Kantian ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Onora O’Neill
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Reasoning About Action ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
The Relationship

Kantian ethics originates in the ethical writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), which remain the most influential attempt to vindicate universal ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings without presupposing theological claims or a metaphysical conception of the good. Kant’s systematic, critical philosophy centres on an account of reasoning about action, which he uses to justify principles of duty and virtue, a liberal and republican conception of justice with cosmopolitan scope, and an account of the relationship between morality and hope. Numerous contemporary writers also advance views of ethics which they, and their critics, think of as Kantian. However, some contemporary work is remote from Kant’s philosophy on fundamental matters such as human freedom and reasoning about action. It converges with Kant’s ethics in claiming that we lack a substantive account of the good (so that teleological or consequentialist ethics are impossible), in taking a strong view of the equality of moral agents and the importance of universal principles of duty which spell out what it is to respect them, and in stressing an account of justice and rights with cosmopolitan scope. Both Kant’s ethics and contemporary Kantian ethics have been widely criticized for preoccupation with rules and duties, and for lack of concern with virtues, happiness or personal relationships. However, these criticisms may apply more to recent Kantian ethics than to Kant’s own ethics.

Kantian ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Onora O’Neill ◽  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Reasoning About Action ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
The Relationship

Kantian ethics originates in the ethical writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), which remain the most influential attempt to vindicate universal ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings without relying on theological claims or a metaphysical conception of the good. Kant’s systematic, critical philosophy centres on an account of reasoning about action, that is practical reasoning, which he uses to derive principles of duty and virtue, a liberal and republican conception of justice with cosmopolitan scope, and an account of the relationship between morality and hope. Numerous contemporary writers also advance views of ethics which they, and their critics, think of as Kantian. However, some contemporary work is remote from Kant’s philosophy on fundamental matters such as human freedom and practical reason. It converges with Kant’s ethics in claiming that we lack a substantive account of the good (so that teleological or consequentialist ethics are impossible), in taking a strong view of the fundamental equality of moral agents and the importance of universal principles of duty which spell out what it is to respect them, and in stressing an account of justice and rights with cosmopolitan scope. Both Kant’s ethics and contemporary Kantian ethics have been widely criticized for preoccupation with rules and duties, and for lack of concern with virtues, happiness or personal relationships. However, these criticisms may apply more to certain strands within modern Kantian ethics than to Kant’s own ethics.

Religion and Toleration from the Enlightenment to the Post-Secular Era

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Forst
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Fundamental Question ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Pierre Bayle ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter addresses the classical question of the relationship between enlightenment and religion. In doing so, the chapter compares Jürgen Habermas's thought to that of Pierre Bayle and Immanuel Kant. For, although Habermas undoubtedly stands in a tradition founded by Bayle and Kant, he develops a number of important orientations within this tradition and has changed his position in his recent work. The chapter studies this change to understand Habermas's position better. It also draws attention to a fundamental question raised by the modern world: what common ground can human reason establish in the practical and theoretical domain between human beings who are divided by profoundly different religious (including antireligious) views?

scholarly journals Framing Humanity by Framing Nature: John Maxwell Coetzee's Disgrace in the Context of Kant's Theory of Morality // Encuadrar a la humanidad encuadrando a la naturaleza: Desgracia de Coetzee en el contexto de la teoría moral de Kant

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-150
Author(s):  
Kamil Michta
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Third ◽  
Formula Of Humanity ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

The essay discusses the correlation between Immanuel Kant’s ethics, especially his views on human duties toward animals, and John Maxwell Coetzee's literary depiction of man’s struggle to rediscover the meaning of humanity by tending unwanted animal corpses. Hence, it firstly concentrates on the key issues concerning Kant's moral philosophy, placing particular emphasis on the third formula of his categorical imperative, the so-called formula of humanity as an end in itself, and on elucidating the thinker's contention that good treatment of animals, that is, as if they were moral agents, improves in humans the propensity to treat other people well. The essay argues that the manner in which people treat animals, approached from the Kantian perspective, partakes in the duty to improve their own morality and, thus, their humanity. After examining Kant's outlook on animals, the essay discusses Coetzee's 1999 novel Disgrace. In particular it scrutinizes the figure of an aging literature professor, David Lurie, who, having been expelled from his university for sexual abuse, moves to the country. Here he engages in putting down unwanted animals and also in taking personal care for incinerating their bodies with decency and respect. Adopting the perspective of Kantian philosophy, the essay argues that Lurie's concern for animal corpses, despite its apparent pointlessness, can be seen as indicating the renewal of his humanity. In a sense, then, it is nature (unwanted animals and their corpses) that makes Lurie rediscover his humanity. The essay concludes by maintaining that Disgrace, when coupled with Kant's moral theory, is a novel conveying the (Kantian) idea that the manner in which people frame nature, that is, how they relate to it, is formative of the manner in which they frame their own humanity. Resumen   Este ensayo analiza la correlación existente entre la ética de Immanuel Kant, especialmente sus opiniones sobre las obligaciones de los seres humanos hacia los animales, y la descripción literaria que hace John Maxwell Coetzee de la lucha de un hombre por redescubrir el significado de su humanidad ocupándose de cadáveres de animales no deseados. Se centra, por ello, en su primera parte en los temas clave de la filosofía moral de Kant, haciendo especial hincapié en la tercera formulación de su imperativo categórico, es decir, la llamada formulación de la humanidad como un fin en sí misma, y en la elucidación de la controversia kantiana de que el buen trato dado a los animales, o sea, el hecho de tratarlos como si fueran agentes morales, mejora la propensión del ser humano a tratar bien a las demás personas. El ensayo sostiene que la manera en que la gente trata a los animales, examinada desde una perspectiva kantiana, contribuye al deber de mejorar su propia moralidad y, con ello, su humanidad. Tras la parte dedicada al punto de vista kantiano sobre los animales, el ensayo examina la novela Desgracia de Coetzee, publicada en 1999, y, en particular, el personaje de un profesor de literatura cincuentón, David Lurie, quien, tras haber sido expulsado de su universidad por acoso sexual, se traslada al campo donde se dedica a eutanasiar e incinerar con decencia y respeto a animales no deseados. Desde la perspectiva de la filosofía kantiana, el ensayo argumenta que la preocupación de Lurie por los cadáveres de animales, a pesar de su aparente falta de sentido, podría ser considerada como un signo de la renovación de su humanidad. En cierto modo, es la naturaleza (los animales no deseados y sus cadáveres) la que hace redescubrir a Lurie su humanidad. El ensayo concluye sosteniendo que Desgracia, combinada con la teoría moral de Kant, es una novela que transmite la idea (kantiana) de que la forma en que los seres humanos encuadran a la naturaleza, es decir, su forma de relacionarse con ella, configura la manera en que encuadran a su propia humanidad.  

Immanuel Kant: Ethics

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosophies ◽  
The Will ◽  
Kant's Ethics

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.

A Objectividade na Filosofia Moral de Immanuel Kant

1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (13) ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Célia Teixeira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Responsibilities

This paper tries to show that despite the problems surrounding the defence of an objective morality, this is a better alternative than a subjective one. For this I take the moral philosophy of Kant as an example of an objective moral philosophy. I start by spelling out briefly his moral philosophy, then I show the problems he has to face, and finally I defend his standpoint against a subjective one that aims at depriving us from our moral responsibilities as moral agents and human beings.

The Ethics of Human–Robot Interaction and Traditional Moral Theories

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Nyholm
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Human Robot Interaction ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Robot Interaction ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Domains Of Life

The rapid introduction of different kinds of robots and other machines with artificial intelligence into different domains of life raises the question of whether robots can be moral agents and moral patients. In other words, can robots perform moral actions? Can robots be on the receiving end of moral actions? To explore these questions, this chapter relates the new area of the ethics of human–robot interaction to traditional ethical theories such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. These theories were developed with the assumption that the paradigmatic examples of moral agents and moral patients are human beings. As this chapter argues, this creates challenges for anybody who wishes to extend the traditional ethical theories to new questions of whether robots can be moral agents and/or moral patients.

Making Theology Moral

1999 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-327
Author(s):  
D. Stephen Long
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Christian Faith ◽  
Heinrich Heine ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
History Of Religion ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Era

The relationship between theology and ethics has been largely determined in the modern era by the questions Immanuel Kant posed and the answers he gave. This contains a certain irony because in 1786 at Marburg Kant's philosophy was banned on the assumption that it threatened faith and morals. His demolition of the scholastic arguments for the existence of God were thought to be a threat to Christian faith. Many neo-kantians relished this challenge to theology and moved Kantianism in the very direction the orthodox authorities feared. By 1835 Heinrich Heine wrote an essay for French publication entitled, ‘On the history of religion in Germany'. He argued that Robespierre himself was unworthy of comparison with the revolutionary Kant. Robespierre may have lopped off a few royal heads but ‘Kant has stormed heaven, he has put the whole crew to the sword, the Supreme Lord of the world swims unproven in his own blood’. Perhaps Kant's ethics did not go as far as Heine asserted, but it did result in the marginalization of theology from ethics. Ethics was grounded in freedom alone. Theology could be consistent with ethics, but not determinative for it.

Elateres Motiva: From the Good Will to the Good Human Being

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inder Marwah
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Division Of Labour ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Anthropology ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractKant's ethics has long been bedevilled by a peculiar tension. While his practical philosophy describes the moral obligations incumbent on all free, rational beings, Kant also understands moral anthropology as addressing ‘helps and hindrances’ to our moral advancement. How are we to reconcile Kant'sCriticalaccount of a transcendentally free human will with hisdevelopmentalview of anthropology, history and education as assisting in our collective progress towards moral ends? I argue that Kant in fact distinguishes between theobjectivedetermination of moral principles andsubjectiveprocesses of moral acculturation developing human beings’ receptivity to the moral law. By differentiating subjective and objective dimensions of moral agency, I argue (1) that we better interpret the relationship between Kant's transcendental and anthropological accounts as a division of labour between principles of obligation and principles of volition, and so, as complementary rather than contradictory; and (2) that this counters the view of Kant's ethics as overly formalistic by recognizing his ‘empirical ethics’ as attending to the unsystematizable facets of a properly human moral life.

Making Sense of the Relationship of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Ethics

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanine Grenberg
Keyword(s):  
Recent Book ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
General Account ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Moral Feeling ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn this essay, I look at some claims Anne Margaret Baxley makes, in her recent book Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, about the relationship between reason and sensibility in Kant's theory of virtue. I then reflect on tensions I find in these claims as compared to the overall goal of her book: an account of Kant's conception of virtue as autocracy. Ultimately, I argue that interpreters like Baxley (and myself) who want to welcome a more robust role for feeling in Kantian ethics must, in order to achieve our purposes, move beyond the general account of the limits for the role of the moral feeling of respect in the grounding of Kant's ethics which Henry Allison established in his influential Kant's Theory of Freedom.

Justice in and to the Environment: Ethical Uncertainties and Political Practices

1997 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
N P Low ◽  
B J Gleeson
Keyword(s):  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
Environmental Discourse ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
Ethic Of Justice ◽  
Planetary Environment ◽  
The Relationship

As the world moves towards increasing rather than reducing inequality, the question of justice forces itself on to the political agenda. But that agenda is also shaped today by people's growing fears for the future of the planetary environment. In this paper we explore the connection between just distributions of environmental values—justice in the environment—and the just relationship between humanity and nature—justice to the environment. We discuss current uncertainties about ‘justice’ as an ethical category. We conclude that justice cannot be dispensed with. But, in the face of postmodernist critique of ‘totalising discourse’, how can universal principles be reasserted? There is a continuing and healthy debate about ‘human rights’ which is focused upon all human beings on the planet. The debate is about the principles which apply to this population, and not to any culturally circumscribed space. It is in this sense ‘universal’. Turning to the relationship between humanity and nature we ask whether an ethic of justice applies to this relationship. Early green utopias which suggest authoritarian solutions are rejected as politically unsustainable, but institutional forms based on an ecological rather than a purely anthropocentric perspective are required to ensure future survival. We conclude that, in the interests of justice, a global nexus of institutional forms is required which is capable of reconciling the universal with the particular and which embodies a recovery of the progressive elements in social and environmental discourse.

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