Elateres Motiva: From the Good Will to the Good Human Being

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inder Marwah

AbstractKant's ethics has long been bedevilled by a peculiar tension. While his practical philosophy describes the moral obligations incumbent on all free, rational beings, Kant also understands moral anthropology as addressing ‘helps and hindrances’ to our moral advancement. How are we to reconcile Kant'sCriticalaccount of a transcendentally free human will with hisdevelopmentalview of anthropology, history and education as assisting in our collective progress towards moral ends? I argue that Kant in fact distinguishes between theobjectivedetermination of moral principles andsubjectiveprocesses of moral acculturation developing human beings’ receptivity to the moral law. By differentiating subjective and objective dimensions of moral agency, I argue (1) that we better interpret the relationship between Kant's transcendental and anthropological accounts as a division of labour between principles of obligation and principles of volition, and so, as complementary rather than contradictory; and (2) that this counters the view of Kant's ethics as overly formalistic by recognizing his ‘empirical ethics’ as attending to the unsystematizable facets of a properly human moral life.

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40
Author(s):  
Josip Guc

Differentiation of morality and legality is one of the fundamental topoi of Kant?s ethics. However, alongside it is often interpreted in too simple (and also sometimes wrong) manner, this differentiation does not demonstrate the whole complexity of Kant?s understanding of moral correctness of certain types of will determination. Thus the goal of this paper is to point out different kinds of morally relevant actions (which are not limited to morality and legality), and then to explain to which extend each of them can be understood as morally correct. For that purpose we will thoroughly consider the issue of determination of will, and then also some of the problematic interpretations of legality and morality, where as a specific issue arises the one of equating morality with autonomy and legality with heteronomy (especially in domestic philosophical works). The issue of different levels of moral correctness of action will also be examined concerning the phenomenon of moral feeling. Particular attention will be given to the role of the kind of action that refer to having direct inclination toward morally correct action, even though it is not directly determined by the moral law. The analysis of these issues brings us to conclusion that legality is satisfied by an action which is outwardly done in a way it would be done by an autonomously determined will. Considering this, the determination of morality precedes the determination of legality. Other way around can be detected only in the process of education.


Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.


Production Micro-Processes Under high collectivism, determination of the division of labour within the productive unit and specification and management of the actual work pro-cesses were handled by the collectives, apparently in a rather democratic fashion. To some extent the collectives still discharge these functions, although now less through a collective democratic process and more by arrangement and supervision of contracts. How the collectives now arrive at a division of labour (on the basis of which to let contracts) is also an area for further research, although the general thrust of policies on planning and management would suggest a drift towards technocratic rather than participatory criteria and methods. Once the division of labour is determined and workers allocated within it, there are still the problems of managing and supervising the work process. Under high collectivism, this was handled by a combination of monitoring by elected local officials, direct mass participatory political processes (at work point meetings, for example), and continuous monitoring by other peasants working on the same job nearby (whose interest in maintaining certain stan-dards of work derived at least partly from the fact that their incomes depended - via the work point - on the economic performance of the collective as a whole). Now, management and supervision of the labour process is the responsibility of the contracting group or household. The peasants have lost control of the capacity to set work standards and monitor work performance for the collective as a whole; hence they have less control over its economic performance. Yet, if they still receive remuneration in work points, their incomes continue to depend on that performance. In this sense, they have been separated from the capacity to control some of the important forces which determine their livelihood. This is a key contradiction of the specialised and production contracting responsibility systems, which may have had something to do with their relatively rapid demise and the corresponding rise of 'con-tracting in a big way' to a predominant position. One major and still unresolved analytical problem revolves around the question of why Chinese peasants, who made high collectivism work satisfactorily for two decades, could abandon it so rapidly and utterly rather than embracing moderate reforms more fully. This analysis suggests that perhaps they preferred depending mainly on them-selves to a situation in which they depended on their neighbours but could not control or monitor them. Production Macro-Processes The state still plays a major role in agricultural planning. It is unclear whether the relationship between the lowest level of collective organisation - the team - and its superior units, and among its superior units, in the planning process has changed. Within the team, the method of implementing plans passed down from above now takes the form of regulation by contract with peasant producers. The scope of production planning and regulation has also been reduced, and restrictions on engaging in many sorts of sidelines have been lifted, so that the collectives and peasants have greater latitude to determine the nature of their production activities.


Author(s):  
Onora O’Neill

Kantian ethics originates in the ethical writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), which remain the most influential attempt to vindicate universal ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings without presupposing theological claims or a metaphysical conception of the good. Kant’s systematic, critical philosophy centres on an account of reasoning about action, which he uses to justify principles of duty and virtue, a liberal and republican conception of justice with cosmopolitan scope, and an account of the relationship between morality and hope. Numerous contemporary writers also advance views of ethics which they, and their critics, think of as Kantian. However, some contemporary work is remote from Kant’s philosophy on fundamental matters such as human freedom and reasoning about action. It converges with Kant’s ethics in claiming that we lack a substantive account of the good (so that teleological or consequentialist ethics are impossible), in taking a strong view of the equality of moral agents and the importance of universal principles of duty which spell out what it is to respect them, and in stressing an account of justice and rights with cosmopolitan scope. Both Kant’s ethics and contemporary Kantian ethics have been widely criticized for preoccupation with rules and duties, and for lack of concern with virtues, happiness or personal relationships. However, these criticisms may apply more to recent Kantian ethics than to Kant’s own ethics.


Author(s):  
Onora O’Neill ◽  
Jens Timmermann

Kantian ethics originates in the ethical writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), which remain the most influential attempt to vindicate universal ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings without relying on theological claims or a metaphysical conception of the good. Kant’s systematic, critical philosophy centres on an account of reasoning about action, that is practical reasoning, which he uses to derive principles of duty and virtue, a liberal and republican conception of justice with cosmopolitan scope, and an account of the relationship between morality and hope. Numerous contemporary writers also advance views of ethics which they, and their critics, think of as Kantian. However, some contemporary work is remote from Kant’s philosophy on fundamental matters such as human freedom and practical reason. It converges with Kant’s ethics in claiming that we lack a substantive account of the good (so that teleological or consequentialist ethics are impossible), in taking a strong view of the fundamental equality of moral agents and the importance of universal principles of duty which spell out what it is to respect them, and in stressing an account of justice and rights with cosmopolitan scope. Both Kant’s ethics and contemporary Kantian ethics have been widely criticized for preoccupation with rules and duties, and for lack of concern with virtues, happiness or personal relationships. However, these criticisms may apply more to certain strands within modern Kantian ethics than to Kant’s own ethics.


Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This book is a reader’s guide to Kant’s final work in moral philosophy, The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals. The guide has five parts plus a conclusion. Part I, “Background,” includes two chapters: 1. “Life and Work” and 2. “Philosophical Background.” Part II, “General Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals,” covers the introduction to the entire work and includes three chapters: 3. “On the Idea of and Necessity for a Metaphysics of Morals,” 4. “Mental Faculties, the Moral Law, and Human Motivation,” and 5. “Preliminary Concepts and Division of the Metaphysics of Morals.” Part III, “Introduction to The Doctrine of Virtue,” includes four chapters covering Kant’s dedicated introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue: 6. “The Doctrine of Virtue as a Doctrine of Ends,” 7. “General Ends that Are Also Duties,” 8. “Radical Evil and the Nature of Virtue,” and 9. “The Science of Ethics.” Part IV, “The Doctrine of Elements,” is devoted to Kant’s system of duties of virtue that represents his normative ethical theory. It contains six chapters: 10. “Perfect Duties to Oneself as an Animal Being,” 11. “Perfect Duties to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being,” 12. Imperfect Duties to Oneself,” 13. “Duties of Love to Other Human Beings,” 14. “The Vices of Hatred and Disrespect,” and 15. “Friendship.” Part V, “The Doctrine of Methods of Ethics and Conclusion,” includes chapter 16 “Moral Education and Practice.” The book’s conclusion reflects on the significance of The Doctrine of Virtue for understanding Kant’s ethics.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
A Salman Maggalatung

Abstract: The Correlation among Facts, Norms, Moral and Legal Doctrine in Consideration of a Judge's Decision. A judge must be able to explore and understand the legal values ​​that live in the community, maintain their independence, applying legal norms with high moral, ethical and adhere to a code of professional conduct, attention to doctrine and the views of legal experts in making a decision. This research aims to identify and analyze the correlation between facts, norms, moral and legal doctrine in consideration of a judge's decision. In addition to knowing the scope of the relationship between the existing facts, norms should be used as the base, and how much influence a judge moral (law enforcement) in the decision and determination of the law. This study uses a qualitative-analysis-normative juridical and sociological-empirical. Abstrak: Hubungan Antara Fakta, Norma, Moral, dan Doktrin Hukum Dalam Pertimbangan Putusan Hakim. Seorang hakim harus mampu menggali dan memahami nilai-nilai hukum yang hidup dalam masyarakat, menjaga kemandiriannya, menerapkan norma hukum dengan moralitas yang tinggi, mematuhi etika dan kode etik profesi, memperhatikan doktrin dan pandanganpandangan para Ahli hukum dalam pengambilan sebuah putusan. Penulisan bertujuan untuk mengetahui dan menganalisis hubungan antara fakta, norma, moral, dan doktrin hukum dalam pertimbangan sebuah putusan hakim. Ruang lingkup tulisan ini meliputi hubungan antara fakta-fakta yang ada, norma-norma yang patut dijadikan dasar, dan seberapa besar pengaruh moral seorang hakim dalam pengambilan dan penetapan hukum. Metode yang digunakan kualitatifanalisis dengan pendekatan yuridis-normatif dan sosiologis-empiris. DOI: 10.15408/jch.v1i2.1462


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-26
Author(s):  
Ian A. McFarland

Jennifer Herdt argues that Luther’s account of human ethical action implies an absolute passivity before God that both leads to psychological paralysis and fails to appreciate the non-competitive nature of the relationship between divine and human agency. This article argues that neither accusation can be sustained. Not only does Luther’s work lack any evidence of the paralysis Herdt ascribes to him, but Luther’s understanding of the relationship between divine and human action reflects a more theologically persuasive understanding of the distinct modes by which God relates to human beings in creation and redemption than does Herdt’s nature-grace framework. The passivity of the human agent in Luther simply reflects the communicative situation in which Christian moral agency follows on hearing of the gospel, resulting in a model of moral formation in which the focus is on the good of the neighbour rather than one’s own ethical qualities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (9) ◽  
pp. 958-966
Author(s):  
Afreen FAIZA

Background and Objectives: The advent of 2020 was eclipsed by an epidemic crisis of COVID-19. The swift spread of fatal viruses creates paralyzing apprehensions among all human beings and has produced a need to develop a sound psychometric scale to measure anxiety related to COVID-19. Methods: Items for a Corona Virus Anxiety Scale (CVAS) emerged from literature reviews, a SARS fear scale, and qualitative analysis of interviews. After successive item modifications and pilot-testing, the 17-item self-reported CVAS was administered to (N = 256) participants. A sample of (N = 45) individuals was recruited for determination of CVAS construct validity with the Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R). Results: Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) showed 3 factors with 57.46 % variance, Fear of Infection and Death (FOIAD), Social Isolation (SI), and Loss of Control and Helplessness (LOCAH). Item-total correlation values ranged from (r = 0.46 to 0.63, p < 0.01). Overall, CVAS showed a high-value Cronbach alpha reliability (α = 0.896); alpha reliabilities for subscales also lay in acceptable ranges. The relationship between CVAS and IES-R suggests significant and positive correlation values (r = 0.477, **p < 0.01), demonstrating the construct validity of the newly-developed CVAS. Interpretation and Conclusions: CVAS is a reliable and valid self-reporting tool for screening of anxieties about COVID-19 among the general population.


1994 ◽  
Vol 72 (03) ◽  
pp. 426-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
S Kitchen ◽  
I D Walker ◽  
T A L Woods ◽  
F E Preston

SummaryWhen the International Normalised Ratio (INR) is used for control of oral anticoagulant therapy the same result should be obtained irrespective of the laboratory reagent used. However, in the UK National External Quality Assessment Scheme (NEQAS) for Blood Coagulation INRs determined using different reagents have been significantly different.For 18 NEQAS samples Manchester Reagent (MR) was associated with significantly lower INRs than those obtained using Diagen Activated (DA, p = 0.0004) or Instrumentation Laboratory PT-Fib HS (IL, p = 0.0001). Mean INRs for this group were 3.15, 3.61, and 3.65 for MR, DA, and IL respectively. For 61 fresh samples from warfarin-ised patients with INRs of greater than 3.0 the relationship between thromboplastins in respect of INR was similar to that observed for NEQAS data. Thus INRs obtained with MR were significantly lower than with DA or IL (p <0.0001). Mean INRs for this group were 4.01, 4.40, and 4.59 for MR, DA, and IL respectively.We conclude that the differences between INRs measured with the thromboplastins studied here are sufficiently great to influence patient management through warfarin dosage schedules, particularly in the upper therapeutic range of INR. There is clearly a need to address the issues responsible for the observed discrepancies.


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