On disarmament: the role of conventional arms control in national security strategy

1992 ◽  
Vol 29 (10) ◽  
pp. 29-5933-29-5933
Author(s):  
K. P. Marabyan

The article aims to consider the development and adoption process of one of the most crucial conceptual documents – Armenia’s National Security Strategy. The Armenian vision of internal and external threats of Armenia’s National Security is presented in accordance with the conceptual documents of Armenia. Particularly stressed is the role of the factor of adoption of such type of document as Armenia’s National Security Strategy and the role of the very document in the activity of the state authorities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Gerson

The release of the Barack Obama administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats. Despite general agreement that the United States' nuclear policy and posture was in need of overhaul, there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made. At the core of these debates was the issue of U.S. declaratory policy—the stated role and purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whereas some members of the administration advocated that the United States retain all of the flexibility and options afforded by the policy of calculated ambiguity, others contended that to fulfill President Obama's commitment to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,” the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as no first use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. By not adopting NFU, the NPR missed an important opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. The traditional case for NFU hinges on the argument that the threat of nuclear first use is unnecessary for deterrence. Yet the continued U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first is not only unnecessary but dangerous. Given the size and accuracy of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, and given the variation in the nuclear capabilities of current and potential adversaries, the first-use option risks creating instabilities in a severe crisis that increase the chances of accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate nuclear use. In a future crisis with a nuclear-armed state, the fear—whether real or imagined—that the United States might attempt a disarming nuclear first-strike increases the possibility of nuclear escalation.


Author(s):  
N. P. Gribin

Under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, the President of the United States must submit to Congress each year a report on the national security strategy. This report under the name of “National Security Strategy” is intended to be a comprehensive statement anticipating the worldwide interests, goals and objectives that are deemed crucial to the national security of the United States. The new “National Security Strategy” (December 2017) lays out the strategic vision of the Presidential Administration under Donald Trump about ways and means by which the US seeks to deal with internal and external threats. The authors of the Strategy set themselves the main task of proving that American security is based on the realization that American principles are: “a lasting force for good in the World.”  The authors of the Strategy prioritize the protection of the American way of life and American interests all over the world. In that aspect, they see the main danger from the hostile states and non-states actors who are “trying to acquire different types of weapons”. In addition, the administration is demonstrating concerns about the activity of international terrorist organizations (jihadist), transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels and cybercrime. Different from previous similar documents, Trump’s Strategy makes an evident accent on economic security as an important part of national security. The task in that area is “to rebuild economic strength at home and preserve a fair and reciprocal international system.” In a rather confronting manner, the Strategy assesses the role of China and Russia in the international affairs. It underlines that between the main sets of challengers – “the revisionist powers of China and Russia and the rogue states of Iran and North Korea”, the United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors but will do so from a position of strength. The Strategy pays great attention to restoring military capability of the US. It is stressed that military strength remains a vital component of the competition for influence. In a certain sense, the authors of the Strategy demonstrate a new approach to the role of diplomacy, and especially in regards to the tools of economic diplomacy, intended to protect the US “from abuse by illicit actors”. Pillar four of the Strategy outlines considerations for expanding US influence on a global scale and for supporting friendly partners. As stated in the Strategy, American assistance to developing countries should help promote national interests and vice versa. The US will use all means, including sanctions, to “isolate states and leaders that pose a threat to the American interests.” The Strategy pays much attention to the regional aspect of national security, and, from these positions, the situation in various parts of the world (the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, etc.) is assessed. The authors emphasize that changes in the balance of power at the world level can cause global consequences and threaten American interests and US security. On the contrary, “stability reduces the threats that Americans face at home.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (34) ◽  
pp. 122-144
Author(s):  
Stanisław Zarobny

In the article the author presents the genesis and evolution of the research on strategic culture. He also conducts an analysis of the conditions and factors shaping the Polish strategic culture and the role of the Polish national security strategy in it. Attempts are also made to evaluate the Polish strategic culture, with an emphasis on the perception of the role of military forces in it. The main research problem is as follows: Is strategic culture really present in Poland and what were the conditions for its development? Specific questions to be answered are: What has characterized strategic culture in Poland? What factors have determined the shape of Polish strategic culture? What is its impact on foreign policy and Poland’s security? How are armed forces perceived in Polish strategic culture? The main conclusion is that Poland has its own strategic culture, which has been shaped by historical experience.


1969 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 755-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Kay

This review essay will focus on four central questions which the author believes to be closely related to the problem of progress in the study of international organizations. These questions, narrowed to fit the scope of this essay, are the following: 1) What has been the role of international organizations in the national security strategy of the United States; 2) what has been the impact of the United States in the international organizations of which it is a member; 3) what has been the impact of participation in international organizations on the range of United States choices and methods in the foreign policy area; 4) what impact have changes in the shape of the international political system had upon United States participation in international organizations and upon those organizations' impact on the United States. This analysis will concentrate only on studies relevant to these themes.


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