scholarly journals Reform of the EU Sugar Market

2006 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Busse ◽  
Franziska Jerosch
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lubos SMUTKA ◽  
Irena BENEŠOVÁ ◽  
Patrik ROVNÝ ◽  
Renata MATYSIK-PEJAS

Sugar is one of the most important elements in human nutrition. The Common Market Organisation for sugar has been a subject of considerable debate since its establishment in 1968. The European agricultural market has been criticized for its heavy regulations and subsidization. The sugar market is one of the most regulated ones; however, this will change radically in 2017 when the current system of production quotas will end. The current EU sugar market changed is structure during the last several decades. The significant number of companies left the market and EU internal sugar market became more concentrated. The aim of this paper is presentation characteristics of sugar market with respect to the supposed market failure – reduction in competition. The analysis also identifies the main drivers and determinants of the EU especially quota sugar market. In relation to paper’s aim the following results are important. The present conditions of the European sugar market have led to market failure when nearly 75 % (10 million tonnes) of the quota is controlled by five multinational companies only. These multinational alliances (especially German and French one) are also taking control over the production capacities of their subsidiaries. In most countries, this causes serious problems as the given quota is controlled by one or two producers only. This is a significant indicator of market imperfection. The quota system cannot overcome the problem of production quotas on the one hand and the demand on the other; furthermore, it also leads to economic inefficiency. The current EU sugar market is under the control of only Sudzucker, Nordzucker, Pfeifer and Langen, Tereos and ABF.


Author(s):  
Ľuboš SMUTKA ◽  
Helena ŘEZBOVÁ ◽  
Patrik ROVNÝ

The European sugar beet quota system is in very high dynamic process in recent years. The number of sugar companies involved in this system has been constantly decreasing. The aim of this paper is to define subjects (companies/alliances), which possess the current production capacities working under the production quotas system. The paper is determining especially the level of beet sugar production quota holder system concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The paper provides the following findings. The European quota holder system is extremely concentrated and it is becoming more and more dominated by fewer players. Sugar quota is distributed among 19 EU-Member States. In this regard, the quota is generous, especially in relation to France, Germany, Poland and United Kingdom. In Finland, Lithuania, Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the United Kingdom controlled by two or even one subject (companies, alliances). There is a large discrepancy between political efforts to distribute equitable R 1308/2013-sugar quotas among states and the actual reality of those distributions. While the EU-quota holder system does not indicate an extreme concentration, an analysis according to the headquarters´ location and allocated quotas to owners of production capacities provides the evidence of extreme concentration.


2013 ◽  
pp. 770-777
Author(s):  
Yelto Zimmer

The EU is about to abolish the sugar – and the isoglucose – quota system in 2016/17. Isoglucose made from corn occupies about 50% of the US sweetener market while its market share in the EU caloric sweetener market is less than 5%. Against this background, this paper analyses the economics of isoglucose production in Europe in order to understand its competitiveness vis-à-vis sugar. Key results: (1) Isoglucose will become a rather competitive product. The EU sugar industry will have to give up about 40% of its current processing and profit margin in order to sell sugar at the same price as isoglucose will be traded; (2) Once industrial sugar users move to isoglucose, they will tend to be “hooked-in,” giving the sugar industry a strong incentive to defend its market share; and (3) Since only about 30% of the current sugar market is able to switch to isoglucose, the sugar industry has the option to practice a mixed calculation. In an extreme scenario, the industry may even opt to cross-subsidize sales. Therefore it’s not clear whether investors in isoglucose will be able to gain a major market share in Europe.


Author(s):  
Michał Pietrzak ◽  
Marcin Mucha

In the period 1990–2013 sugar industry in Poland faced numerous legal transformations, shifting from nearly free-market conditions into a strongly regulated sector. Changes of the sugar industry regulations had a significant impact on the structure of the sugar market, companies’ actions and, as a result, on their performance. Accession to the European Union and the reform of the sugar regime conducted from 2006 to 2010 on the initiative of the European Commission involved deep restructuring and modernization of the factories, which caused growth of their productivity. However, prices of sugar in the EU and in Poland are much higher than prices on the world market.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cinthia Cabral da Costa ◽  
Heloisa Lee Burnquist ◽  
Joaquim José Martins Guilhoto

Purpose – This paper aims to present a critical analysis of special safeguards (SSGs) and a simulation of their effects on Brazilian sugar exports to countries such as the US and the European Union (EU) bloc. Design/methodology/approach – The first stage involved the identification of tariff lines for the EU and the US sugar imports from Brazil between 1995 and 2013. Next, notifications of World Trade Organization about SSGs were examined to identify the years when the measure was applied on the sugar trade by these countries. For the years when SSGs were applied, the values of these additional tariffs were calculated. This information was used, along with price elasticities, to obtain the effects of an increase in Brazilian sugar exports in the absence of SSG and also the overall impact on the Brazilian economy, using its input-output matrix. Findings – Results indicated that the estimated value of the direct, indirect and income effects of SSG tariffs on Brazilian sugar exports to the EU and the US markets through the period 1995 to 2013 could amount to BRL 22 billion in terms of the exporting country GDP. This suggests that this policy can be highly perverse, as it translates into lower domestic production for both, the exporting and the importing countries. This issue is relevant for discussions on the global sugar market, given the facts that it is one of the markets which have been most distorted by protectionism. Originality/value – This issue is relevant for discussions on the global sugar market, given the facts that it is one of the markets which have been most distorted by protectionism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 224-233
Author(s):  
Andrzej Hornowski ◽  
Karolina Pawlak ◽  
Luboš Smutka ◽  
Pavel Kotyza

In Central and Eastern Europe countries, the sugar industry has undergone a number of structural changes in the post-communist era, especially after accession into the EU in 2004, which implemented a sugar market reform in 2006 and then ended the sugar quota system in 2017. From a long-term perspective, EU sugar industry is undergoing a rapid development – increasing productivity, rising concentration as well as changes in market and regulated environments. For the Polish and Czech sugar industry, changes in the industry concentration can be identified by analysing the development of beet areas, quotas, beet yields, revenues and profits of the sugar industry players. This helps to better define the position of the sugar industry in the whole value chain in Poland and in the Czech Republic. It was noted that the position of the Czech sugar factories in the value chain has increased significantly. In Poland, market concentration at the level of sugar factories has remained stable.


2010 ◽  
pp. 29-36
Author(s):  
Stephan Nolte ◽  
Harald Grethe

The article reviews the developments on the sugar market in 2009. After the introduction, it starts with an overview of production and consumption in all world regions. Production shortfalls in major producing countries led to an increase of the world market price to a 28 year high. For the current season, a further deficit is expected. The next chapter informs about developments on the EU market, where the implementation phase of the 2006 reform ended and a new regulation for sugar imports from ACP countries entered into force. The last chapter discusses model based forecasts of the world sugar market over the coming decade and determining factors of the medium term development of production and consumption of sugar.


2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (No. 11) ◽  
pp. 502-508
Author(s):  
M. Božík ◽  
T. Izakovič

A full liberalisation of the sugar market is hardly acceptable for Slovakia, because it would significantly affect not only the economic performance and employment across different sectors, but also their production structures, particularly in the farming-intensive regions. We nonetheless believe that the reform is necessary as the sugar sector remains the last unreformed CAP sector in the EU, which puts it in a better position vis-ŕ-vis other producers and farms. On the other hand, the justified claims of producers for the compensation of losses, similarly as the claims laid during the 1992 CAP reform, would disrupt the EAGGF budgetary framework through 2013, because only the claims of Slovak sugar beet producers would amount to some € 200 million during 2010–2015. We believe that the solution and consensus lies in the combination of reforms based on the scenarios of fixed quotas and falling prices, and/or the application of the “Midway situation” after 2011. The alternative setting of quotas, based the administratively assessed production efficiency levels for the individual EU countries, would also be unacceptable for Slovakia. In the recent past, the volume of investments in the Slovak sugar industry has been considerable and the most viable sugar refineries have already emerged from the selection process. The situation in the sugar beet sector is similar and the results of the “Fall in Prices” scenario until 2011 are largely similar to the situation before the accession to the EU.


Author(s):  
Ellen Huan-Niemi ◽  
Leena Kerkelä

The ongoing trade negotiations, unilateral trade concessions and obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) are pushing the EU sugar regime to undertake reforms. These reforms will alter the positions of developing countries in the global sugar markets. Gradual changes within the tariff rate quotas in the EU sugar regime would have a very marginal impact on the flow of sugar exports to the EU and world sugar markets as well. The simulation results showed that the scheduled changes in tariff rate quotas and transition period are stalling the impacts of tariff liberalisation granted by the Everything But Arms (EBA) concession. Small concessions will not threaten the EU internal market, but total liberalisation of sugar imports from the least developed countries (LDCs) will be a major threat to the EU sugar regime. Conversely, the EU would gain from the liberalisation scenarios in welfare terms due to cheaper imports of sugar. The current regime limits sugar imports from all developing countries or some efficient producers, if the cost data is a right estimate of the potential supply response from developing countries. The supply responses, which strongly affect the outcomes, are dependent on both the nature of substitution for sugar as well as on the efficiency of sugar production in different countries. The LDCs would be the major winners under the EBA concession supported by the unchanged EU sugar regime, but if the current regime is entirely liberalised, much of the gains are diluted due to the deterioration in the terms of trade and a few efficient sugar producers would be the winners. The multi-region and multi-sector general equilibrium framework (GTAP model) is used for this analysis.The full liberalisation of the EU sugar regime and the abolition of the preferential treatment in the EU sugar regime would change the position of the countries as winners or losers. The assumptions on the production and export possibilities of the sugar producing countries and the homogenous nature of sugar would create more losers than winners. For some of the losers, the loss of sugar exports could seriously damage their fragile economy. Therefore, the abolition or loss of preferential treatment is an important issue and hotly debated around the world.Trade preferences have the potential of helping developing countries to promote self-sustained economic development and can substitute transfers in the form of direct financial assistance from developed countries to poor developing countries. The EU has maintained this development perspective by granting preferential access to the highly protected and subsidised EU sugar market with prices significantly above the world market prices. In the short run, any sudden changes in the EU regime and trade policies may cause severe problems for the poor currently employed in the export-oriented sugar industry of the developing countries. Compensation is needed for these affected people because of the adjustment costs due to the changes in trade policies. In the long run, the sustainable export performance and economic development based on the comparative advantage of the developing countries should be the final objective. Though, the livelihood of the poor must be protected against sudden changes in trade policies in the effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
pp. 288-294
Author(s):  
Johannes Paha ◽  
Timon Sautter ◽  
Reinhard Schumacher

AbstractThe sugar industry is a major provider of jobs and income for sugar-exporting countries in Africa. The lower sugar prices that were caused by the recent liberalisation of the EU sugar market may not only jeopardise economic development in those countries, but the reforms also create difficulties for sugar-importing countries in Africa that seek to develop their sugar industries. The article analyses the effects of EU sugar market reforms on three African countries — Nigeria, South Africa and Mozambique — and provides insights into the balancing of the EU sugar policy’s intended effects against their adverse effects on European trade and development policy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document