Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (1929–2003)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Harrison ◽  
Edward Craig
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Ethical Judgment ◽  
Independent Set ◽  
Moral Emotion ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Attribution Of Responsibility ◽  
Scientific Judgment ◽  
The Way

Bernard Williams wrote on the philosophy of mind, especially personal identity, and political philosophy, where his position is staunchly liberal; but the larger and later part of his published work is on ethics. He is hostile to utilitarianism, and also attacks a view of morality associated in particular with Kant: people may only be properly blamed for what they do voluntarily, and what we should do is the same for all of us, and discoverable by reason. By contrast Williams holds that luck has an important role in our evaluation of ourselves and others; in the proper attribution of responsibility the voluntary is less central than the Kantian picture implies. Williams thinks shame a more important moral emotion than blame. Instead of there being an independent set of consistent moral truths, discoverable by reason, how we should live depends on the emotions and desires that we happen to have. These vary between people, and are typically plural and conflicting. Hence for Williams ethical judgment could not describe independent or real values - by contrast with the way in which he thinks that scientific judgment may describe a real independent world.

Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (1929–2003)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Ethical Judgment ◽  
Independent Set ◽  
Moral Emotion ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Attribution Of Responsibility ◽  
Scientific Judgment ◽  
The Way

Bernard Williams wrote on the philosophy of mind, especially personal identity, and political philosophy; but the larger and later part of his published work is on ethics. He is hostile to utilitarianism, and also attacks a view of morality associated in particular with Kant: people may only be properly blamed for what they do voluntarily, and what we should do is the same for all of us, and discoverable by reason. By contrast Williams holds that luck has an important role in our evaluation of ourselves and others; in the proper attribution of responsibility the voluntary is less central than the Kantian picture implies. Williams thinks shame a more important moral emotion than blame. Instead of there being an independent set of consistent moral truths, discoverable by reason, how we should live depends on the emotions and desires that we happen to have. These vary between people, and are typically plural and conflicting. Hence for Williams ethical judgment could not describe independent or real values – by contrast with the way in which he thinks that scientific judgment may describe a real independent world.

Are there dead persons?

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 755-775
Author(s):  
Patrick Stokes
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Vegetative State ◽  
Ethical Judgment ◽  
Unexpected Result ◽  
Ethical Practices ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Permanent Vegetative State ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Dead ◽  
The Way

AbstractSchechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ (PLV) offers an account of personal identity whereby persons are the unified loci of our practical and ethical judgment. PLV also recognises infants and permanent vegetative state patients as being persons. I argue that the way PLV handles these cases yields an unexpected result: the dead also remain persons, contrary to the widely-accepted ‘Termination Thesis.’ Even more surprisingly, this actually counts in PLV’s favor: in light of our social and ethical practices which treat the dead as moral patients, PLV gives a more plausible account of the status of the dead than its rival theories.

J. S. Mill's Political Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 47 (182) ◽  
pp. 334-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hollis
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Way

That freedom involves a power (or right) to choose is a natural idea. But it requires a model of man which English philosophers have usually rejected. It requires an agent equipped with a will, who is faced with genuine alternatives and is, in some sense, autonomous. So it is rejected both by those, like Hobbes, who hold a strong version of determinism and by those, like Hume, who deny the existence of an autonomous self. The will, says Hobbes, is simply ‘the last appetite in deliberating’. A mind, says Hume, is ‘nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations’. The way is then apparently open for a denial that men ever act freely at all and so for a thoroughly deterministic basis for the social sciences. But this is not the usual conclusion. Hobbes and Hume both agree that there is no conflict between freedom and determinism, once ‘freeedom’ is properly understood. A man is free when he can get what he wants. As Hobbes puts it, ‘liberty is the absence of all impediments to action which are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent’. In other words freedom does not involve choice but consists instead in the power to satisfy desire.

Systematicity and Normative Justification

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Unique Form ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Normative Justification ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines systematicity as a form of normative justification. Thompson’s contention is that the Hegelian commitment to fundamental presuppositionlessness and hence to methodological immanence, from which his distinctive conception of systematicity flows, is at the core of the unique form of normative justification that he employs in his political philosophy and that this is the only form of such justification that can successfully meet the skeptic’s challenge. Central to Thompson’s account is the distinction between systematicity and representation and the way in which this frames Hegel’s relationship to the traditional forms of justification and the creation of his own distinctive kind of normative argumentation.

scholarly journals Philosophy as Synchronic History

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
DANIEL STOLJAR
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
The Way

Abstract Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation offered by David Lewis may be modified to bring out the way in which this moral applies to philosophy, and so to defend the Williams thesis. I discuss in detail the consequences of the thesis for the issue of philosophical progress and note also several further implications: for the larger context of contemporary metaphilosophy, for the relation of philosophy to other subjects, and for explaining, or explaining away, the belief that success in philosophy requires a field-specific ability or brilliance.

scholarly journals Language Acquisition in the Light of Rationalist Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Language

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-315
Author(s):  
Halina Święczkowska ◽  
Beata Piecychna
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
17Th Century ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Speech Acquisition ◽  
The Way

Abstract The present study deals with the problem of the acquisition of language in children in the light of rationalist philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. The main objective of the paper is to present the way Gerauld de Cordemoy’s views on the nature of language, including its socio-linguistic aspects, and on the process of speech acquisition in children are reflected in contemporary writings on how people communicate with each other. Reflections on 17th-century rationalist philosophy of mind and the latest research conducted within the field of cognitive abilities of human beings indicate that between those two spheres many similarities could be discerned in terms of particular stages of the development of speech and its physical aspects.

Feminism

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy J. Hirschmann
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
History Of ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Opening Up ◽  
The Way

The topic of feminism within the history of political philosophy and political theory might seem to be quite ambiguous. Feminists interested in the history of political philosophy did not urge the abandonment of the canon at all, but were instead protesting the way in which political philosophy was studied. They thus advocated “opening up” the canon, rather than its abolishment. There have been at least five ways in which this “opening” of the canon has been developed by feminists in the history of political philosophy. All of them do not only demonstrate that the history of political philosophy is important to feminism; they also demonstrate that feminism is important to the history of political philosophy. A two-tiered structure of freedom, with some conceptualizations of freedom designated for men and the wealthy, and other conceptualizations designated for laborers and women, shows that class and gender were important dimensions to be explored when examining the history of political philosophy. One way in which feminism has opened up the canon is its relevance to contemporary politics.

scholarly journals Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views Revisited

Disputatio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (52) ◽  
pp. 9-22
Author(s):  
Harold Noonan
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Clear Sense ◽  
Reasonable Possibility ◽  
Time Fall ◽  
Recent Account ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

Abstract Eric Olson has argued, startlingly, that no coherent account can be giv- en of the distinction made in the personal identity literature between ‘complex views’ and ‘simple views’. ‘We tell our students,’ he writes, ‘that accounts of personal identity over time fall into [these] two broad categories’. But ‘it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed’. I argue, first, that, for all Olson has said, a recent account by Noonan provides the coherent characterization he claims impossible. If so we have not been wrong all along in the way he says in what we have been telling our students. I then give an account of the distinction between the reductionist and non-reductionist positions which makes it differ- ent from the complex/simple distinction. The aim is to make clear sense of the notion of a not simple but non-reductionist position — which seems an eminently reasonable possibility and something it may also be useful to tell our students about.

Rawls, Reciprocity and the Barely Reasonable

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Systematic Investigation ◽  
Political Cooperation ◽  
The Way

The concept of the reasonable plays an important role in Rawls's political philosophy, but there has been little systematic investigation of this concept or of the way Rawls employs it. This article distinguishes several different forms of reasonableness and uses them to explore Rawls's political liberalism. The discussion focuses on the idea, found especially in the most recent versions of this theory, of a family of liberal conceptions of justice each of which is regarded by everyone in a polity as reasonable, even if only barely so. The idea of such a family is central to Rawls's notion of reciprocity and the view of political cooperation associated with it. This article questions whether the concept of the reasonable can play the role that Rawls intends.

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