independent decision-making, the following are suggested: When waste supply is far less than demand, the cooperation scope of system profit and main product output do not exist; When waste supply is far greater than demand, the cooperation scope of main product output of upstream supply chain is the maximum, and the cooperation scope of system profit is much bigger; When waste supply is roughly matchable to demand, the cooperation scope of system profit and product output of upstream supply chain are the largest.

scholarly journals Incentive Decision on Safety Investment of Supply Chain of Agricultural Products in “Agricultural Super-Docking”

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiqin Tang ◽  
Weimin Tang ◽  
Changsheng Jiang ◽  
Shan Lu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Practical Case ◽  
Safety Issues ◽  
Distributed Decision Making ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Safety Investment ◽  
Decision Making Model ◽  
Distributed Decision

Since the “agriculture super-docking” mode was introduced in China in 2007, remarkable success has been made in reducing the transaction cost and improving the quality safety of agricultural products. However, the quality safety issues of agricultural products still occur frequently because both specialized farmers’ cooperatives and supermarkets have insufficient safety investment. In order to study the necessity, goal, and incentive decision schemes of safety investment in “agriculture super-docking” supply chain, three kinds of models, which include noncooperatives distributed decision-making model, centralized decision-making model, and incentive coordination models led by cooperatives and supermarkets, are, respectively, set up in this paper. Conclusions are drawn as follows: when making the uncooperative decentralized decision, both cooperatives and supermarkets have the moral risks to decrease the safety investment, but appropriate measures can achieve the coordination of the supply chain; when achieving the coordination of supply chain, the two contacts under the guidance of cooperatives and supermarkets are the same, and the schemes of distributing profits are also the same. Moreover, a practical case is given to improve the effectiveness and feasibility of the incentive decision schemes.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategy in a Green Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liyan Wang ◽  
Minghai Ye ◽  
Shanshan Ma ◽  
Yipeng Sha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Optimal Decisions

This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product’s demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members’ decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain’s expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer’s expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient’s effects on the retailer’s expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.

The Research of Supply Chain Based on the Order Agriculture

2014 ◽  
Vol 945-949 ◽  
pp. 3195-3198
Author(s):  
Hai Dong ◽  
Qing Sen Lv
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Decision Making Model

Based on the analysis of the development of agriculture in our country, and the application of supply chain management in agriculture, the centralized decision-making model and the decentralized decision-making model without contract are established for a two-level supply chain made by a farmer and an enterprise processing agricultural products, figuring out that the decentralized decision-making model without contract cannot achieve the optimal decision for the sake of the whole supply chain. Then the order contract is set up, and through the analysis of the decentralized decision based on the order contract we can find that the order contract leads to the output of agricultural products to achieve the optimal supply chain system.

scholarly journals Pricing, Green Degree and Coordination Decisions in a Green Supply Chain with Loss Aversion

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Efficiency Coefficient ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

The consumer environmental awareness promotes green manufacturing and the behavioral preferences of members become prevailing in supply chain management. To promote further development of green supply chains, a two-echelon green supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer is considered, where the manufacturer is loss-averse and the retailer is risk-neutral. We use a Stackelberg game to investigate the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient on retail price, wholesale price, green degree, profits of members, and profit of the green supply chain under the assumption that manufacturer’s reference point of loss aversion is equal to the subgame perfect equilibrium partition. It is shown that, in the centralized decision-making setting (CDS), green degree and profit of the green supply chain are higher than those in the decentralized decision-making setting (DDS), while in the decentralized decision-making setting with a loss-averse manufacturer (DDS-LAM) loss aversion of manufacturer further decreases green degree and profit of green supply chain. It is also found that profits of the manufacturer and the retailer decrease with levels of loss aversion of manufacturer. Furthermore, it is also shown that wholesale price and retail price in the three decision-making settings depend on the green efficiency coefficient. Wholesale price and retail price in DDS-LAM are always the lowest (highest) if the green efficiency coefficient is sufficiently high (low). Finally, executing a greening cost-sharing contract can improve chain members’ profits if the retailer shares an appropriate proportion with the loss-averse manufacturer.

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