The changing nature of arms control and the role of coercion

2013 ◽  
pp. 245-253
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Keith Krause

This article evaluates the achievements and limitations of the world organization in the field of disarmament. It stresses the role of the UN as part of the efforts to control arms as a way to achieve international peace and security. It also notes specific cases where progress was achieved or not, as well as the more recent efforts to handle the problems of anti-personnel land mines and small arms and light weapons. The article also tries to draw out some of the broader implications for international relations of the UN experience with formal multilateral arms control, among others.


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 262-280
Author(s):  
Ulrich Kühn

The goal of a world free from nuclear weapons is directly related to the issues of international institutions and deterrence. Assuming that it would be possible, first, to move to significantly lower numbers of nuclear weapons and then to zero nuclear weapons, governing institutions would have to be resilient enough to respond in a timely manner and to uphold the bargain. But what factors determine and influence institutional resilience? And what would be the likely role of deterrence? This article first assesses what the general ir narratives tell us about determining factors. It then examines two empirical cases from the realm of arms control institutions (the cfe and the npt treaties) and asks why these agreements are not as effective as intended. The next section discusses three additional factors of influence and identifies a shared interest in overcoming the deterrence principle as a key variable for institutional cooperation and as a factor that continues to influence resilience and effectiveness. The last section presents the conclusions.


1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond A. Zilinskas

This paper has four parts. First, I begin my examination of the aerial surveillance measure by reviewing the work by VEREX on this measure. Second, I discuss aerial surveillance as it relates to UNSCOM's mission in Iraq specifically. Third, I make some general observations about the applicability of this measure to detecting biological facilities and activities. Last, I comment on the utility of this measure for UNSCOM and international biological arms control.


1969 ◽  
Vol 25 (8) ◽  
pp. 23-25
Author(s):  
S. C. Yuter
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 678-708
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic

Th? paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China?s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China?s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China?s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China?s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.


Author(s):  
Andrej Stefanović

The author explores the deterioration and (forthcoming) collapse of the global arms control system, with special consideration given to potential consequences this event would have for the European continent. In this context, and in assessing the significance of the remaining mechanisms for preventing a potential arms race and deepening of conflict in Europe, he draws attention to the OSCE Vienna Document, as a tool which could enable the revival of stability through confidence building in Europe, especially in view of its capacity for adaptation and modernization.


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