EBA and the EU sugar market reform

Author(s):  
Michael Brüntrup
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lubos SMUTKA ◽  
Irena BENEŠOVÁ ◽  
Patrik ROVNÝ ◽  
Renata MATYSIK-PEJAS

Sugar is one of the most important elements in human nutrition. The Common Market Organisation for sugar has been a subject of considerable debate since its establishment in 1968. The European agricultural market has been criticized for its heavy regulations and subsidization. The sugar market is one of the most regulated ones; however, this will change radically in 2017 when the current system of production quotas will end. The current EU sugar market changed is structure during the last several decades. The significant number of companies left the market and EU internal sugar market became more concentrated. The aim of this paper is presentation characteristics of sugar market with respect to the supposed market failure – reduction in competition. The analysis also identifies the main drivers and determinants of the EU especially quota sugar market. In relation to paper’s aim the following results are important. The present conditions of the European sugar market have led to market failure when nearly 75 % (10 million tonnes) of the quota is controlled by five multinational companies only. These multinational alliances (especially German and French one) are also taking control over the production capacities of their subsidiaries. In most countries, this causes serious problems as the given quota is controlled by one or two producers only. This is a significant indicator of market imperfection. The quota system cannot overcome the problem of production quotas on the one hand and the demand on the other; furthermore, it also leads to economic inefficiency. The current EU sugar market is under the control of only Sudzucker, Nordzucker, Pfeifer and Langen, Tereos and ABF.


Author(s):  
Ľuboš SMUTKA ◽  
Helena ŘEZBOVÁ ◽  
Patrik ROVNÝ

The European sugar beet quota system is in very high dynamic process in recent years. The number of sugar companies involved in this system has been constantly decreasing. The aim of this paper is to define subjects (companies/alliances), which possess the current production capacities working under the production quotas system. The paper is determining especially the level of beet sugar production quota holder system concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The paper provides the following findings. The European quota holder system is extremely concentrated and it is becoming more and more dominated by fewer players. Sugar quota is distributed among 19 EU-Member States. In this regard, the quota is generous, especially in relation to France, Germany, Poland and United Kingdom. In Finland, Lithuania, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the United Kingdom controlled by two or even one subject (companies, alliances). There is a large discrepancy between political efforts to distribute equitable R 1308/2013-sugar quotas among states and the actual reality of those distributions. While the EU-quota holder system does not indicate an extreme concentration, an analysis according to the headquarters´ location and allocated quotas to owners of production capacities provides the evidence of extreme concentration.


2013 ◽  
pp. 770-777
Author(s):  
Yelto Zimmer

The EU is about to abolish the sugar – and the isoglucose – quota system in 2016/17. Isoglucose made from corn occupies about 50% of the US sweetener market while its market share in the EU caloric sweetener market is less than 5%. Against this background, this paper analyses the economics of isoglucose production in Europe in order to understand its competitiveness vis-à-vis sugar. Key results: (1) Isoglucose will become a rather competitive product. The EU sugar industry will have to give up about 40% of its current processing and profit margin in order to sell sugar at the same price as isoglucose will be traded; (2) Once industrial sugar users move to isoglucose, they will tend to be “hooked-in,” giving the sugar industry a strong incentive to defend its market share; and (3) Since only about 30% of the current sugar market is able to switch to isoglucose, the sugar industry has the option to practice a mixed calculation. In an extreme scenario, the industry may even opt to cross-subsidize sales. Therefore it’s not clear whether investors in isoglucose will be able to gain a major market share in Europe.


Author(s):  
Michał Pietrzak ◽  
Marcin Mucha

In the period 1990–2013 sugar industry in Poland faced numerous legal transformations, shifting from nearly free-market conditions into a strongly regulated sector. Changes of the sugar industry regulations had a significant impact on the structure of the sugar market, companies’ actions and, as a result, on their performance. Accession to the European Union and the reform of the sugar regime conducted from 2006 to 2010 on the initiative of the European Commission involved deep restructuring and modernization of the factories, which caused growth of their productivity. However, prices of sugar in the EU and in Poland are much higher than prices on the world market.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Dong Ju Kim

In the last two decades, privatisation has been slowly progressing in Poland. I examine the case of beet-sugar factories in western Poland, which were privatised between 1995 and 2003. As this process was coming to an end, reform for the European Common Agricultural Policy was implemented and, after Poland joined the European Union, the European sugar market reform started to take shape as a result of a global trade dispute on subsidised sugar prices. I recount the story of sugar factory privatisation and multiple reform processes from the viewpoint of sugar beet farmers, factory managers, and local rural experts from the province of Wielkopolska in western Poland. These accounts will show how sugar market reforms affected the aftermath of privatisation and factory close-downs, and how these experiences have prompted local people to think of being Polish within Europe, but reluctantly European within a global framework of sugar trade.


Subject Recent developments in EU financial markets regulation. Significance EU authorities have conceded that the January 2017 deadline for implementing the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) must be pushed back, probably for a year. The postponement underlines a gap within the EU between tough rhetoric on financial market reform and the institutional ability to translate it into practice. However, EU regulators have made clear that the MiFID II delay will not spill over to slow other reforms -- for example, by moving to resolve a long-running dispute with the United States over derivatives clearing. Impacts Firms' compliance challenges will be formidable and are as yet undefined. The scope of these challenges will depend on formal adoption of the final texts of pending technical standards. The MiFID II delay vindicates concerns expressed by ESMA, and will buttress its authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cinthia Cabral da Costa ◽  
Heloisa Lee Burnquist ◽  
Joaquim José Martins Guilhoto

Purpose – This paper aims to present a critical analysis of special safeguards (SSGs) and a simulation of their effects on Brazilian sugar exports to countries such as the US and the European Union (EU) bloc. Design/methodology/approach – The first stage involved the identification of tariff lines for the EU and the US sugar imports from Brazil between 1995 and 2013. Next, notifications of World Trade Organization about SSGs were examined to identify the years when the measure was applied on the sugar trade by these countries. For the years when SSGs were applied, the values of these additional tariffs were calculated. This information was used, along with price elasticities, to obtain the effects of an increase in Brazilian sugar exports in the absence of SSG and also the overall impact on the Brazilian economy, using its input-output matrix. Findings – Results indicated that the estimated value of the direct, indirect and income effects of SSG tariffs on Brazilian sugar exports to the EU and the US markets through the period 1995 to 2013 could amount to BRL 22 billion in terms of the exporting country GDP. This suggests that this policy can be highly perverse, as it translates into lower domestic production for both, the exporting and the importing countries. This issue is relevant for discussions on the global sugar market, given the facts that it is one of the markets which have been most distorted by protectionism. Originality/value – This issue is relevant for discussions on the global sugar market, given the facts that it is one of the markets which have been most distorted by protectionism.


2006 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Busse ◽  
Franziska Jerosch
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 224-233
Author(s):  
Andrzej Hornowski ◽  
Karolina Pawlak ◽  
Luboš Smutka ◽  
Pavel Kotyza

In Central and Eastern Europe countries, the sugar industry has undergone a number of structural changes in the post-communist era, especially after accession into the EU in 2004, which implemented a sugar market reform in 2006 and then ended the sugar quota system in 2017. From a long-term perspective, EU sugar industry is undergoing a rapid development – increasing productivity, rising concentration as well as changes in market and regulated environments. For the Polish and Czech sugar industry, changes in the industry concentration can be identified by analysing the development of beet areas, quotas, beet yields, revenues and profits of the sugar industry players. This helps to better define the position of the sugar industry in the whole value chain in Poland and in the Czech Republic. It was noted that the position of the Czech sugar factories in the value chain has increased significantly. In Poland, market concentration at the level of sugar factories has remained stable.


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