Competitive Behaviour and Business Innovations in the Forestry Industry: Family Firms and Listed Firms in Comparison

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-151
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Competitive Behaviour ◽  
Forestry Industry

scholarly journals Extract Or Not Extract? The Effect of Familism on Stock Option Plans

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Arena ◽  
Simona Catuogno ◽  
Alessandro Cirillo ◽  
Luca Pennacchio
Keyword(s):  
Family Involvement ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Rent Extraction ◽  
Strike Price ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Market Index ◽  
Managerial Positions

<p>There is an ongoing debate in managerial literature regarding the aim of stock option plans (SOPs). In this paper we analyse whether and to what extent the family involvement in ownership and managerial positions affects the use of SOPs as tools to extract rents. By examining a sample of plans issued by Italian listed firms, we classify the SOPs according to their characteristics (i.e. vesting period, lock-up, strike price, market index) and identify three different clusters namely Rent SOPs, Non-Rent SOPs, Hybrid. After controlling for CEO family, board size, equity owned by minority shareholders, and other firm-specific characteristics, we find that family firms are less likely to adopt SOPs for rent extraction purpose. We also find that SOPs specifically granted to family members are less likely to pursue rent extraction goals. Our findings are robust against different specifications of family firms. This paper offers important theoretical contributions to management research and insightful policy implications for all family owned listed firms.</p>

scholarly journals Family Control And The Value Of Cash Holdings

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Imen Derouiche ◽  
Majdi Hassen
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Firm Resources ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Excess Cash ◽  
Cash Reserves ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings

The present study investigates the effects of family control on the value of corporate cash holdings. Using a large sample of French listed firms, the results show that the value of excess cash reserves is lower in family firms than in other firms, reflecting investors concern about the potential misuse of cash by controlling families. We also find that the value of excess cash is lower when controlling families are involved in management and when they maintain a grip on control, indicating that investors do not expect the efficient use of cash in these firms. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the extent to which excess cash contributes to firm value is lower when dominant shareholders are likely to expropriate firm resources. Overall, family control seems to be a key determinant of cash valuation when ownership is concentrated.

Do Female Directors on Corporate Boards Make a Difference in Family Owned Businesses?

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Sveva Magnanelli ◽  
Luigi Nasta ◽  
Elisa Raoli
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Female Directors ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Gender Quota

ABSTRACT This paper investigates how the presence of female directors on corporate boards impacts the performance of family firms. This study enriches the literature on gender diversity on corporate boards and its effects on firm performance by focusing on a country in which family businesses are dominant. The empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of 165 Italian-listed firms from 2011 to 2016, representing the period during which the mandatory gender quota law was introduced and implemented in Italy. The results show a positive relationship between the presence of women on corporate boards and firm performance, specifically in family owned businesses. These findings lead to the conclusion that female directors do not have a negative impact on firm performance. And, given the domination of family businesses and a mandatory gender quota law in Italy, this study makes a regulatory and performance assessment not previously examined in the literature. JEL Classifications: M1; M12; M48; M21.

scholarly journals Do Political Connections Affect the Conservative Financial Reporting of Family Firms?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5563
Author(s):  
Hsin-Yi Chi ◽  
Tzu-Ching Weng ◽  
Guang-Zheng Chen ◽  
Shu-Ping Chen
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Reporting Incentives ◽  
Final Sample ◽  
The Family ◽  
Governance Practice ◽  
Using Data

This paper investigates the effect of political connections on the association between family firms and conservative financial reporting. While family firms have incentives to reduce agency and litigation-related costs by means of conservative reporting, firms with political connections tend to have opaque financial reporting, which enable them to engage in rent-seeking activities. Using data for Taiwanese listed firms between 1996 and 2012, the final sample observations were 13,877 firm-year observations from a population of 21,393 firm-year observations. We found that political connections weaken the positive relationship between family ownership and conservative financial reporting. This suggests that politically connected family firms make fewer demands for conservative financial reporting. This study contributes to the literature on how political connections affect the family owners’ reporting incentives. Policy makers may consider political connections as an essential factor with respect to establishing governance practice in family firms.

scholarly journals Family Control, Political Connection, and Corporate Green Governance

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7068
Author(s):  
Xiaolin Li ◽  
Weian Li ◽  
Yaowei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Chinese Family ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Social Emotional ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Green Governance ◽  
Governance Practice

This paper firstly introduces green governance into the empirical research of family firms. Due to the fact that family firms have their own particularity in the principal agent and also have a strong desire to preserve social emotional wealth, this paper deeply studies the driving influence of family control on the green governance of family firms, and analyzes the moderating effect based on the political connection of executives. Taking the 2015–2017 Chinese family-listed firms that released social responsibility reports as the research sample, we find that family control contributes to the improvement of corporate green governance in family firms. However, the political connection of the actual controller weakens the effect of family control on the green governance of family firms. In addition, this research is also carried out under different situations, such as at the regional level and individual level. The research helps family firms give full play to their own advantages, guide the green governance practice of family firms, and improve the level of green governance.

scholarly journals Do families shape corporate governance structures?

2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Sacristán Navarro ◽  
Silvia Gómez Ansón
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Firm ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Spanish Family ◽  
Open Question

AbstractThis paper provides empirical evidence of family firm corporate governance structures, by examining a set of corporate governance characteristics of 132 non-financial Spanish listed firms. Results show that family firm boards present differential characteristics and that different patterns of family ownership configurations do not affect family firm corporate governance structures. We find that Spanish family firm boards are smaller than those in non-family firms. Family firm directors own a larger fraction of firm shares and have longer Chairman tenure than non-family firms, and family firms use fewer voluntary board committees – such as nomination and remuneration committees and executive committees. Besides, family firm boards and committees are biased towards insiders. Whether these differential characteristics affect other minority non-family shareholders negatively remains an open question.

scholarly journals Family presence and financial performance in large listed companies in India

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rakesh Pandey ◽  
Dennis Taylor ◽  
Mahesh Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Model ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Family Presence ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Better Than

This study investigates the impacts of family presence and board independence on corporate financial performance in 131 large listed firms from India, an emerging economy dominated by the presence of large business groups having concentrated ownership. Family presence includes the extent of family ownership and appointment of family CEO and family chairperson. Employing a multiple linear regression model, this study first detects a positive relationship between family ownership and financial performance. Second, a negative relationship is found between family CEO and firm performance, indicating that family firms with non-family CEOs perform better than firms having family CEOs. Third, the proportion of Board outsiders ‟ (i.e. independent non-family directors) is found to have no significant relation to financial performance, thus challenging agency theory‟s need for independent monitoring in family firms to enhance performance. These results are interpreted in the context of historical Indian family business practices and modern changes.

The effect of internal controls on financial reporting quality in Iranian family firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 254-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Lari Dashtbayaz ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Toktam Safdel
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Significant Negative Relationship

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between internal controls weakness and financial reporting quality and the effect of family ownership on the mentioned relationship in Iranian listed firms.Design/methodology/approachIn this way, the authors included the number of 139 firms from 2013 to 2017, of which 28 were family firms. The hypotheses are analyzed based on panel data and means comparison.FindingsThe results illustrated that weakness in internal controls has a significant negative relationship with financial reporting quality. In other words, internal controls weakness decreases the quality of financial reporting quality. Moreover, the results showed that being familial does not affect the aforementioned relationship.Originality/valueConsequently, there is no suitable criteria to distinguish family firms and there is a need to take them into serious consideration because very few studies have been conducted focusing on this issue in Iran, as it is considered an argumentative subject to be discussed in the Iranian market.

Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Family Firms

2019 ◽  
pp. 127-153
Author(s):  
Elisabete Vieira ◽  
Mara Madaleno
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Ownership Effect ◽  
And Control

Earnings management and corporate governance relationships are examined for a sample of 49 Portuguese listed firms considering an unbalanced panel for the period 2002-2017, using panel corrected standard errors models and considering the family ownership effect. Empirical findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between corporate board independence and earnings management and that the presence of women on board decreases earnings management practices. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management practices are lower in family firms than in non-family firms. Size, being audited by the Big 4 companies, return on assets, loss, and the existence of an audit committee on board influence positively earnings management, but leverage, age, and ownership control are negatively related to earnings management. Results indicate that further auditing and control is necessary for Portuguese listed companies leading to strict recommendations to be followed by policymakers regarding control of these firms.

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