scholarly journals Rifiuto delle cure e diritto di morire

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianfranco Iadecola
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Life Support ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Life Support Care ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Moral Freedom ◽  
The Will ◽  
Conflictual Situation

Lo scritto intende sottolineare la difficile problematicità, dal punto di vista legale, del tema del rifiuto di cure salvavita da parte del paziente e del rilievo che una tale volontà (sempre che libera e cosciente) ha per il medico. In tale prospettiva, si dà conto di come, nella questione, interferiscano (ed entrino in contrasto) due interessi fondamentali, entrambi protetti dall’ordinamento, ossia quello della libertà morale della persona e quello della vita, osservandosi come siffatta situazione conflittuale si tragga proprio (anche) dal recente provvedimento giudiziale sulla vicenda “Welby”. Il tribunale di Roma, infatti, dopo aver ampiamente evidenziato la univoca protezione garantita dall’ordinamento giuridico alla libertà di autodeterminazione del malato, non può non registrare la indiscutibile ed assoluta tutela assicurata al bene della vita, in sostanza individuando in essa l’adempimento al riconoscimento della vincolatività, per il medico, di una volontà di cessazione delle cure idonee al mantenimento in vita, espressa dal paziente. Si osserva come, nella prima (reale) disamina specifica del problema (dei limiti di rilevanza della volontà del malato rispetto alla posizione di garanzia del medico) da parte di un giudice nazionale, venga condivisa – di contro alle opinioni dominanti nel dibattito dottrinale – la posizione secondo cui la indisponibilità del bene fondamentale della vita si ponga, anche allo stato normativo attuale, come limite al riconoscimento – del rifiuto consapevole di cure mediche salvavita – quale situazione giuridica soggettiva tutelata, sempre e comunque, dall’ordinamento. ---------- The writing intends to underline the difficult problematic nature, under the legal point of view, of life support care refusal matter by the patient and of the relief that such a will (provided that be free and conscious) has for the physician. In such perspective, it gives an account of how, in the matter, interfere (and enter contrast) two fundamental interests, both protected by the order, i.e. that of person’s moral freedom and that of life and it explains as such conflictual situation concerns really (also) about the recent judicial provision on the “Welby” case. The court of Rome, in fact, later have widely highlighted the univocal protection ensured by the legal system to the patient self-determination freedom, has to take into account the indisputable and absolute tutelage assured to the good life, basically identifying the fulfilment to the recognition of bond, for the physician, of a will of cessation of the cares suitable to the maintenance in life, expressed by the patient. One observes as, in the first (real) close examination of the problem (of the limits of importance of the will of the patient compared to the guarantee position of the doctor) by a national judge, is shared - against to the opinions ruling in the doctrinal debate, the position according to which the unavailability of the fundamental life good places, also according to the current normative state, as limit to the recognition - of the refusal aware of sustaining-life treatments - as subjective juridical situation protected, always and anyway, by the order.

Part I

Good Lives ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 3-124
Author(s):  
Samuel Clark
Keyword(s):  
Literary Criticism ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Ethical Reasoning ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Self Presentation ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Self Knowledge

Part I investigates a wide range of autobiographies, alongside work on the history and literary criticism of autobiography, on narrative, and on the philosophies of the self and of the good life. It works from the point of view of the autobiographer, and considers what she does, what she aims at, and how she achieves her effects, to answer three questions: what is an autobiography? How can we learn about ourselves from reading one? About what subjects does autobiography teach? This part of the book develops, first, an account of autobiography as paradigmatically a narrative artefact in a genre defined by its form: particular diachronic compositional self-reflection. Second, an account of narrative as paradigmatically a generic telling of a connected temporal sequence of particular actions taken by, and particular events which happen to, agents. It defends rationalism about autobiography: autobiography is in itself a distinctive and valuable form of ethical reasoning, and not merely involved in reasoning of other, more familiar kinds. It distinguishes two purposes of autobiography, self-investigation and self-presentation. It identifies five kinds of self-knowledge at which autobiographical self-investigation typically aims—explanation, justification, self-enjoyment, selfhood, and good life—and argues that meaning is not a distinct sixth kind. It then focusses on the book’s two main concerns, selfhood and good life: it sets out the wide range of existing accounts, taxonomies, and tasks for each, and gives an initial characterisation of the self-realization account of the self and its good which is defended in Part II.

Foucault on Freedom and Trust

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 653-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Luxon
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Western Civilization ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Progressive Change ◽  
Ordinary Life ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
Significant Locus ◽  
Christian Understanding ◽  
The Will

Charles Taylor opens the essay “Foucault on Freedom and Truth” with the stark claim: “Foucault disconcerts.” Foucault disconcerts, on Taylor's reading, because he appears to repudiate both freedom and truth. Where other Western thinkers have sought to “[make] ordinary life the significant locus of the issues that distinguish the good life,” the Foucault of Discipline and Punish seems to refuse this Enlightenment valuation. After puzzling alongside Foucault, and the implications of his thought for freedom and truth, Taylor finally queries what drives Foucault to adopt a Nietzschean model of truth and argues to the contrary that we can trust in progressive change from one form of life to another because its politics intuitively derive from our personal discovery of “our sense of ourselves, our identity, of what we are.” These changes entail that “we have already become something. Questions of freedom can arise for us in the transformations we undergo or project.” For Taylor, the link between personal and political discovery is so tight, so intuitive, and such a clear barometer for progress and change, that the insistence on incommensurability, let alone its use to challenge Enlightenment values, simply is perverse. And so Taylor concludes his essay by asking of the late Foucault two questions: “Can we really step outside the identity developed in Western civilization to such a degree that we can repudiate all that comes to us from the Christian understanding of the will?” and “Is the resulting ‘aesthetic of existence’ all that admirable?”

“Ne Quid Nimis.” Kierkegaard and the Virtue of Temperance

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob Compaijen
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Human Existence ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
The Will ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Harsh Critique

AbstractIn this article I argue that-despite Kierkegaard’s seemingly harsh critique of temperance-it plays a crucial role in the ethics he worked out under the pseudonym of Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death and Practice in Christianity. Anti-Climacus, following Socrates in the Philebus, thinks of the good life as a “mixed” life in which the different and opposed dimensions of human existence, peras and apeiron, are in due proportion. In Anti-Climacus’ ethics the process of realizing the “mixed” life does not, contra the Socratic conception, involve reason restricting desire, but, instead, the will (infused with self-knowledge) grounding imagination in the facticity of human existence. It is through this perfectionist process that we are able to imitate Christ, which is how Anti- Climacus ultimately understands the good life. Moreover, I suggest that we could understand this form of temperance as a virtue. In the conclusion I show that Kierkegaard’s seeming critique of temperance is actually a critique of mediocrity

scholarly journals Excluded from the Good Life? An Ethical Approach to Conceptions of Active Ageing

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 44-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larissa Pfaller ◽  
Mark Schweda
Keyword(s):  
Old Age ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Active Ageing ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Social Discrimination ◽  
Ethical Point ◽  
Normative Content ◽  
Blind Spots ◽  
Policy Discourses

Contesting previous deficit-oriented models of ageing by focusing on the resources and potential of older people, concepts of ‘successful’, ‘productive’, and ‘active ageing’ permeate social policy discourses and agendas in ageing societies. They not only represent descriptive categories capturing the changing realities of later phases of life, but also involve positive visions and prescriptive claims regarding old age. However, the evaluative and normative content of these visions and claims is hardly ever explicitly acknowledged, let alone theoretically discussed and justified. Therefore, such conceptions of ‘ageing well’ have been criticised for promoting biased policies that privilege or simply impose particular practices and lifestyles. This appears problematic as it can obstruct or even effectively foreclose equal chances of leading a good life at old age. Against this backdrop, our contribution aims to discuss current conceptions of active ageing from an ethical point of view. Starting from an analysis of policy discourses and their critique, we first examine the moral implications of prominent conceptions of active ageing, focusing on evaluative and normative premises. By employing philosophical approaches, we analyse these premises in light of a eudemonistic ethics of good life at old age and detect fixations, shortcomings, and blind spots. Finally, we discuss consequences for ethically informed active ageing research and policies, highlighting the interrelations between one-sided ideals of ageing well and social discrimination and exclusion.

Liberalism and Meaningfulness

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-224
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Church ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Susan Wolf

The contemporary debate between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists is at an impasse. This paper does not take sides in this long-standing debate, but finds common ground between both groups in the notion of “meaningfulness,” as developed recently by philosopher Susan Wolf and psychologist Roy Baumeister. This notion is distinct from the good life in that meaningfulness describes formal qualities of a good life, but not its basis and substance. Accordingly, I argue, we can expect far less fundamental disagreement about meaningfulness than about the good life, giving perfectionists a good reason to focus on meaningfulness. In addition, I contend that meaningfulness is a necessary condition for the exercise of our liberty, giving political liberals a good reason to embrace it as well. Finding this common ground, both sides would hold that a legitimate function of government is to foster meaningful options for individual self-determination.

Nationalism in Tropical Africa

1954 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 404-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Consciousness ◽  
Tropical Africa ◽  
The Awakening ◽  
The Social ◽  
Active Interest ◽  
Social Anthropologist ◽  
Objective Research

Postwar uprisings and nationalist assertions in Tropical Africa—that part of the continent south of the Sahara and north of the Union—have directed increased attention towards the nature and implications of the awakening of the African to political consciousness. Among scholars this neglected area has long been the preserve of the scientific linguist or of the social anthropologist; only recently have American sociologists, economists, and political scientists developed an active interest in its problems. As a consequence, apart from certain efforts by anthropologists to popularize their findings and insights we have been obliged to rely primarily upon the somewhat contradictory accounts of colonial governments seeking to explain imperial connections, or of African nationalists determined to achieve self-government and the good life of which national self-determination has become the symbol. Thus, we have been placed in the uncomfortable position of having to formulate opinions and policy and to render judgments without sufficient knowledge, or, what could be worse, on the basis of evaluations provided by participants in the nationalist struggle. There is, therefore, a very real need for independent and objective research regarding the character and probable course of African nationalist development.

Religious Liberty and the Rawlsian Idea of Legitimacy: The French Laïcité Project between Comprehensive and Political Liberalisms

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eoin Daly
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Social Goal ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Public Commitment ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Ways Of Life

AbstractKahn has argued that the French Laïcité project has degenerated, in some of its recent incarnations, into an illiberal public commitment to a ‘comprehensive’ doctrine of enlightened or emancipated autonomy. He suggests it can instead be conceived in a Rawlsian sense, a concept of right derived independently of ‘comprehensive’ conceptions of the good—thus, merely an institutional appendage to liberty of conscience, distinct from any deeper social goal. The attempt at separating out ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ secularisms is best viewed through the prism of the headscarved school-goer whom the liberal state deems unfree. Can such a state intervene to ensure the autonomy of its child-citizens with regard to comprehensive doctrines, or is this to impose a conception of the emancipated rational life, freely lived? Is this autonomy of conscience distinguishable from an idea of the good life, a merely ‘political’ guarantee of self-determination—or is this distinction even viable? The figure of the headscarved child-citizen ostensibly challenges the Rawlsian assumption that the state’s claim to neutrality between comprehensive doctrines can transcend or stand outside these doctrines, and represent anything other than an ends-oriented project of liberal emancipation. This arises because, on one view, the state must, in order to guarantee schoolchildren freedom to choose between ways of life, paradoxically first impose such a particular conception, of emancipation or rational autonomy. However, this article suggests that despite its ostensible allure, the dualism of ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ secularisms is not the best lens through which to critique the French Laïcité project.

Part II

Good Lives ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 125-224
Author(s):  
Samuel Clark
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Interesting Part ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Good For ◽  
Self Discovery

Part II works from the point of view of the reader of autobiography, and asks: what should we learn from autobiography? It argues for a lesson about selfhood and the good life, and specifically about the roles of narrative and of self-realization in those targets of human self-knowledge. This investigation addresses four questions: given that autobiographies are narratives, should we learn something from them about the importance of narrative in human life? Could our narration of our lives explain how their parts relate to them as wholes? Could it retrospectively unify them and thereby make them good for us? Could it create self-knowledge by interpretatively making the self? In each case it answers: no. The lesson we should learn here is instead about the centrality of self-realization to selfhood and the good life. To make that case, this part argues for pluralist realism about self-knowledge: autobiographies of self-discovery, martial life, and solitude show that the ‘self’ which is created and known by self-interpretation is, at best, one part of what we can know about ourselves, and not the most interesting part. These modes of self-discovery reveal a self that is unchosen, initially opaque to itself, and seedlike, which could not be a self-interpretation, and whose good is its realization.

A Process Model of Wisdom from Adversity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Ferrari ◽  
Igor Grossmann ◽  
Stephen Grimm ◽  
Julia Staffel
Keyword(s):  
Emotion Regulation ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Adverse Experience ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Daily Stressors ◽  
The Future

How might one measure the wisdom and its gains from adversity? To answer this question, it is essential to define the central terms. Social scientists and philosophers have defined wisdom in a number of ways (Staudinger & Glück, 2011). In the present paper, we will build on the idea that wisdom involves knowledge about how to live well, which includes knowledge of what is more or less important for well being (Grimm, 2015). From this perspective, adversity can mean any situation that is appraised by a person as a challenge to the good life (e.g., trauma, transgressions, daily stressors). Gains in wisdom would involve the learning that emerges through mastering this adversity—learning that may result in a new look on the adverse experience, including lessons for how to cope with similar adversity in the future. This point of view suggests the need for a process-oriented account of emotion regulation (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri & Gross, 2011; Smith & Kirby, 2009) to identify conditions under which one can successfully navigate the adversity.

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